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Preface
The main souree of inspiration for writing this book is the Research
Group Women's Studies, Department ofPhilosophy, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam ofwhich I have been a member since its founding in 1983.
I selected the philosophicalliterature discussed in this book from among
the texts which we read over the years and many theoretical issuesraised
here emerged out of the discussions we held. Later, the members of the
group were so kind as to discussand comment on the entire manuscript.
Some people had already experienced the earlier rounds of discussions
and I would like to thank thern for their patience and valuable sugges-
tions. My thanks goes out to Trix Bakker, Ymkje de Boer, Erica
Drewes-Wentink, Tine Greidanus, Frederike de Jong, Anna Kant-
Koolma, Marya Mourits-de Haas, Mariëtte Willemsen, and Diet
Zijlstra-Grosheide. I would like to mention especiallyour chairperson,
Atie Brüggemann-Kruijff for her valuable contributions.
I wouidalso like to thank the former head of the philosophy library
of the Vrije Universiteit, the late Marius Bremmer, for his support in
ordering lirerature pertaining to this research. I had told him that I
would mention his name in this book and he was, asalways, enthusiastic.
Above all, I would like ro thank my parents for their loving support.

Introduetion
The point of departure for writing this book is the premise that
philosophers in the past have written on the question of the nature of
women and their role in society and that what they wrote was read by
other philosophers who in turn reacted to the views presented. I am
prepared to admit that the philosophical dialogue on women was never
an extensive part of philosophical systems but, almost without excep-
tion, philosophers did speak about women. As such, this fact need not
be at all surprising. For many philosophers, a view ofwomen was part
and parcel ofa view on human nature and society. Ifwe ask the question
"What is man?" we must consider the nature and significanee of the
male-female distinction. Ifwe want to consider the nature of the social,
political and ethical, we need to concern ourselves with questions
surrounding the spheres of the public and private, the home, familyand
state, the roleswhich people are to have in society. Even questions which
do not at fi:t~t glance seem to concern the male-female distinction, such
as: what is the nature and scope of reason and emotions? the ultimate
nature of reality itself? are connected to male and female by some
philosophers. The masculine and the feminine have been used as
allegorical or symbolical representations ofhuman capacities and aspects
of reality.
In this book, a number of ways in which philosophers speak of
women are discussed. There is a historical line and at the same time
every chapter has its own theme through which another aspect of
speaking about the feminine emerges.
In the first chapter, I argue that the patriarchal system is basic to
western society. Because this system has so much influence on the
perception of the nature and social roles of women, discussions con-
cerning women are usually held in response to the power ofpatriarchy.
First, I show that there are patriarchal theories which go back to the very
beginning ofwestern philosophy, that is, to the Pythagorean school. In
this school, women wrote on their roles as mothers and housewives in
light of Pythagorean philosophical principles. The emphasis in this
chapter is on the ethical demands which the traditional patriarchal
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family structure makes on women, or, more traditionally speaking, on
the "virtues" demanded ofwomen functioning in this structure. In the
second part ofthis chapter, I discuss philosophical theories on the origin
and power of patriarchy.
In the second and third chapters, on Plato and Aristotle, I show that
questions concerning the nature ofwomen were answered by means of
theories on the nature of the human soul. The answers were used to
determine the capacity of individuals to playtheir roles in society. Plato
and Aristotle differ in their views of the nature ofwomen and we shall
see the implications of this for their theories of society.
For the philosophers ofthe patristic and medieval period, the nature
of women was analysed in terms of the philosophical and theological
implications ofthe Bible stories and thus the discourse on women enters
into the realm of the theologieal. Philosophers of this period discussed
the implications for a view on women the story ofAdam and Eve, the
fall into sin, the resulting curses on mankind, the role of Mary in the
history of salvation, the female virtues, the nature of marriage, and the
contributions which women could make to religious life.A contrast will
be sketched between the views of St. Thomas Aquinas, discussed in
chapter four, and those ofChristine de Pizan, whose views are presented
in chapter five.
In the early modern period, with the rise of modern science and the
emphasis on reason as opposed to tradition, the issue was raised as to
the equal access to knowledge for women. In chapter six, the relation-
ship between the development of"the new science" and viewsofwomen
is discussed with reference to Bacon and Descartes. The conclusions
these two thinkers draw are very different: Bacon seesreason and science
as masculine, and nature as feminine, while Descartes supports the
notion of sensus communis, the universal capacity of all people to know
the truth of reality and to think rationally. In this period, in contrast to
the Middle Ages, there is perhaps a hardening of attitudes towards
admitting women to academie pursuits. At the same time, however, the
first steps were taken by women to use their reason and its results in the
publierealm, such as having an academie education or literary employ-
ment.
In the seventh chapter, I show how in the 18th century, Rousseau,
Kant and Wollstonecraft concerned themselves with theories on femi-
ninity by attempting to describe "natural" characteristics specific to
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women. The description of such characteristics was meant to define a
woman's role in a male-female relationship and in culture as a whoie.
Ir was used to try to settle the question ofwhat type ofeducation would
be suitable for women to prepare them for marriage (Rousseau and
Kant) or life in general (Wollstonecraft), In this discussion, the nature-
culture issue plays a prominent role. Can one speak about an "authentic"
female nature? What influence does culture have on it? What are the
ideal cultural norms within which feminine nature can develop to the
fullest? We shall see that Wollstonecraft draws conclusions very different
from those drawn by Rousseau and Kant.
In the 19th century, a mosaic of views on women emerged. In this
period, the feminist movement fought for issues such as the universal
right to education, the vote and an independent legal status for women.
These rights had seemed to be promised but not granted in the wake of
the French Revolution. Philosophers differed in their reactions to the
suffragist movement. Some saw the good sense of the struggle, others,
such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer reacted negatively to something
so "unnatural". In the I9th century debate, the issues concerning the
nature of women and their role in society became more emotionally
charged than ever, appearing as they did within the context ofa struggle
for liberation. It is in this light that I shall discuss the views ofNietzsche
and Schopenhauer in chapter eight.
In the first half of the zoth century, it seemed as though not much
had changed in philosophy as a result of the I9th century women's
liberation movement. A number ofphilosophers such as Buytendijk and
de Beauvoir did indeed take up the philosophical issue of the nature of
women and their role in society, but many of those who are considered
to be the most prominent philosophers of those years took to a strategy
of ignoring women's issues. A long list of such philosophers could be
compiled. Ir would include one of the most important philosophers of
this century, Martin Heidegger. Jacques Derrida, in his book Spurs,
describes the way in which Heidegger responds to Nietzsche's idea of
"wornan as truth":
Heidegger quotes this sequence, even respects its underlining, but
in his commentary (as seems to be generally the case) he skirts the
woman, he abandons her there. Much as one might skip over a
sensible image in a philosophy book or tear out an illustrated leafor
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allegorical representation in a more serious volume, Heidegger
analyses all the elements ofNietzsche's text with the sole exception
of the idea's becoming-female (sie wird Weib). In such a way does
one permit oneself to see without reading, to read without seeing.I
If there really are philosophers in our century who "read without
seeing", this has fortunately proven to be more than compensated by
women themselves. The second feminist wave, a movement generally
dated as beginning in the 1960's, took up anew and expanded on the
women's issues first raised in the 19th century. The results of this
movement have become increasingly apparent in our society. One
consequence of this influence is the volume of philosophical and other
literature on women. More works concerning women have been written
in our century than have ever appeared in the past. In philosophy, the
number ofstudies appearing is overwhelming and makes any conscien-
tious author ponder the advisability of adding more to this massive
outpouring.
The feminist contribution to zoth century philosophicalliterature
has, I think, two notabie characteristics. Firstly, the literature is moti-
vaeed by the desire for the liberation ofwomen. In this sense, personal
and ethical commitments and goals underlywomen's studies in philoso-
phy. Secondly, it is new, becausewomen, thanks to their accessto higher
education, have now read the philosophers of the past for themselves
and react to them from out of their own experience of being women.
Women reacted to the male philosophers who wrote about them in
previous centuries, but never has the response been so scholarly and
widespread. In the final chapter of this book, on Luce Irigaray, the
emphasis will be on the struggle ofwomen for recognition, or to use a
more abstract philosophical phrase, on thinking from out of female
subjectivity. By this I mean the desire ofwomen to have their own voice,
perspective, and critique of life and philosophy, to express their own
identity as women and to deelare their right to be what they want to be,
to say what they want to say, beyond domination.
In constructing this book, I have not limited myself to a history of
views of women presented by male philosophers but I have tried to
present a dialogue between the two genders. The book starts with the
viewsofPythagorean women. Christine de Pizan's critique ofthe sexism
of the later Middle Ages is discussed. The overview of classical modern
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thought includes the reaction of Mary Wollstonecraft to what she
considers a lack of rationality in the view of women by men who
considered reason to be the highest ideal. The book ends with Luce
Irigaray's rethinking offemale subjectivity. In this way, some skirmishes
in the battle of the sexes are described in a historical context. Perhaps
one will react to this announcement by thinking that this book will not
present a dialogue but a free-for-all.And perhaps the suspicion will arise
that the author, being female, is setting the odds. But that is not really
the intention.
Much philosophical and other dialogue on male and female has, I
think, caused misunderstandings between the sexes. Some male philoso-
phers are nervous or even feel threatened about being confronted with
historical research which they fear will only bring to the surface back-
ward ideas which discredit philosophy and philosophers. Others con-
sider this type of research to be the hobby of their female colleagues,
not particularly worth taking note of or to be seen as academically
respectable. Still others think of work in women's studies as monopo-
lised by radical feminists who, because they are doing ideologically
coloured work, are not to be taken seriously.
On rherother side of the gender gap, some feminist writers have
given the field a threatening aura by venting their anger and frustration
at ideas they consider to be unacceptable. Such emotion can lead to the
breathless announcement ofthe discoveryofnew horrors, the one-sided
analysis of philosophical theories, or to a lack of appreciation for
historical contexts. There is no lack of emotion in the area ofwomeri' s
studies and emotion often serves to cloud what should ultimately be an
open discussion of the issues involved.
Therefore, this book is meant as an invitation to the reader to debate
and weigh different views. Within the area of women's studies, philo-
sophical questions are raised as to human nature, values and norms, and
it seems to me that it is both inadvisable and impossible to lay down
absolute criteria for these matters or to come to definitive conclusions
concerning them. I doubt whether any one perspective on these ques-
tions is acceptable or correct for all people at all times. History warns
us that the views on women in the history of philosophy and even in
the relatively short period of the past twenty years have continually
shifted due to all sorts of factors: religious, cultural, inrellectual, social,
and economie. But even though views change in the course of time, it
XIV Introduetion
is also the philosophical task to rule out ideas which go against funda-
mental ethical notions of how we should speak of and deal with our
fellow human beings.
These considerations make the area of women's studies a delicate
one. There is the obligation to do justice to the history of philosophy
and to answer the traditional question ofwhat truths can still be learned
from that history. But there is also the obligation to present an analysis
and critique ofviews which seem to violate fundamental principles and
values concerning right and wrong. As an author, I can only give
information and try to set a tone, for better or worse. I think this book
will only be meaningful ifpeople react to what is being said and decide
for themselves how they wish to think about the issues being raised.
Finally, I would also like to make some short remarks on the two
terms, image and history, which appear in the subtitle ofthis book. The
concept of "image" is an important human notion in the sense that
human beings are not simply what they are. People develop images of
themselves and of other people; images are created in society; art,
science, literature, and philosophy are areas in which images of people
play a role. Images serve to tell people who theyare and what they should
be. Very generally speaking, people not only have their own nature or
character, but also the capacity to alter themselves according to an
image, thus creating and re-creating themselves.
An image ofcertain people created by a philosopher can be thought
ofas a "picture", but it is not always clear how weIl that picture reflects
their nature. This is part of the more general philosophical question of
whether or not philosophy is capable ofpresenting a "mirror" ofnature
or reality." T raditionally, philosophers believe that theoretical thought
is seeing with the mind's eye. They believe that when a mirror is flat
and smooth, a true image appears on it. In contemporary discussions,
the question has arisen ofwhether or not philosophy, thought or reason
can be considered to be mirroring reality. Are there perhaps quite
fundamental things wrong with such an idea?
There are two possible answers to this question with respect to the
creation of philosophically or theoretically based images of women.
Firstly, one can argue that the mirrors held up by male philosophers to
women are a apriori unreliable. The contemporary French philosopher
Luce Irigaray places the problem of the male origin and use of the
philosophical concept of the mirror at the center of her discussion of
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images ofmen and women in western thought.' A mirror, Irigaray notes,
reflects the person looking into it and the people looking into mirrors
have mostly been men. In other words, the mirror as thought or
philosophical thought is a product which may be reflecting only itself.
Thus men create an image of women, an image which is a weak
reflection ofthemselves and oftheir own thought, Women are described
as "other" than men, as differing from the norm which they represent.
Irigaray suggests that she would purposefully like to see women under-
mine the traditional idea of the mirror by making themselves into
mirrors, cloudy or curved, concave or convex, thus taking away the
illusion that there is one clear and "neutral" analysis possible ofwomen
on the basis of reason. A concave mirror can reflect light in such a way
that it can burn an object placed in front ofit. Symbolically, it can burn
the person looking into it. A convex mirror distorts the person looking
into it, turning the image into the ridiculous. In this way, the mirror is
turned against the person wanting to look into it, undermining the
whole concept of mirrors and mirroring in the traditional sense. This
can be translated as a call to women to undermine the entire idea of
philosophy as a field in which reason reigns supreme.
Seconelly, one can in principle accept the idea of thought as mirror-
ing reality and try to make the mirrors of philosophers more flat and
smooth by clearing up the distortions which occur in them. Distortions
can occur when there are prejudices in our culture concerning the nature
and capacities of women, prejudices which do not give women a clear
image of themselves, but serve to distort that self-image. Even idealised
images of women can distort their nature and capacities as they and
others see them. On this reading of the task of philosophy, the aim is
not, as in the first example, to undermine a hopelessly prejudiced
rationality but it is to clear up and sweep away prejudices.
However one evaluates the need for and status of mirrors and the
accuracy of images presented to women in our western culture, the fact
remains that the greatest power of an image is not so much that it
describes someone but that it presents women with an ideal for which
they must strive. For human beings, ideals are very compelling concepts
which can (be used to) structure human livesor which can be the trigger
for angry critique or rebellion.
The second term is that ofhistory. A considerable number ofstudies
have been written concerning the history and development of images
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ofwomen in our culture. But why history, and what would be clarified
by asking what the history ofphilosophy saysabout women? One ofthe
most difficult questions which arises when examining the history of
philosophers' theories about women is how to evaluate such theories in
light ofthe culture in which they arose. Repeatedly, the question isasked
in this book what this relationship is. Does philosophical discourse
about women reflect the factual situation in a culture? Are philosophers
on the whoIe eccentrics who present ideas which the majority of their
contemporaries find strange? Do philosophers tend to write about
matters which they disagree with and must we therefore read their
theories on women as the search for ideals? In this book, we shall see
that all these possibilities can occur. It is, however, important to be
careful about drawing conclusions too rapidly on the difficult point of
the relationship between philosophy and culture. It is not the case that
the history ofwestern philosophy can simply be seen as identical to the
history ofwestern culture. On the other hand, a study of the history of
philosophy would lose all interest and meaning if philosophy were not
very closely associated with its cultural context.
The history ofphilosophy is of importance and of interest not only
fol'~~s relationship to culture, but also for itself for its own developments
and changes. Philosophical research also increases our knowledge and
insight into our intellectual heritage as a whoie. A historical study is
guided by the leading intuition that we can learn from the past in our
present situation and in the future. An investigation into the history of
male and female images in philosophy can account for the cccurrence
of similar types of images in contemporary philosophy or culture as a
whole. Here the question can be asked as to whether or not the creation
and development ofimages ofmen and women can be wholly described
as a historical-cultural process or whether it has an a-historical dimen-
sion. I will return to this issue in the conclusion of this book.
Knowledge of the history of philosophy is also a precondition for
the possibility ofideology critique. When looking historically at images
of women, it becomes clear that there are powerful ideologies concer-
ning women. These ideologies in philosophy and culture have up to
now been primarily created by males. Perhaps what is necessary now is
the creation of a "critique of male thought". By looking at the history
of how men spoke about women and the feminine in general, one can
try to analyse characteristics of male thinking. Concerns with history
XVII
can thus vary from a purely historica! interest to a quite fundamental
investigation ofhuman thinking and reasoning processes.
Notes
IJ. Derrida, Spurs/Éperons. Nietzsche's Styles/Les Styles deNietzsche. trans!. by B. Harlow.
Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 85. Derrida gives a detailed
reading of Heidegger's view on gender in "Geschlecht. Différence sexuelle, différence
ontologique" and "La main de Heidegger. (Geschlecht 11)" in: J. Derrida, Psyché.
Inventions de l'autre. Paris, Galilée, 1987, p. 395-451.
2 This issue is discussed at length in R. Rorty, Philosophy and theMirrorofNature. New
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1979.
3 L. Irigaray, Speculum. Ofthe Other Woman. trans!. by Gillian C. Gil!. Ithaca, New
York, Cornell University Press, 1985.

I The Pythagorean School
I Introduetion
I would like to begin this book by focussing on the most primordial
image of male and female which has been repeated throughout history
and which has had an especiallystrong hold on the human imagination.
By this primordial image, I mean seeing women mainly in terms oftheir
domestic roles as daughters, wives, mothers and grandmothers, whose
main souree of self-identification and purpose in life lies in the realm
of reproduetion and the family or the realm of the "natural". Men are
traditionally seen as finding their identity and activities outside the
sphere of the home, in the workforce, warfare, government, the public
interest, and providing for and protecting the family, realms of the
"cultural". The man is seen as returning to the home from out of the
public sphere, and when at home is considered, in legal and personal
terms, the head ofthe household. Such a socialorder, the most pervasive
one on earth, is called patriarchal because the power and status of
women within the home is considered te be lesserthan that ofmen both
inside the home and outside it.
Most if not all images of men and women serve to justify, confirm
or criticise this basic socialorder. This order isalso the point ofdeparture
of most philosophical analyses of women in western society, analyses
which attempt to either confirm or deny the legitimacy ofthe patriarchal
order. In feminist literature and philosophy there is a search for rede-
scriptions of the nature and social roles of women. Examples are the
re-examination of the history of patriarchy; attempts to find evidence
of non-patriarchal cultures or pre-patnarehal matriarchies; the search
for images of women which emphasise the talents and strengths of
women outside ofthe home; callsforwomen to liberate themselves from
their domestic roles in order to realisetheir potential in the public realm.
The patriarchal order is seen asworking with negative images or taboos
in order to strengthen its hold on people, excluding or even demonising
women who do not fit in or who do not wish to fit into it. Feminist
critiques of the patriarchal order thus include attempts to rehabilitate
non-domestic images of women, all the way to those of the woman as
witch or goddess. Feminism maintains that the patriarchal order has
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always "placed" or "identified" women in a manner which is reduction-
istic, hierarchical, and that it denies them of their possibilities and
talents.
In this first chapter, I would like to look at the historical question
ofthe emergence ofpatriarchy from two perspectives. I will first describe
one of the oldest known concepts of a patriarchal order in the history
ofphilosophy in order to show that male-female imagery as we know it
today is not a result, as has sometimes been argued, of the development
of the nuclear family but was already theoretically weIl in place in the
6th century B.C. and may in fact be as old as mankind itself. In the
second part of the chapter, I will consider what some philosophers have
said about the historical emergence of patriarchy: when did it develop?
why did it develop?
2 The Pythagorean Letters and Fragments
The Pythagorean school, founded by Pythagoras in the 6th century B.C.,
is one of the oldest schools of philosophy in the Greek-Western tradi-
tion-Interest has been shown in this school in women's studies because
of two ways in which the Pythagoreans describe women: one on the
metaphysicallevel and the other on the everyday level. Common to both
types ofapproach is the Pythagorean point ofdeparture in a philosophy
which sees the world in terms of order, harmony and mathematically
describable relationships. The question is how women are placed in this
order and how they are evaluated in terms of it.
On the first and more primary level, the Pythagorean school made
one of the first known attempts to create a metaphysics which includes
the categories male and female. This was done by means of an opposi-
tion table in which male-female is one of the fundamental categories of
reality. There were ten such contrasts in the table: Iimitlunlimited,
even/odd, one/many, right/left, male/female, rest/rnotion, straight/
curved, light/dark, good/bad, square/oblong. From this table it can be
seen that the female is on the negative side, the male on the positive.
The "logic" behind such a categorisation is that elements which are
"good", "ordered", and "harmonious", are "rational" and positive, their
opposites negative.' Women seem to be placed in the category which
includes the irrational and inferior. Such a metaphysics is surprising:
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why would anyone want to make the male-female distinction into a
fundamental category of reality and place the female on the negative,
irrational side? One can speculate that perhaps men think women are
less rational then they are because men and women think differently;
or that perhaps at that time there was already a difference in the amount
offormal, theoretica], education which men and women had; or perhaps
that it issimply the desire ofmen to see themselves assuperior to women,
with superiority linked to rationality and intelligence. This type of
theory formation can also be seen as being embedded in, and having
implications for, social contexts. On the metaphysical plane, women are
placed on a secondary level, excluded from the the highest, positive,
realm. Their lack of status in this realm can be linked to their confine-
ment to the home, to their domestic education, and to the broader aim
ofkeeping women in their own sphere through the confirmation of the
superiority of the male in his realm. In short, it can be argued that this
metaphysics is tied in with patriarchal notions.
Besides describing the place of the female on the metaphysicallevel,
the Pythagoreans also had views on the nature and roles of women in
everyday life. Women were to be trained to develop their capacities,
includingshose of rationality and judgment, within the home. On this
level, one can see an earnest desire to appreciate women and to help
them develop themselves so that they can function as well as possible in
this realm. However, besides strengthening the family structure by
encouraging women to develop the skills they need to run a home, the
training and advice serves male interests. AsJean-Jacques Rousseau was
to remark many centuries later, no husband or male philosopher,
however much he wishes to confirm his own position in the public
realm, wants an irrational, uninteresting or hopeless woman as wife and
mother.
The Pythagorean texts which speak of the roles of women in the
domestic sphere are more than 2,000 years old. They consist of frag-
ments of letters and books of advice written (or so it is claimed) by
female philosophers for other women. It is thought that Pythagoras
(bom circa 570 B.C.), the founder of the school bearing his name,
encouraged women to apply the principles of his philosophy to their
own situations and to questions as to their nature, their virtues and how
to comport themselves. The texts are called "economie" writings be-
cause they deal with the oikos, that is, the realm of the home. They are
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pseudepigrapha, pseudonymous writings. Attempts have been made to
trace the identity of the authors to whom the texts were attributed in
ancient times and to determine if they were indeed written by the
women cited as their authors.' The texts as a whole are dated within the
following three categories: early Pythagorean, dating from the end of
the 6th century B.C. to the end ofthe 4th century B.C.; late Pythagorean,
from about 425 B.C. to about 100 A.D.; neo-Pythagorean of the Helle-
nistic period, dating from the rst century B.C. to the jrd century A.D. 3
Despite their age, we can readily recognise the patterns in which
women are spoken about in these texts. The writers of these letters and
fragments confirm a patriarchal social structure: the main purpose of
life for women lies in the realm ofreproduetion and the family. Women
are placed squarely within the domestic sphere and the focus of the
authors is on the virtues to be realised in it. The first duty of a woman
is towards her family: her parents, husband, children and household,
which in this time and culture means an extended household of slaves
and guests. Everything in this sphere must be well run. Basically,
everyone must be kept happy and handled in such a fashion that all the
members of the household will live productive, good and, for the
freeroen, comfortable lives. The husband, children and slaves must all
be approached in a manner appropriate to them: the husband respected,
the children not spoiled and the slaves kept at work. The virtues women
must have are those of moderation, harmony, strength of character,
modesty, practicalsense, with, both for themselves and in terms ofhow
they treat the children, a tinge of asceticism. Besides leading to good
management of the household and expressing philosophical-ethical
ideals, the virtues are seen as ensuring the best possibie life for the
woman practising them, ultimately aiding the person following the
instructions to attain the greatest possible happiness through right
behaviour."
The virtues relare-nor only to the individual and her family, but also
to various broader human contexts within which women live. Behaviour
connects to social, legal and religious spheres. Women should follow
the laws of the land; the gods will punish unvirtuous behaviour; other
people, such as members ofone's household and friends, are dependent
on the virtuous behaviour and wisdom ofwomen; social mores demand
that one have a good name in society, something which is important
because it strengthens the social life and position of the family. The
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mention of these contexts serves to emphasise the importance of the
virtues being advocated and also gives them an element of pressure.
Women are reminded that society and the gods are watching thern and
that there is more to win or lose by their behaviour than the ordering
of relationships within the family itself.5
The texts have a strongly conservative flavour which may appeal to
"traditionalists" even today. There are, however, some assumptions
made and some advice given which mark these texts as a reflection of
their ~ulture. For example, the Greek notion of confining women to
the home during the day is mentioned in these texts. The reason for
such a practice was to ensure that the woman's reputation was not
sullied. The virtuous woman, faithful to her husband, only goes out
briefly with her servants to go shopping and leaves the home only
towards nightfall in order to go to the temple to pray. Because the ideal
woman places all her worth in marriage, she not only serves and obeys
her husband, but if necessary accepts the sexual double standard that "a
man is forgiven his transgression, a woman not", not only by society,
but also by the gods/' Keeping the peace at home is all-important, so
that if her husband does have an affair, she istosay nothing about it
and be assured that it is only a temporary thing. Besides, a woman is
counselled, ifshe complains she will only make matters worse and sour
her own life. T 0 keep the peace, a woman must always share her
husband's opinions and keep up the appearance of a harmonious
household," I think that behind this advice which may even go too far
for present-day traditionalists, the fundamental presupposition of rhe
texts is universal in its appeal: the idea that certain attitudes and virtues
will lead to more happiness or good than others.
The concept of ideals and with it the notion of self-fulfillment and
happiness is not a naïve one: the two opposing sides in this debate whom
we can roughly call traditionalists versus feminists both believe in these
things. Taking the side of the more traditional intrepretation of the
self-fulfillment ofwomen, one can argue that people in many societies
throughout the ages have thought that a wornan's happiness and
fulfillment can be found in the domestic realm. The Pythagorean texts
are, moreover, more subtle than many others on this topic because there
is an awareness in these texts that there will probably always be a gap
between the ideal ofdomestic happiness and reality. Perhaps this insight
into this gap even lies at the basisofthe letters on the same fundamental
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level as the ideal of goodness and happiness: why elsewrite this advice,
give these admonitions? The texts are quite clear in their view ofvirtue
and happiness in the domestic realm as something which is not simply
given, but as something which must be fought for. The authors wam
that even when women aim to be virtuous, there is a risk that the
household will not function weIl, the children be spoiled, one' s reputa-
tion tarnished, and that one's husband takes up with a courtesan. Virtue
and the following of good advice will minimize these risks, yet at times
the only realistic goal may be that of damage containment.
Finally, in evaluating the relationship between these texts and
reality, one can ask if the principles recommended by the Pythagorean
texts reflect everyday life in the upper classes of ancient Greece. Or did
they reflect the principles ofthose people who followed the Pythagorean
school ofphilosophy? Or is all this advice not a reflection ofhow things
were but an attempt to put people back on what was considered to be
the right track?
3 The History of Patriarchy
Even though the philosophical texts written by the Pythagoreans by no
means take us back to the dawn oftime, it isstriking that the patriarchal
order described in these texts isso recognisable even to "modern" people
today. From a philosophical point of view, this observation raises a
number of questions as to the origin, tenacity, power and legitimacy of
the patriarchal order. A great deal of research has been done in fields
such as history and cultural anthropology to trace the nature and origin
of patriarchy. Philosophers have also tried to account for the deep
historical roots and power of patriarchy. I would like to give several
examples ofhow theyexplain the emergence and power of patriarchy.
Plato, in the Menexenus, gives a (prel-hisrorical account of the
emergence of the patriarchal order. The Menexenus is an account by
Socrates of a "Remembrance Day" speech he heard being given in
Athens by Aspasia, the wife of Pericles. It opens with a glorifying,
celebratory account of the history of Greece and Athens. Aspasia begins
by telling about the origin of Greece. She states that the motherhood
of the land ofAttica is the souree ofeverything: the earth is the primary
nurturing mother. It precedes and is an example for human mother-
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hood. Human mothers, in bringing forth children and caring for them,
imitate the earth. The earthly, biological, nurturing, and domestic
realms are seen to be basic to the development of human society in
Greece. The first order is therefore a feminine one. The emergence of
the state is a male innovation and achievement. With the creation of
the state, different forms of government come into being. Aspasia
mentions aristocracy, democracy, monarchy, and oligarchy. As aresult
of this political order, the Athenian "fathers and brethern...did both in
their public and private capacity many noble deeds famous over the
whole world". 8 The female origins of the land and the family as well as
their value are turned into the basis ofmale achievements in the public
realm on which the new focus comes.
The idea that the emergence of the patriarchal order is associated
with the development of a certain sociology is basic to Plato'saccount
and is widespread among philosophers. The family structure, with the
woman in the home caring for the biological unit, emerges as a distinct
entity when society begins to distinguish between the private and the
public, the family and the state, personal ethics and a politieal-legal
system. Plato of course did not like the public-private distinction nor
individual-family units. He presents his alternative to these structures
in the Republic.
Aristotle sees social roles as the fundamental reason for the emer-
gence of the family unit and the role ofwomen in that unit. He sees the
familyas the basis for the stability, order and wealth ofsociety. He argues
that without the family unit as a basic element in society, the state
cannot function. In his view, the creation of a traditional family unit
has two origins: in the natural tendencies ofpeople and in the pragmatic
needs of people and society as a whole. Aristotle thinks it is important
to do all we can to maintain astrong family structure in society."
Hegel, in his great work The Phenomenology ofSpirit also presents
an account of the emergence of patriarchy as the development of a
division between the realms of the family and the state, a separation
which results in different areas of competence for the feminine and the
masculine. Hegel' sinspiration for these ideas is an ancient Greek source,
Sophocles' Antigone. Sophocles' Antigoneis a tragedy and Hegel seesthe
first emergence of the the state as a onesided and hence tragic (in the
literal meaning of this word) event. Hegel' s view, resembling that of
Plato's Menexenus, is that the primary reality is a feminine, natural,
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familial, order which is replaced in dominanee by a masculine order
whose main characteristic is the creation of human law. Hegel sees the
emergence of the masculine order as a tragic conflict situation because
it arises out of a conflict between the realm of the family, in which the
laws are based on the commands of the household gods, and the realm
of the state where human laws are to be followed. The state, in order to
assert itself, must in fact defeat the moral rules of the familial order and
its gods. Hegel sees the primordial example of this conflict in the tragic
confrontation between a woman, Antigone, and a man, King Creon.
Antigone wishes to follow the laws of the family and the gods of the
underworld in her desire to bury her deceased brother Polyneices. Her
desire, however, stands in stark conflict to the decree of Creon that
Polyneices is not to receive a decent burial because he died as a traitor
to the state. Both Antigone and Creon are confronted with tragedy:
Antigone, because she will not recognise the legitimacy ofthe legalorder
of the state, dies at the hand of that state; Creon, because he has defied
the gods of the underworld, is punished as well. For Hegel, this story is
an illustration ofwhat he calls the birth of the ethical order. Ultimately,
the aim of society is to overcome the onesidedness of the conflicts of
inteeest between the naturallaws which govern the family and the legal
order ofthe state. Only when the familyfunctions harmoniously within
the political and legal order will the tragic conflict be resolved. But
despite Hegel's optimism that the tragedy which lies at the birth of the
division between the family and the state will be overcome, he also sees
the relationship between these two units as one ofperpetual strife. The
family is a biological unit, meant to produce and maintain life. The
state, on the other hand, in order to assert its power and legitimacy, will
in the end always demand the ultimate obedience from its citizens: the
willingness to sacrifice loyalry to the family in favour of loyalty to the
state. This conflict returns again ~nd again when the state demands the
ultimate biological sacrifice: the willingness to die for it. Women will
always want to protect and keep their husbands and sons. Therefore,
Hegel states that the feminine will alwaystry to undermine the authority
f h W . h "the i "f h 10o t e state. oman IS, e says, t e lfony 0 t e state.
Plato and Hegel see the state and hence patriarchy as emerging from
a separation which occurs when the biologicalorder becomes dominated
by the legal order. A quite different view is presented by J.-J. Rousseau,
whose point ofdeparture is that of"natural" evolution. Rousseau claims
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that it is not the familial order which is historically basic but simply the
fact of reproduction. Men and women in the beginning merely met for
the purpose of conception; the woman drove the man away when she
had conceived and raised the children on her own. The family structure
emerges when a certain role division is discovered to be convenient. At
that point, the division arises between the male as hunter and protector
of the family and the woman as caring for the home, the male and their
children. This role division makes use of the "natura]" strengths of the
two genders and is a better means for meeting the needs ofall concerned.
Out of this order, the social and legal order arises. Rousseau, unlike
Hegel, does not see this development as progress. For Rousseau, every
social structure which humans create removes them a step from their
"natural" origins and condition.
Within many religious philosophical traditions, such as in the view
of St. Thomas Aquinas, role divisions and the structure of the family
do not have a social or biological history, but are divinely decreed, part
ofthe ordering ofcreation. The roleswhich women have in the domestic
realm are then justified, as they were by the Pythagoreans, on the basis
of divine ordinance.
I havegiven some examples of philosophical accounts of the erner-
gence of patriarchy, some of which are taken from the works of
philosophers who will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. This
brief survey shows that there are various ways in which to account for
the emergence and power of the patriarchal order. Alternatively, one
can also conclude that the patriarchal order is all of the above; a
sociological phenomenon based on a complex private-public ordering
of human life; the domination of a male ruling order over a female
biological order; a convenient solution to the needs of people living in
private and public structures; a role division which takes advantage of
differing capacities of male and female; and a reflection of a "natural
desire" which people manifest in this ordering.
4 Conclusions
These theories on the origin of patriarchy and the fact that patriarchy
is so widespread makes the drawing of conc1usions about the Pythago-
rean texts particularly difficult. What is "good" and what is "bad" about
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them? Do we have any right to judge them at all, even if the intention
of such a judgment is to raise awareness of the rights of women to be
themselves and not be stifled by an order placed over them? Or do
women themselves help form and maintain this order because they feel
comfortable in "their own" realm? Do the virtues women are being
urged to develop serve the interests of women or the social context to
which they are being referred? Is this the way women themselves want
to be or are these ideals imposed on them "from outside"? Will following
the precepts of the Pythagorean school truiyensure the happiness and
self-fulfilment ofwomen? Perhaps the only way to deal fairlywith these
texts and their historical context is to mention the various ways one can
react to them.
Waithe, in her commentary on these texts, argues that they should
be acceptable to feminists. After all, she argues, if it is really true that
these texts were written by women, Pythagoras and the Pythagorean
school accepted and encouraged women philosophers and had respect
for the capacity ofwomen to understand these teachings, an emancipa-
tory idea. Furthermore, she argues, the virtues spoken about demand a
great deal ofwomen, thus showing respect for their strength ofcharacter
and~he high ideals which they are capable of attaining.II Another
possible approach to the texts is to take the line of Elshtain. 12 Elshtain
argues that a very basic category of non-emancipatory thought about
women is the public-private distinction, that is, placing women within
the sphere of the private, men in the sphere of the public. As long as
women are seen as functioning exclusively within the realm of the
private, no matter how weIl and according to whatever ideals, ir means
that they are excluded from the public realm and from the privileges
which functioning in the public realm entails. A third option is to say
that feminism should not prescribe the interpretation of the texts or to
judge the values and roles which are being assigned to these women. In
other words, feminism should be open to all forms oflife for women as
long as women themselves have freely chosen to live that way. Finally,
one can also approach the texts by comparing the ethica! standards and
values they propose with those that apply in our culture today. Seen in
this light, some of the virtues and values mentioned by the texts may be
considered to be acceptable, others not, and one can argue for and
against specific points raised.
Conclusions II
The Pythagorean texts show how fundamental and ancient a certain
view of women is: of women in the home, self-sacrificing, virtuous,
supporting order and familyvalues. In the next chapter, however, a very
different view on women will he presented in light of the philosophy of
Plato.
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2 Images ofWomen in Plato
1 Introduetion
Plato (c. 429-347 B.C.) is generally considered to be the first and most
influential philosopher in the western tradition. Plato does not present
us with a systematic view ofwomen, but with a somewhat mixed set of
ideas. This mixture can be partly due to the incidental nature of
references to women within his dialogues and partly to the fact that he
may not have been concerned with presenting a complete systematic
view on this issue in the modern sense of the word. The reading of
Plato's views becomes more complex because the main speaker in the
dialogues is not Plato himself but Socrates and Socrates often speaks
ironically. Socrates is sometimes also ambiguous when speaking about
women, making a straightforward interpretation difficult.
First, 1 will contrast Socrates' view of women and marriage to that
of the writers of the Pythagorean school discussed in the previous
chapter. I will do so by describing three women in Socrates' life:
Xanthippe, Aspasia and Diotima. Secondly, I will describe Plato'sview
of the role of women in his ideal state. The picture he presents in the
Republic of the nature of women, the family and division of labour
between men and women is quite revolutionary and is the souree of
considerable criticism by Aristotle, a critique discussed in the next
chapter.
2 Xanthippe
Perhaps the most famous and very un-Pythagorean marriage ofancient
Greece was that between Socrates and Xanthippe. Socrates (469-399
B.C.) is believed to have married Xanthippe when he was around fifty
years old. He may have married her in order to have children, a common
convention in his culture and time. Ultimately, the couple had three
children, most likely bom when Socrates was in his fifties and sixties.
The marriage was stormy. No doubt both partners were at fault.
Socrates himself relates in the Apology that he did not have time to earn
a living as other men did because of his philosophizing. The result was
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that, despite being invited to dinner parties by wealthy friends, he was
quite poor. The poverty in which Xanthippe had to raise her children
as well as the philosophical work ofSocrates, which had him going out
a great deal, may have caused tensions. But Socrates also felt attracted
to young men and defended homosexuallove as part of the education
of younger men. It is difficult to estimate the cultural factors in this
bisexuality. On the one hand, it seems a more common phenomenon
in ancient Greece than in many other societies, yet on the other hand,
the Pythagorean texts which we looked at in the previous chapter do
not mention this particular risk to the well-being ofwives. In any case,
some or all ofthese factors may have caused difficulties between Socrates
and Xanthippe.
Also in contrast to the harmonious Pythagorean attitude which
wo men are advised to have to marital problems, Xanthipppe was known
as a woman who did not hide her emotions or mince words. Xenophon
in his Symposium characterises Xanthippe as the most furious and angry
woman up to his time (400 B.C.) and most likely of all future genera-
tions. A famous account of a marital fight is as follows. Socrates leaves
the house after a fight; he suddenly finds himself deluged by a tub of
wasp water, poured on him by Xanthippe from a second story window.
Socrates remarks that after the thunder comes the rain. The image here
seems to be one of Socrates suffering through the marriage stoically,
Xanthippe with a great deal of frustration. I
The most poignant description ofXanthippe is given in the Phaedo
at the scene of Socrates' death.' Xanthippe comes with the çhildren to
bid her husband farewell. She is taken out of the room crying, for
otherwise her emotions would interfere with Socrates' desire for a final
conversation with his friends and with his plan to die in a stoical,
dignified rnanner. The passage has some ironie overtones. Asshe leaves,
Xanthippe says that the men will now have their last conversation. In
the text, the comment is made that this is typically the remark of a
woman. The remark could be seen as typical ofa woman because of the
preconception that women tend to comment on the obvious. The
reaction can also be interpreted as typical ofXanthippe. If this is what
is meant and if we can believe the accounts of her character, the
comment must have been made in an aggressive or sarcastic way, in the
sense of"go ahead, you can have your conversation now", If this is the
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case,Xanthippe demonstrates that she seesvery clearly that the situation
is one ofher own exclusion.
AsXanthippe predicts, the men indeed have their conversation, but
in the end the men all end up crying as well, with one also being sent
away. The comment is made in the text that it is shameful that the men
end up crying. That was precisely the reason the women were sent away.
It is to Plato's credit that he paints a very true picture, one which goes
beyond the stereotypes of male and female: despite all the ideals, men
too are capable oflosing control. Yet Plato does not take the further step
of saying that it may be a good thing for men to show their emotions.
That would go against the stoical and dignified ideals of manhood.
If one may believe the roth century German philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche, Socrates' irony also extended to his own marriage. In a
marvellous passage in the Genealogy ofMorals, Nietzsche argues that a
philosopher is a person who basically wants independence, not to be
tied down by a wornan, family and material worries. Such day-to-day
concerns inhibit the philosopher from concentrating on higher things.
Nietzsche calls this the ascetic ideal, an ideal which is ultimately aimed
at attaining an optimal amount of concentration. Asceticism is the
souree of.~hilosophical power because by means of it philosophers
attempt to make reality fit into their own theoretical framework. This
framework, removed from everyday reality, is imposed on others as the
true reality. Therefore, asceticism ultimately aims at influencing others
and the way they live their lives. It is, to use Nietzsche's words, a will to
power. Nietzsche lists some philosophers who never married: Heradi-
tus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Schopenhauer. He
exclaims that one cannot even imaginethembeing married. But he states
that Socrates is an exception because he married ironically just to
demonstrate the fact that philosophers who marry belong in a comedy
(one can think here of Sophocles' satirical comedy The Clouds), not in
a serious context. Socrates, the philosopher of irony, wouldbe the one
who would want to prove by his own lifestyle the fact that philosophers
should not marry.'
All this is quite removed from the Pythagorean view in which the
woman provides a comfortable support system for the functioning of
the man. According to Nietzsche, philosophers need more space than
marriage can give and some women, like Xanthippe, are not willing or
able to agree to that.
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Socrates also had a tendency to admire talented women who did not,
as the Pythagoreans advised, simply keep to the home. This is shown
by two examples, that ofAspasia and Diotima. The fact that we know
of the existence of these two women indicates that in ancient Athenian
society it was possible for women of a certain social, intellectual or
spiritual standing to gain acceptance. But these two women have
another curious characteristic in common: Socrates calls both of them
his "teachers": Aspasia in rhetoric, Diotima in love. It is therefore
interesting to see what Socrates' attitude towards them is.
Aspasia, a contemporary ofSocrates, was first the mistress and later
the wife ofPericles, the famous Athenian orator. It was said that she was
so charming and beautiful that two wars were fought over her. Yet it
seems, from rumours in Athens, that her marriage to Pericles was not
entirely happy: she was said to keep women for him."
At the beginning and end ofthe Menexenus, Socrates makes remarks
about Aspasia and about a speech she gave the day before in Athens.'
These remarks are full ofirony and double meanings. On the one hand,
Soq~tes says that he admires Aspasia. On the other hand, there is a
joking atmosphere about his admiration. Double entendres and insinu-
ations are mixed with expressions of admiration. Did she really write
this speech herself' Did she take passages from the speeches ofPericles
to make her speeches? Or was it the other way around: was she ghost
writing speeches for Pericles? Is the speech Socrates tells abçut in the
dialogue really her speech or is it Socrates' own satire on her speech?
Stangelyenough, the way in which Socrates speaks ofAspasia is some-
how easily recognisable by women. Is the admiration for the achieve-
ments ofwomen always sincere? Why do women often have the feeling
that their accomplishments are relativized and in extreme cases mini-
malized? Are men uncomfortable with the achievements ofwomen?
Apart from the male-female dynamics and perhaps a personal
tension between Socrates and Aspasia which might be at the root of
Socrates' ironie words, it is clear that he did not have a high regard for
rhetoricians, especially not for those who appealed to nationalistiè
sentiments. In this sense, Socrates' target is more than Aspasia herself.
She is being used as a prominent example ofthe rhetoricians with whom
Socrates is not impressed. But why piek a woman, his "teacher", as the
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personification of the rhetoricians? Presumably because Aspasia was
well-known and an easy target. Is this equal opportunity in the sense
that Socrates does not distinguish between a man and a woman in his
attack? Or is a woman more vulnerable to such an attack, having the
additional characteristic of herself being an exception, as Menexenus
notes? But the temptation oflinking women and sophistry is surely one
that Socrates could not resist.
4 Diotima
The third female character whom I would like to look at is Diotima.
Diotima is the wise priestess whom Socrates calls his teacher in matters
of love and appears in one of the most well-known of the Platonic
dialogues, the Symposium, that is, the dinner party.
We know very little about the historical Diotima. It is likely that
she indeed existed, since most of the characters in the dialogues ofPlato
were real historical figures." When introducing her, Socrates calls her a
woman from Mantinea, an expert on love. She came to Athens when
people weresacrificing to the gods to avoid the plague and she managed
to keep the plague away for ten years.
Plato's view of love says a great deal about his view of women,
especially because he wishes to include and exclude them from certain
aspects of love. T 0 clarify this issue, I will discuss the question of the
relationship between his view of love and his attitude to Diotima a
woman, who presents his theories,"
Diotima begins by defining eros as the desire to possess something
forever. The first form in which eros is expressed is a feminine one, that
is, through pregnancy and procreation. T 0 want to have children is a
godly desire, it is the yearning for immortality in mortals who want to
pass something of themselves along which will reach beyond their own
lives. Diotima says that reproduetion occurs in beauty. A beautiful
father and mother wish to produce a beautiful child, while ugliness does
not reproduce and is not in harmony with the godly. The desire to have
children in beauty is the expression of the urge of humans to have the
immortality of the gods. This desire, says Diotima, is so strong that
people and even animals are prepared to sacrifice everything, even their
own lives, for their children. At this point, it would seem that Diotima's
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view of love says something positive about women and is in harmony
with female values. According to traditional views, such as that of the
Pythagoreans, physical reproduetion is the realm of the feminine. Yet
for Diotima, the level of physical reproduetion is only a first and lower
stage of the realisation of love. Her theory is hierarchical: she speaks of
levelsof increased abstraction. The more abstract the realisation oferos
is, the more value it has.
The higher form of pregnancy is spiritual pregnancy. In spiritual
creation, man continually forms new ideas, forgets old ones and trans-
mits ideas through time. This desire is also a desire for eternity and
immortality. People, here too, are ready to do practically anything to
win eternal fame, to mark themselves as the authors of eternally pre-
served ideas. It is this type of longing, according to Diotima, which
motivates authors, statesmen, sophists, heroes and philosophers, that is,
people working in culture, arts and sciences.Those people who long for
spiritual children prefer them to physical ones. The spiritual children
are nobler and assure the author of even greater immortality. Diotima
mentions Homer and Hesiod as examples of people who are immortal
in the highest sense of the word.
.piotima also describes levelsof abstraction in the objects ofhuman
love. She speaks of the progression from the love ofa man for a woman,
which lies on the level of physical reproduction, to the love of a man
for another man, in which the spiritual side is of importance. Whether
oriented to male or female, a person is first attracted to physical beauty
and faUs in love with one physical body. At the next stage, he will
understand that one beautiful body is much like another beautiful body
and he will fall in love with allbeautiful bodies, leaving behind him the
intense love he felt for the one beautiful body. But after the stage at
which he desires all beautiful bodies, he will realise that a beautiful soul
is much nobler than a beautiful body and he williove the beautiful soul
even though it may live in a not-so-beautiful body. This level of love
will make him appreciate the beauty of institutions and of the sciences.
After that, he will turn to aU the ways in which beauty manifests itself
in the spiritual dimension and, by listening to discourses and discovering
new ideas, he will be driven to long for all sorts ofknowledge. This will
lead him to appreciate beauty in the highest degree.
The final goal oflove is to go beyond all these forms. It is to see love
itself, as it really is, in a vision of the most exalted, eternal beauty. This
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vision goes beyond the oppositions which are part of the structure of
love. It is the vision of beauty itself, one with itself, free from all
limitations and constraints. As a result of seeing this beauty, man will
also see true virtue and be in contact with truth. And, once having
conceived and brought forth true virtue, this man will be able "to win
the friendship of the gods".
Socrates' description of Diotima's ideas makes it apparent that her
views differ from those of the Pythagorean women, sounding suspi-
ciously Soeratic and male. For Diotima, spiritual reproduetion is higher
than physical reproduction. Yet she must have realised that women in
ancient Greece were seen primarily in terms oftheir capacity for physical
reproduction, not for spiritual company. Homosexuallove, according
to Diotima, is a higher form of love than heterosexuallove.8 This view
of relationships excludes women who have already been excluded from
the educational process. Sexuality is made secondary to an intellectual
relationship: the homo-sexuality she speaks of is perhaps better de-
scribed as "horno-intellectuality". Such an interpretation would be
consistent with Diotima's view that the highest form of love is some-
thing which makes the person turn away entirely from human relation-
ships, to cÛ'me to a higher, ultra-human form ofself-identification. The
contemporary philosopher L. Irigaray in her criticism of this Platonic
notion says that the ultimate goal of "friendship with the gods" is
actually a form of self-projection or self-aggrandisation."
Women who see their purpose in life and their honour in terms of
the home, physical reproduction, marriage, and heterosexuality have
been placed on the lowest level of all. It is therefore all the more
surprising that Diotima, a woman, is saying these things. One would
expect Diotima to be supportive ofother women. In her defence, it can
be argued that Diotima is not speaking for herself. She is being quoted
by Socrates on the occasion ofa male dinner party which she could not,
as a woman, attend. A problem in the interpretation ofthe work ofPlato
is that it is not always clear whose point ofview is being expressed. This
problem applies not only to the characters in the dialogues but also to
the issue ofhow to distinguish between the viewsofSocrates and Plato.'?
One possibility is that Socrates is telling the truth, that Diotima
indeed taught these ideas. The other possibility is that what Diotima
says are in fact Socrates' views and that he wants someone else to present
them - and for some reason he wants that someone to be a woman.
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Diotima, as a woman, is perhaps being used as the justification for
Socrates' views on love. Perhaps Socrates thinks that if a woman were
to express his views, they might seem to be more "objective", since
Diotima is not part of the male society attending the party. The effect
of that would be that her views would be seen to be true and relevant
for both genders, not just for the interested parties, the men. In a sense
that would be a back-handed compliment to women, implying that a
man would like a woman to agree with his idea of love. Alternatively,
it is possible that the men would have so little regard for a woman'sview
on love that it is not the case that Diotima was introduced to give a
measure of objectivity or universality to Socrates' views. There is the
possibility that Diotima, as a priestess, is not really considered to be a
"woman" at all in the eyesofthe ancient Greeks; perhaps only a married
woman is a "real woman". In that case,her role ofpriestess, representing
a higher form ofwisdom, justifies the views in that they come from the
most "objective" level of all, someone who is neither male nor female
who represents the highest possible spiritual values.
From this short survey of the three most important women in
Socrates' life,we can conclude that theycome across aslessdomesticated
tha.n the women described by the Pythagoreans. We saw that the
Pythagorean women were not always completely happy in their roles.
The different lifestyle of Socrates' female friends does not seem to give
them perfect happiness either. Xanthippe struggled in amiserable
marriage, Aspasia's competence is questioned, and Diotima serves
Socrates' purposes.
5 Plato's View ofWomen in the Ideal State
In the Republic, Plato describes Socrates' view of the ideal social and
political structure of the state. Plato re-examines, among others, ques-
tions as to the nature ofwomen and their roles in society, the division
oflabour between the genders, and the family structure. Plato is known
for his call to do awaywith the traditional family structure and to liberate
women to fulfill all the roles in society of which they are capable,
unhindered by domestic cares. But how liberating is this side of Plato' s
philosophy reallyî"
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Fundamental to the discussion of the roles of male and female in
the state is the concept of human nature. According to Plato, a human
being's role in society must reflect the natural capacities of that person.
This is because he takes as his point ofdeparture the principle that "...to
h . h . " 12H h kt e same natures we must...asslgn t e same pursUlts . eten as s:
"..Jor what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the
woman's nature differs from the man's"." The final answer to this
question is slow in coming and along the way there seems to be some
Soeratic irony again. The first position which is considered is that "...the
one sex is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many
women, it is true, are better than many men in many things, but broadly
speaking..." women are less strong and capable than men/" This idea is
rejected and a jump is made to the final conclusion there are after all no
essentialdifferences between men and women in terms of their natures
and their roles in society:
Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to
a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But
the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and
women natdtally share in all pursuits and men in all- yet for all the
woman is weaker than the man."
The only distinction which Plato wishes to hold on to is that men are
stronger than women. From the context, it is not entirely clear what
this strength means: it could be solely a matter of physical strength 'Of
it could also include mental and emotional strengths.
Plato's view on the nature of men and women can be considered to
be quite revolutionary. Hardly any other philosopher before or after
him has said that in principle there are no differences in the abilities of
men and women and hence no special areas in which they should
operate to the exclusion of the other gender. Women can be educated
to perform any role and task within the state ofwhich they prove to be
capable: of being teachers, musicians, philosophers, rulers, in short,
anything.
Plato's next step in the reconsideration of the division of labour
between men and women is the reorganisation of the family structure,
which, he warns, "...is a far bigger paradox than the other, and provokes
more distrust as to its possibility and utility"."
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This second step is to eliminare monogamous marriage, the tradi-
tional family structure, and, ultimately, private possessions. Men and
women are to live together not in individual family units, but everyone
of the same age is brother and sister to each ether. People of different
generations are parents and children to each other. Only those of the
same generation are to be brought together by the state solely for the
purpose of reproduction. The state is to perform a type of genetic
engineering when bringing males and females together, ensuring that
the best couples will produce the best children and that an unsuitable
male or female will not have children with a suitable male or female.
These matters are to be arranged discreetly, even if this involves, as Plato
says "falsehood and deception"." After the children are bom, theyare
to be taken care ofby nurses and the children are to call all the children
bom in their age bracket brothers and sisters, all those capable of being
their parents by age, their parents. Private property too is to be abo-
lished, all things being held in common. As a result of theelimination
of the traditional family, women would be freed from the task of taking
care of their families and homes.
Thus the state provides for the education of women according to
theit abilities and allows women to fulfiU the roles in society for which
they have been trained. There are, however, a number of questions
which can be asked about Plato's ideas. In the first place, Plato may not
be as revolutionary as he appears to be on first sight, An indication of
this is the way he writes. The style he uses to speak of men and women
isvery traditional. The point ofview and the standard from out ofwhich
is spoken is male. For example, the question is posed "...whether female
human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at
alL.", implying that the point of departure as well as the standard lies
in male nature and tasks." Plato could be writing in this way because
his point of departure is in the prejudices ofhis society in his time. But
is he actually aware of the fact that he is doing this? That it is possible
to doubt this is apparent from another example of a traditional style of
speaking about men and women, this time with reference to the ideal
situation in his city state of the future. Despite the fact that women and
men are to perform the same tasks according to their abilities, men are
still spoken of as the ones who "have" women. Socrates, for example,
states that, "This...is the manner of the community of wives and
children among the guardians".I9 But women were supposed to be able
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to become guardians on an equal basis with men. In addition, even
though men and women are to share tasks equally, the text assumes that
the people running the communal care centers for children will be
women.
A second question which can be raised concerns the practical
implications of Plato's views. Plato is confronted with the great task of
combining the idea of equal natures, education and roles for men and
women with a social structure. Is it desirabie to eliminate the realm of
the private, of the family? Or, putting it in another way, is it right that
the price people must pay to let women have more opportunities is the
loss of the private realm? Is the home not a safe haven for people to
return to from their participation in the public realm? Is it not the best
place to raise children? Is the family not the basic souree ofwealth and
stability in the state? These questions, some of which were also posed
by Aristotle in his critique ofPlato's Republic, have been repeatedlyasked
of Plato and "communal" theorists up to the present day.
Thirdly, many contemporary women would prefer Plato to have
said that men must change their roles by doing their share in the private
realm as a way to free women for other tasks. In our society, the practical
solution fotthe division oflabourwhen women workoutside the home
has been sought in this direction. But this solution also has its draw-
backs. Is combining tasks within and outside the home possible or does
it mean a greater workload and stress all around? Are the domestic tasks
shared fairly between men and women? A great deal of research in the
last few years shows that this is not the case. Women in fact end up
doing both the work in the home and work outside the home. Either
the consciousness of men must be raised to a higher level on this point
or a more sophisticated solution must be found. 20
Perhaps raising these questions elicits the thought that it is veryhard
to know "whatwomen want", to quote Freud. Today, feminist perspec-
tives on the role of wornen focus on maintaining both the private and
the public sphere. But both theoretically and practically it is hard to
function in both, Men tend to leave the practical problems of running
the household and raising the children to women and women tend to
do most of the work. Plato was at least on the right track when he said
that the issue of equal opportunities and roles for all people, male and
female, is something both genders must think about and work on
together.
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6 Incidental References to Women in Plato's Work
Despite the his radical view ofwomen in the Republic, feminist theorists
are not totally convineed that Plato's philosophy as a whole presents a
positive image of women. In the earlier sections of this chapter, I have
already pointed out that there is sometimes ambiguity in Plato's corn-
ments on women. There are also several incidental references to women
in Plato's work which are ironie and not very flattering. It is however
important to note that these are passing remarks made by all sorts of
characters in the dialogues, so they may not necessarily reflect Plato's
views. They do seem to be able to be fitted into a pattern: when women
are criticised it is mostly in terms of their lesser capacity for reasoning."
The idea that women are less rational than men takes on different
forms. Women, as in the passage in the Phaedo discussed above, are seen
as less in control of their emotions than men. For Plato, controlling
emotions is not only a matter of strength of character but also of the
power of reason which enables a person to rise above a situation.
Êmotions are seen as direct responses to a situation, while using reason
results in an indirect or delayed response, which, for Plato, is of greater
valvn.
Another way in which women are seen as less rational iswhen certain
ideas are attribured to women, implying that women have no real
knowledge of things, but that they tend to use lower forms of reason,
such as speaking in clichés or forming opinions which are not rationally
based. An example of this is the remark in Letters VIIIwhere.it is stated
that: "The usage that applies the term "happy" to the rich is itself
miserable, being a foolish usage ofwomen and children, and it renders
miserabie those that put confidence in it".22 On the other hand, to
Plato's credit, he sometimes praises the insight ofwomen such as in the
following passage in the Gorgias: "Perhaps the true man should ignore
this question of living for a certain span of years and should not be so
enamoured of life, but should leave these things to God and, trusting
the womenfolk who say that no man whatever could escape his destiny,
should consider the ensuing question..."23
Finally, women are sometimes seen as less honourable, courageous
or decent than men. This characteristic can perhaps also be linked to
their lesser power of reason because rationality is the basis for a strong
character. An example of this is the passage in the Republic in which
Incidental References to Women in Plato's Work
instructions are given for the education of the male guardians. Since
people who imitate others may perhaps end up taking on the charac-
teristics of those whom they imitate, the guardians should, "...from
childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them - men, that is, who
are brave, sober, pious, free, and all things of that kind...". They are not,
"...being men, to play the parts ofwomen and imitate a woman young
or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting,
fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune and possessed
by grief and lamentation - still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in
labor" .24 Perhaps this comment says more about the stock characters of
Greek theatre than about Plato's own view ofwomen, but nevertheless,
Plato is saying that men should imitate the qualities of good men.
Women are not seen as suitable for imitation, that is, in a deeper sense,
they are not seen as suitable role models for worthy men.
On the other hand, Plato mentions some women who do not have
weaker characters than men. Anexample ofthis isAlcestiswho sacrificed
her life for her husband. Both the gods and mankind were impressed
by her courage: "But hers was accounted so great a sacrifice, not only
by mankind but by the gods, that in recognition ofher magnanimity it
was grantéd- and among the many doers of noble deeds there is only
the merest handful to whom such grace is given - that her soul should
rise again from the Stygian depths.T" It may be relevant to note that the
courage ofAlcestis is told of in the context of a story about the courage
which people receive from the power of love: perhaps an area in which
women have extra strength.
Plato also thinks that in a metaphysical sensewomen are ofless value
than men. He relates in the Timaeusthat in the process ofreincarnation,
souls return to female bodies if they were not good enough to be
reincarnated as men: "He who lived well during his appointed time was
to return and dwell in his native star, and there he would have a blessed
and congenial existence. But ifhe failed in attaining this, at the second
birth he would pass into a woman, and if, when in that state of being,
he did not desist from evil, he would continually be changed into some
brute who resembied him in the evil nature which he had acquired ..."26
That this doctrine is to be taken seriously is indicated by the fact that
it is repeated another two times in the course of the dialogue.
From this small selection from the incidental references to women
in Plato's dialogues, I think it must be concluded that in all fairness we
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have a hung jury. Some references are flattering, others are ambiguous,
some others are not positive. Plato also makes distinctions among men,
as we have seen, describing them in both flattering and non-flattering
ways. Perhaps it is more important to note that the references to women
are very much fewer than those to men, indicating that Plato waswriting
mainly about men and for men.
7 Theoretica! Contexts for a Feminist Interpretation of Plato
Attempts have been made in the literature to account for Plato's
seemingly contradictory statements about women by creating a theo-
retical context in which to read them. A number of these theories focus
on Plato's preferenee for a male world with male values.
One can consider Plato'sview ofwomen in the context of the way
in which he sees people and values in general. As the passage in the
Symposium, discussed above, indicates, Plato believes that human be-
ings, living between heaven and earth, should orient themselves to the
higher spheres. This implies a hierarchical view of people in which
peQplewith a higher and more rational orientation are better than those
without one. Leaving the earthly behind, the best people should orient
themselves to contemplating the Good, the Beautiful and the True.
Such a view ofpeople means that women will generally speaking be
considered to have less value than men. According to Plato, one is
oriented to the higher realms primarily through a theosetical and
preferably philosophical education, an education almost exclusively
available to men in ancient Greece. Despite the beautiful words in the
Republicin which Plato emphasises the equal talents ofmen and women,
even citing the example of "lover ofwisdom" as being within feminine
reach, the fact of the matter was that women were excluded from
participation in Socrates' dialogues and from attending Plato's Aca-
derny. Proof of this is the story ofAxiothea. Inspired by reading of the
equality of man and woman in Plato's Republic, Axiothea, according to
Themistius, travelled from Arcadia to Athens to study with Plato.
Dichaearchus relates that she had to dress as a man to be admitted to
Plato' s lectures. Her dressing as a man was not a personal eccentricity
but this fact was used in ancient times by Dichaearchus to show the
discrepancy between Plato's theories and practice."
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Not only are women excluded from those realms which, in Plato's
view, would give them equal status to men, they are also, as we saw,
identified with the spheres which are considered to be lower: the realm
of the everyday world and of the natural realm of reproduction. The
question here, however, is, why these realms are seen as "lower",
In the history ofphilosophy, many philosophers have criticised Plato
on the point of his otherwordly view of people and reality and the
resulting value system. In this sense, the feminist critique ofPlato forms
part of an older philosophical discussion. All those who would like a
greater appreciation for the concrete, the earthly, the everyday world,
accuse Plato of too great an emphasis on the non-physical, the non-em-
pirical, the abstract. I think that there are rwo sides to such a philosophi-
cal critique, a positive and a negative one. On the positive side, I think
that the tendency of contemporary philosophy to renounce high levels
ofabstraction, too much otherwordliness in philosophical thought, and
the devaluation ofeveryday life and physical reality, is positive because
this gives more value to the concrete and specific sides of philosophical
thought. On the negative side, the contemporary philosophical orien-
tation to the earthly, everyday reality and the non-rational or irrational
sides of li-fe can also be considered to be a luxury which we can now
afford, but which was not a luxury in Plato's time, By this I mean that
in contemporary culture there is more academie, scientific and abstract
activity going on than ever before in the history of humankind. For
Plato and his time, abstract knowledge, truth, and mental values were
not as developed and were vitally needed in order to further knowledge
of people, society, and the world. We can see how important Plato
considers education and rationality in his story of the allegory of the
cave. Here he argues that it is the task of the philosopher to lead people
away from their fascination with the concrete, earthly world of mere
appearances to the realm ofinsight and truth. In the allegory ofthe cave,
Plato argues that it is the task of the intellectual to see things the way
they really are. I think that in our time we sometimes take the immense
intellectual achievements on which our culture is built for granted. We
should therefore not look down on the ideals which Plato formulates
for the development ofphilosophical, theoretical and scientific thought.
After all, there is still more we do not know than we knowand as to the
high regard which Plato had for ethics, we could also leam something.
Nevertheless, from outofour position of relative luxury with regard to
Images ofWomen in Plato
the achievements of abstract rationality, we now have the freedom to
say that there is more in the world than that which Plato's philosophy
was directed to. Reason is more than abstraction and separation from
the everyday world.
L. Irigaray has written a psychoanalysisofPlato's allegoryofthe cave.
She regards this allegory as the symbolical expression of the male desire
to distance himself from the womb, the earthly, and the feminine. By
associating himself with the otherworldly, abstract, spiritual, presum-
ably higher, masculine realm, he seeks to find and affirm his male
identity.28 If Irigaray's psychoanalytical categories can be accepted, it
means that Plato does separate the feminine from the masculine realms
of reason and knowiedge. His mistake is perhaps in thinking that a
positive appreciation of knowledge and abstraction implies excluding
women. It is of course possible to have a positive appreciation of both
men and women, abstract and concrete, and to realise that it is not
necessary to associate one gender with a certain type of thought or
approach to reality.
No~s
I M. Pellikaan-Engel, "Socrates' Blind Spots", in: M. Pellikaan-Engel, ed. Against
Patriarchal Thinking. Amsterdam, vu University Press, 1992, p. 5-II. This is a revised
and shortened version of the original Dutch article, "De verhouding Socrates-Xan-
thippe in filosofisch perspectief', Feminisme Filosofie, Leusden, The Netherlands,
Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte, 1979, p. 7-28.
2 Plato, Collected Dialogues, transl. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 43. Phaedo 6oa-b.
3 F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie derMoral; in: Nietzsches Werke. ed. by Gerhard Stenzel,
Salzburg, Bergland, volume 2, p. 869-870. (Third Essay, paragraph 7).
4 G. Ménage, The History ofWomen Philosophers. (Historia Mulierum Philosopharum).
transl, by B.H. Zedler. Lanham/London, University Press ofAmerica, 1984. p. 6-8.
Plato, Collected Dialogues. rransl, by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 187-189 and p. 198-199. Menexenus 235e-238a, 249d-e.
6 For a discussion concerning the historical existence of Diotima, see M.E. Waithe, A
History ofWomen Philosophers. Vol. L 600 B.C. - 500 AD. Dordrechr/Lancaster/Lon-
don, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987,p. 91-II4. Gilles Ménage also mentions Diotimaandgives
Theoretical Contexts for a Feminist Interpretation ofPlato
further ancient references to her. See: The History ofWomen Philosophers. trans!. by
Beatrice H. Zedler, Lanham/London, Univesity Press ofAmerica, 1984,p. 9 and 100.
7 Plato, Collected Dialogues, trans!. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973> p. 553-563. Symposium 20Id-212b.
8 The "weakness" of association when it involves the female is also demonstrared in the
Symposium in the story of Aristophanes concerning love. The famous story relates that
the power ofhuman beings makes the gods jealous. AsaresuIt, rhe gods decide to cut
human beings in half: some are cut as male-male, some as male-female, others as
female-female. Love is the desire to be reunited with one's other half. Aristophanes
notes thar the female-female link is the weakest of the combinations, with the
male-male as the strengest. See: Plato, Collected Dialogues, trans!. by Hamilton and
Cairns. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 542-546. Symposium 189c-193d.
9 L. lrigaray, Speculum. Ofthe OtherWoman. trans!. by Gillian C. Gil!. Ithaca, Cornell
University Press,1985, p. 133-146. Seealso the third part of this book, "Plato's Hystera",
P·243-364.
10 D. Wender, in her article, "Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist", Arethusa 6
(1973), p. 82, does nor discuss the Symposium, because she says, "...it seems to me
doubtful that any speaker in that dialogue (including Socrates-Diotima but perhaps
excluding Alcibiades) wholly represents Plato's view."
II For a feminissinterpretation of rhe Republic, see: J.B. Elshtain, PublicMan, Private
Woman: Women in SocialandPoliticalThought. Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1981, p. 19-41.
12 Plato, Collected Dialogues. trans!. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973,p. 695. Republicv, 456b-c.
13 Plato, Collected Dialogues. trans!. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973,p. 694. Republicv 455a.
14 Plato, Collected Dialogues. trans!. by Hamiton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973> p. 694. Republicv 455b-e.
15 Plaro, Collected Dialogues. trans!. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973,p. 694. Republicv 455d-e.
16 Plato, Collected Dialogues. trans!. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973> p. 696-697. Republicv 457d.
17 Plaro, Collected Dialogues. trans!. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 698. Republicv459c-d. The use of"falsehood and deception"
by a philosopher oriented to the Idea of the Good has troubled some commentators.
See for example Roger Trigg, Ideas ofHuman Nature. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 18.Trigg
speaks here of the "surprising ruthlessness" ofSocrates.
3° Images ofWomen in Plato
18 Plato, Collected Dialogues. rransl. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 691, 692. Republicv, 451e-452a and 453a.
19 Plato, Collected Dialogues. transl. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 701. Republicv461e.
20 Adie Hochschild, TheSecond Shift. Viking, 1989.
21 For a number ofreferences to women in Plato's dialogues, see:Apology 35a-b;Cratylus
414a, 418b, 430b-431C; Critias noa-c, 112d; Epistle VII 349d, Epistle VIII 355c; Gorgias
502d, 512d-e; Hippias, Greater, 286a, Laws I 637b-e, Laws II 658a-d, 669c, Laws III
680b-e, 694d-695b, Laws v 731d, 739c, Laws VI774a-776b, 780e, 781a-785b, Laws VII
788a-797, 802e, 804e, 805a-d, 806a-b, 813e, 814b, Laws VIII 803c, 804c-806c, 806d-
808c, 808d-809a, 828c, 829b-e, 833c-e,LawsXI930a, 932b, LawsXII944d-e.; Lysis208d;
Menexenus 235e-238a, 249d-e; Meno 71e-73b, 99d; Phaedo ëoa-b, 116b, 117d-e; Pro-
tagoras 342d; Republic I 329b-c; Republic II 360a-b; Republic III 387e-388a, 395d-e,
398e; Republic IV 431b-c; Republic v 449C, 451b-c, 451d-e, 451e-452a, 453, 454d-e,
455b-e, 456b, 457a-b, 457C-d,458c-e, 459d-e, 46oc, 461e, 464b, 466c-e, 471d; Republic
VI1540c; Republic VIII 548a-b, 549c-d, 563b-d, 605d-e; Theatetus 176b; Symposium
179b-e, 176e, 180d-181e, 189C-193dj Timaeus 18c,42b-c, 76d-e, 90e-91a.
22 Plato, Collected Dialogues. transl. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 1601. EpistleVIII 355c.
23 Plato,Collected Dialogues. transl. by Harnilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 294. Gorgias 355e.
24 Plato, Collected Dialogees. transl. by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 640. Republic III 395c-e.
25 Plato, Collected Dialogues. transl, by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 533· Symposium 179b-c.
26 Plato, Collected Dialogues. transl, by Hamilton and Cairns. Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973, p. 1171. Timaeus 42b-c. See also Timaeus 76d-e (p. 1198) and
90e-91a (p. 12°9-1210).
27 M.E. Waithe, A History ofWomen Philosophers. Vol. I, 600 B.C. - 5°0 AD. Dordrecht,
Lancaster, London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p. 2°5-206.
281. Irigaray, Speculum. Ofthe Other Woman. transl. by Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 1985, p. 243-364. For a more detailed discussion ofPlato's allegoty of
the cave and possible interpretations of this story, see chapter 9.
3 Aristotle. The Nature ofWoman and her Role in
Society
I Introduetion
Aswe saw in the previous chapter, Plato argues that his view ofwomen
in the Republie is based on a general view of human nature. Aristotle
(384-322 B.C.) too believes that it is necessary to create a philosophy of
society based on the nature of people, that is, on the composition of
their souls. Like Plato, he attempts to justify giving people roles in
society which reflect their tendencies and capacities for fulfilling these
roles. In this sense, he wishes to create a rational ground for a philosophy
of society. With respect to women, such an approach leads Aristotle to
ask and answer the same kind of questions as Plato: "Do women and
men differ in their natures?" "Would such a difference lead to them
fulfilling different roles in society?" Aristotle has, however, a very
different concept of feminine nature than Plato. Aristotle is of impor-
tance in the history ofviews on women because he created an influential
approach which assigned women a traditional role.
In this chapter, I will begin by presenting Aristotle's critique of
Plato's Republie in his book, the Polities. In the second half of this
chapter, anticipating another debate, I will describe Aristotle' s view of
women as presented in On the Generation ofAnimals, his biology.
Aristotle's biological theories concerning women will be taken up again
in the next chapter in which I will discuss the use made of them by the
medieval theologian and philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas.
2 Aristotle's Critique of Plato
In his Polities, Aristotle begins with a discussion on the nature of the
state. He believes that the basis of the state is the traditional family
structure, with the woman in the home, responsible for the household
management and the care of the young children. The task of the man
is to obtain and maintain property and wealth, which is held by the
family and forms the basis ofwealth in society.'
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Fundamental to the family, aswell as to the state, is ruling: "For that
some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for
subjection, others for rule". 2 Aristotle considers various sorts of ruling
relationships: of a better workman over another workman, of the soul
over the body, of men over animals. He then says: "Again, the male is
by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the
other is ruled; this principle, ofnecessity, extends to all mankind" .3 The
argument here is "from nature". Aristotle illustrates his concept ofruling
with reference to the category of masters and slaves, saying that, "It is
c1ear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that
for these latter slavery is both expedient and right"." He does, however,
modify his position quickly, saying that at times slavery may be just the
bad luck ofbeing captured in war, but nevertheless, this was most likely
a just fate because the slave has no reasoning capacity for himself, hence
his slavery and need to be ruled. The ruling relationship is based on the
power of reason in the rulers and the ruled. Because the slave lacks his
own power of reason, the rule over slaves is despotical or tyrannical. A
slave simply needs to be told what to do and is to do what he or she is
tokt
In the Polities, Aristotle calls the rule of a man over his wife
constitutional because in this form of ruling there is an element of
equality and the possession of certain rights. Men and women are to
some extent equal and women have some capacity for reason, but
women have less power ofreason than men. While in men reasen often
prevails over irrationality, in women, irrationality is stronger.' A man
is, therefore, superior to his wife and rules over her in the same way as
in a constitutional state some citizens rule over other citizens. In this
sense, men and women are, according to Aristotle, always unequal.
Nevertheless, a characteristic of constitutional rule is that although the
better rule over others, the ruled still have something to say about the
governing process. In the Niehomaehean Ethies, Aristotle also discusses
the nature of the rule of the husband over the wife and here he calls this
type of rule aristocratie. The reason he gives for this is that "...the man
rules in accordance with his worth, and in those matters in which a man
should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her."
It is possible that in marriage other forms of governing replace aristo-
cratie rule. When a man rules over everything, the rule in the marriage
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is that ofoligarchy. Sometimes the woman rules becauseshe is an heiress
and that too isoligarchie rule. Aristotle definesoligarchy asruling"...not
in virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power...,,6
The rule ofa father over his children is royaF Children are not yet
fully in possessionoftheir reasoning capacities; the rule is, however, not
despotical, because, unlike in the caseofslaves, children are in principle
capable ofdeveloping their reason. The father' s rule is not constitutional
either because a child' s reason is not yet developed fully enough to
participate democratically in the decision making process.
In the Niehomaehean Ethies, Aristotle does not restriet himself to
describing the formal relationships in the family in terms ofrule but he
also introduces the notion of friendship. Friendship relationships are
described by him in the same way as he describes the relationships
among people in the household, that is, in terms ofa hierarchy. There
are two forms of friendship, according to Aristotle, that of equality
between the friends, the ideal form, and that of relative inequality. The
relationships in the family are friendships ofinequality, offather to son,
elder and younger, man to wife and, as he states, "of ruler to subject".
These different forms of relationships differ according to the nature of
the inequiïMty and the type of relationship between the parties. The
relationships between parents and children, father and son, husband
and wife all differ in their virtues, their functions, and the type of love
between rhe parties. The members of the family differ in their obliga-
tions to each other. For example, children should be grateful to their
parents for bringing them into the world. Aristotle then goeson to claim
that in these friendships, the loving relationship is also hierarchically
coloured: "In all friendships implying inequality the love should also be
proportional, i.e., the better should be more loved than he loves, and so
should the more useful, and similarly in each ofthe other cases; for when
the love is in proportion to the merit ofthe parties, then in a sense arises
equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship". 8
Hence, even though friendship in the family is unequal, the true nature
of friendship, equality, can be attained when, for example, the better is
more loved than the inferior. Aristotle later on repeats hisview that there
is a hierarchical power relationship in love. He states, "Most people
seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than to love..."9
In the Polities, Aristotle argues that the main reason for the organi-
sation of a household is virtue and excellence: while the gaining of
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wealth and property are of importance, these are secondary to forming
the character of especially the free persons in the household. He
considers the question of whether or not women and children have
virtues at all, but decides that they have their own types ofvirtue which
must be formed within the context of the family.1O
In considering the question of the virtues of women, Aristotle' s
views differ from those of Socrates. Aristode argues that women have a
different nature from men and hence different virtues. In saying this,
he explicidy attacks Socrates' position as formulated in the Republiethat
men and women are in principle capable of the same things and hence
have the capacity for having the same virtues. "Clearly, then", he says,
"moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance ofa man and
of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are
not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown
in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other
virtues ..." He goes on to add that silence is a wornan's glory, but not a
, Il
mans.
Aristotle continues his discourse with Socrates in the second book
of the Polities, in which the question concerning what is to be held in
common in the state is discussed. He says: "But should a well-ordered
state have all things, so far as may be, in common, or some only and
not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children
and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republie of Plato.
Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of
societyr?" What follows is an attack on Socrates' position, Aristode
argues thar Socrates' view of holding all things in common creates
difficulties because it changes the role divisions between men and
women in the traditional family structure. Aristotle says:
IfSocrates makes the women common, and retains private property,
the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And
who will do so if the agricultural classhave both their property and
their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the
analogy ofthe animals, that men and women should follow the same
pursuits, for animals have not to manage a household."
Aristode does, however, in the end insert the following gallant com-
ment: "The discourses ofSocrates are never commonplace; they always
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exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything
can hardly he expected'T"
Finally, in the last two books of the Polities, Aristotle gives his views
on matters such as marriage, the rules for how women are to comport
themselves and on the best way in which to educate children."
Aristotle begins by considering the age at which men and women
should marry: they should be so matched that the male and female age
of procreation ends at the same time. The man should not be able to
beget children when the woman is no longer able to bear them. Aristotle
also notes that children should not be bom of parents who are too old
or too young. This rule implies that the male should be older than the
female, since males are of course able to produce children for a longer
time than females. Aristotle therefore recommends that women marry
at age eighteen, men at age thirty-seven." Furthermore, men are to cease
begetting children at fifty four or five, since male intelligence, according
to Aristotle, begins to decline after age fifty.17
He next considers the best time for marriage (winter) and the best
type of physical and mental attributes for the male as husband and
father. Women who are pregnant should have regular exercise and a
proper dier, Aristotle makes the recommendation that: "The first of
these prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by requiring
that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship
the gods who preside over birth. Their minds, however, unlike their
bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for the offsprinr derive their naturesfrom their mothers as plants do from the earth".' .•
Aristotle recommends the killing ofdeformed children and limiting
population growth by exposing the children, but, since this is usually
forbidden by states, abortion is preferabie. He then discusses at length
the rearing of children. Aristotle's concerns resembie some of the ones
expressed by the Pythagorean school: how to ensure strong children by
caring for thern soberly and hardening thern to life. He suggests, for
example, making them bear cold conditions and exposing them only to
proper activities and amusements. Children are to do no work or have
formal learning until age five and must live at home until age seven.
They are to be educated in two phases: from age seven to puberty, from
puberty to age twenty-one. Children are to be raised in the home by the
mother, but boys are to be educated later in the male world." Aristotle's
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views on these matters, not surpisingly, are very traditional. Women are
to stay in the home and be virtuous like the Pythagorean women.
3 Patterns in Aristotle's View of the Family in the State
It has been noted by critics, feminist and others, that Aristotle' s theory
of the state and the nature and roles of people within rhe state tends to
justify the customs ofhis time, in contrast with the viewsofPlato, which
can be considered to be more innovative. Aristotle tends to define the
natures ofpeople in terms of the existing social order, a temptation one
finds most strongly in the discussion on slavery. The difficulty is that
the aim at the outset, to base the filling in ofsocial roles on the concept
of nature, becomes circular: the ideas of nature and social role come to
be defined in terms ofeach other. There is then no longer, as Aristotle
claimed, an independent "natural" justification for an existing social
order.
Aristotle could object to this argument by saying that he believes
that the social order of his time is truly the reflection of human nature
itsdt; This implies that the ideal has more or less already been realised
and that nothing remains to be thought about concerning nature and
culture. This can be an acceptable philosophical position to take, albeit
a very conservative one. What is not acceptable is trying to use this as
an argument attempting to prove this relationship.
These ideas concerning the relationship between nature and culture
bring us to the second aspect which we will look at in Aristotle's view
of women, the biological. Perhaps the biological account given by
Aristotle ofwomen will be able to arrive at a separate definition ofmale
and female nature. As we shall see, however, this is not the case. This is
because Aristotle's biology is not an empirical science in the modern
sense of the word. Although he does use examples, observations, and
empirical data, the method of analysing them is based on a system
derived from other parts ofhis philosophy,
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Aristotle wrote a book on the biology of reproduction, called On the
Generation ofAnimals.Although this book is today lessweU known than
Aristotle's works on metaphysics, logic and ethics, its historical impact
was considerable, aswe shaU see in the next chapter in which St. Thomas
Aquinas' use of ideas from this book is discussed. Many ~fAristotle's
ideas can still be found in contemporary thought, primarily because of
their lasting influence on Christian theology.
Aristotle opens his discussion of the nature ofwomen by looking at
the reasons for the existence of men and women in the first place. The
main reason for the human race to be differentiated into two genders is
reproduction, as he states at the beginning of Book II of On the
Generation ofAnimals.2.0
In speaking of the "first principle of generation", the male and
female, Aristotle introduces a number of terms which he identifies with
one or the other gender. On the male side, he speaks in terms of "first
efficient or moving cause" to which belong "definition and form", better
and more divine in its nature, a "superior principle". On the female side,
he speak~ of "material" on which the male principle "works", an
"inferior principle". These terms indicate that Aristotle sees the relative
value of male and female as basic to his biological theory of reproduc-
tion. This valuation of male and female can be seen as a presupposition
of his theory, but, according to Aristotle, it can be concluded Erom
empirical data.
For Aristotle, conception takes place when the male introduces the
sperm, the form, in the female. He believes that the female contributes
matter for the gestation of the sperm. This matter is menstrual blood
which becomes the material support and feeding ground for the unborn
child. Later, it is the woman's body which provides the proteetion and
food for the unborn child. Behind these ideas is the image of a plant
growing in the soil. The father therefore intro duces life, soul, "definition
and form" as the first active, superior principle. The mother is the
material receptacle of the sperm and hence is a receptive, passive,
secondary cause of reproduction.
The reason why the child can be bom either male or female is
explained by Aristotle by means of differences in the heat of the sperm
of the father. Aristotle believes that the hotter a man is, the hotter and
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hence better, more active and effective,his sperm. The heat ofthe sperm
depends on the good health of the father and even on elirnacric
conditions: a cold wind blowing, for example, cools the sperm. The
healthier the father, the warmer the weather at the time ofconception,
the greater the chance is that the child will be male. A female is bom
when these ideal conditions are not present. She is, in Aristotle's
terminology, a "misbegotten male", in fact, a mistake of nature. As St.
Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on this idea of Aristotle makes
dear, the reason for seeing the female as "misbegotten" lies in the fact
that ideally nature always reproduces "the same".2I When an offspring
has characteristics that deviate from the norm, it is defective. Since the
father's sperm is what actually produces the child, the child should
ideally resemble the father, and hence should always be male. This
"mistake" of nature, however, is necessary because women are needed
for reproduction.
The superiority of males to females, according to Aristotle, is also
evident from differences in their development, Female children seem to
be stronger and develop more quickly than males. But Aristotle notes
that the inferior and cold, the female, only demonstrates its inferiority
by itl? faster development. The male develops more slowly but surely
than the fernale."
5 Matter and Form, Metaphysies, Polities and Biology
It has been extensively, and I think successfully, argued that the preju-
dices present in Aristotle's biology are supported by his metaphysics."
To demonstrate this, critics have concentrated on Aristotle's notion of
matter and form. Aristotle is often praised for the fact that he did not
see matter and form as totally separate entities, as did Plato, and that as
a result he does not have such an abstract and otherwordly philosophy
as Plato. In light ofthe discussion held in the previous chapter concern-
ing the relationship in Plato's philosophy between abstraction and
otherwordliness and a view of women as lesser than men, Aristotle's
philosophy would seem to offer women a better deal." But this is not
entirely true. Aristotle does distinguish between matter and form and
this distinction is fundamental to his view ofwomen. Matter and form,
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more "empirical" in Aristotle, are intertwined, yet distinguishable com-
ponents of all things.
In the matter-ferm model of metaphysics, the matter is the "mate-
rial" component of an object. Form is the shape of the object. All
extended things have matter, but that which makes the matter of, saya
chair, different from that of a table is that they have different forms.
Form makes a thing aspecific entity and thus allows us to be able to say
what a thing is.The form ofan object is therefore also that which makes
it knowable. Taking this one step further, Aristotle identifies the
concept of form with knowledge, mind, and spirit itself.
Applying these metaphysical ideas to the texts under consideration,
Aristotle notes that the woman is the material cause of generation. She
thus represents the lower principle, matter, and the male represents the
higher principle, form. Hence the notions ofinferiority and superiority,
passivity and activity, material basis and the identification of the male
with life and spirit. From this primary distinction, many of the other
features of Aristotle' s analysis of male and female can be understood:
the idea that the male is hot, the female cold, the male perfectly formed,
the female defective.
If one.~;tcepts the argument that there is a link between Aristotle' s
metaphysics and his biology, then this means that Aristotle' s philosophy
is a whole which holds together the analyses of reality (metaphysics),
society (as in the passages from the Politiesdiscussed earlier) and biology
(as in the passages from De Generatione Animalium which were men-
tioned) in one conceptual framework. This means that, just as in Plato,
hierarchical structures are present in all three of these areas in Aristotle' s
thought.
Another aspect of the wider philosophical picture is the role which
reason plays in relation to nature. In the Polities, as we saw, males are
to govern since they by nature have the greatest amount of reason. Also
with respect to biology, reason is important because the ordering of
nature is rational in the sense that it accords with certain principles of
purpose. There is, in other words, a rationality in man, society and
nature, a rationality which the philosopher can discover.
Part of this notion of rationality is the concept of telos, end or goal.
All things move towards the goal oftheir proper actualisation. From the
analyseswhich Aristotle givesoffemale nature, it is clear that her nature
has specific forms of self-realisation: in society, to function within the
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family structure, in hiology, to reproduce. Women, as critics have
pointed out, are in no position in Aristotle' s system to determine for
themselves what theywould like to he and do. Thatwould he unnatural,
create a kind of anarchy, since all things and people must order
themselves or he ordered according to their own nature and Aristotle
sees himself as giving the right description of that nature. In this sense,
contrary to Plato'sviews on these matters, as presented in the Republic,
women do not have a great deal of freedom for self-realisation in
Aristotle's world."
Rightly or wrongly, Aristotle has gone into history as rather notori-
ous when it comes to his views on women. Cri tics including men, have,
throughout the centuries, commented on his sexism. But there has also
heen a considerahle amount of historical speculation ahout, and, inter-
estingly, many famous depictions on tapestries, paintings and engrav-
ings of, his private life with Phyllis.26 Aristotle had a relationship with
Phyllis which, if the gossip is true, does not exactly mirror his macho
views. But the most significant fact about Aristotle' s views on women,
as we shall see in the next chapter, is their disproportionate influence
on western thought,
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4 St. Thomas Aquinas. The Theology ofWoman
I Introduetion
In the Middle Ages, as in no other period in the history of western
philosophy, philosophy and theology go hand in hand. The questions
concerning the nature of women and their role in society in this time
are concentrated on the interpretation of Bible passages which speak of
women.
There are a number ofpassages in the Biblewhich mention women.
The first chapters ofGenesis which describe the creation ofwoman, the
fall into sin and the resulting curse on mankind are important for a
theological view of women. As we shall see in this chapter, all sorts of
questions were raised as to the significanee of these passages for a view
ofwomen. Why was Eve created out ofAdam's rib and not, like Adam,
from out of the earth? What does the Bible mean when it says that Eve
was created as a "help meet" for Adam? Why did Eve succumb to the
temptation of Satan before Adam did? Does this mean that she was
weaker and lessrational than Adam? Whywould God create, in: a perfect
creation, a less perfect creature than Adam himself? If Eve was indeed
less rational.and more open to temptation, does she have a soul in the
same sense as Adam? T 0 what extent was she then made in the image
of God? What was the relationship like between Adam and Eve: did
they experience sexual-sensual pleasure before the fall into sin?'
Questions also arose concerning the implications of the fall into sin
in terms of the curse that was placed on the woman, man, and the snake
after the fall. Women, the Biblical judgment relates, are cursed by the
fact that they are to beget children in pain and, because their desire is
for their husbands, are to be ruled by them. What is the implication of
the latter curse: is this the correct order of things in the world and
therefore a justification for the male ruling over the female? It is obvious
that the interpretation of this text is ofvital importance because it may
or may not give men a theological reason for male domination.
Also relevant to a view ofwomen are Old Testament passages which
speak of marriage and polygamy. Why was polygamy practised in
ancient times and why it is was later forbidden? Other well-known
passages are the text at the end of the book of Proverbs describing the
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ideal wife and the references to women in the Song of Songs. The
passages in the New Testament book of Revelation referring to the
notion of the Church as the bride of Christ are interpreted as relating
back to the stories of a man and his bride in the Song of Songs.
In the NewTestament, of interest are the gospel story of Mary and
the birth of Christ, Christ's contacts with women and his references to
women, and Pauline teachings concerning marriage, the relationship
between husband and wife, and the role ofwomen in the Church.
The theology ofMary only began to emerge in the late Middle Ages,
but earlier, the main theological issues concerning women involved
discussions ofthe viewsexpressed by St. Paul. What did Paul mean when
he said that it was better to remain single than to marry? In no other
period of western culture was this advice taken so seriously as in the
Middle Ages. What is the role of women in the Church, especially in
terms ofreligious officesand orders? Ithas been argued that in the course
of the Middle Ages one can observe a gradual growth of control of men
over women in the Church hierarchy. While in the very early period,
women still performed the sacraments, this was later to become an
exclusivelymale task. Femalereligious orders were usually placed under
th,e~upervisionof the neighbouring male order.'
Besides questions concerning the interpretation of Bible passages,
the issuewas discussed ofthe hermeneutic principles to be applied when
reading them. The Bible passages mentioned can be read literally or
allegorically. The distinction between reading a passage literally or
allegorically may sometimes be difficult to draw.' The choice pf the way
in which these passagesare to be treated hermeneutically has, however,
implications for the view ofwomen. This is because at least some of the
allegorical interpretations were less favourable to women than literal
ones.
One of the most striking and perhaps shocking attempts at an
allegorical interpretation of male-female imagery in the Bible is pre-
sented by the Jewish philosopher of the early Patristic period, Philo of
Alexandria." According to Philo, the story of the creation ofAdam and
Eve and the fall into sin are to be interpreted allegorically in terms of
the idea that the male principle, Adam, represents mind and the female
principle, Eve, represents sense experience. On this reading, the period
before Eve was created is the time in which the mind, Adam, reigns
supreme, being purely rational and dedicated to God. With the creation
Introduetion 45
ofthe feminine, Eve, the realm ofsense experience is bom. The fall into
sin, caused by Eve giving the fruit to Adam, means that the pure mind
is defiled by sense experience. This means that the mind is opened up
to the temptations of the world, that is, to desires which are aroused by
the information which comes to man through the five senses. These are
desires such as the sexual drive, gluttony, and the greed for earthly things
and material goods. Man is thus removed from the pure contemplation
of God and hence becomes sinful. Woven into this allegory of the
feminine as sense experience is Philo's conception ofwomen as tempt-
resses who lead men away from the straight and narrow path. The
feminine, Philo says, expresses mankind's lower nature.
In the mainstream of judeo-Christian theological thought, a view
ofwomen such as that ofPhilo was rejected. A certain consensus about
how to viewwomen arose.A number ofconclusions emerged from these
medieval debates, conclusions which form the general theological out-
line ofa view ofwomen in Christian churches to this day. T raditionally,
the role ofthe woman isseen to be in the home, oriented to her husband,
children and family. Women are to obey and remain subservient to men
both in marriage and in the Church since they are in some sense inferior
to men. WOV1en are, however, considered to have souls and rationality
by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Celibaey is seen as a
state which has more perfection than marriage, but on the other hand,
marriage is necessary for containing sexual desires within a proper
context and for the purpose of reproduction.
Much of the complexity of the medieval discussions has been
forgotten, yet the interpretations developed at this time have had an
extraordinarily long lifespan. In this chapter, I shall discuss some of the
views ofSt. Thomas Aquinas on women. I will first deal with Aquinas'
interpretation of the story of creation and the fall into sin as related in
Genesis. In these passages, St. Thomas Aquinas is influenced by Aris-
totle's biology, discussed in the previous chapter. In the second part of
this chapter, I will deal with Aquinas' interpretation of the New
Testament texts concerning the role of women in the Church, their
rationality and spirituality. I will attempt to show that his interpretation
ofBiblical passages concerningwomen in the Church is consistentwith
and related to his view of the way he believes God created women. In
the next chapter, I will discuss a feminine reaction to such theologically
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based views ofwomen by showing how Christine de Pizan argues for a
completely different attitude and approach to this question.
2 The Creation ofWoman
St. Thomas Aquinas writes in a formal, medieval style. First, he presents
what he calls a Question. This question is subdivided into articles. In
the articles, different sub-themes of the question are discussed. He
begins the artiele by presenting the views ofphilosophers and theologi-
ans with whom he does not agree. These views are called Objections.
After stating a number of these objections, he writes the words "On the
contrary". Under this heading, he summarises his own position. Then,
after the words "I answer that", he presents a more detailed statement
of his views. Finally, there is a heading "Reply" to the objections
mentioned at the beginning, in which he rejects the views he does not
agreewith point by point. This style can be somewhat confusing because
of its complexity. I will, however, in my discussion of the questions I
have chosen, follow quite closely the construction ofAquinas' writing.
Iuprder to help the reader follow the complicated progress ofAquinas'
arguments, 1 willindicate at what point of the question we are. In
keeping with Aquinas' own debating style, I will not only present his
views but I will make some objections to his views and suggestions for
alternative ways of seeing the matters being discussed.
In Questions 92 and 93 of the Summa Theologica, SI. Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274) deals with issues surrounding the creation and
nature of man and woman.' Question 92 deals with "The Production
ofWoman". In the first artiele ofquestion 92, he considers the question,
"Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of
things?". This question arisesbecause there was a perfect state in paradise
before the fall into sin. Should woman have been made at this perfect
stage as the Bible relates? He considers three possible Objections which
theologians of his time might have to accepting the idea that woman
should have been present in paradise. The first objection Aquinas
mentions is based on Aristotle's idea that women are "misbegotten
males" and hence are defective creatures, unworthy of existing in
paradise. The second objection which he notes is based on Augustine's
idea that women, as "patients" are subjected to men as "agents" (again,
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Aristotelian terms), and are therefore less perfect than men and, again,
had no right to be in paradise. The third objection concerns the point
that since woman, Eve, caused Adam and then the world to fall into sin,
women should not have been created in the first place. Ergo, there
should have been only males in paradise.
Aquinas' Answer to these objections is that God created woman to
be in paradise and that this was right. It was necessary for God to create
women in the perfect state before the fall into sin because woman was
meant to be a helper for man. Woman was created as a helper for man,
not in other works, for in those a man is better helped by another man
(Aristotle) but woman is a helper in the "work of generation", that is,
reproduction. Following Aristotle, he says that "Wherefore we observe
that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the
passive power. Arnong perfect animals the active power of generation
belongs to the male sex, and the passive to the female". The justification
for Eve being in paradise is therefore her role as passive accompaniment
to the active male gender.
Aquinas then proceeds to state that although women were made for
the purpose of reproduction, the male is not in "continual union" with
the femah:tln keeping with Aristotle's view on this matter, he states:
"But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is
intellectual eperation. Therefore there was greater reason for the dis-
tinction between these two forces in man; so that the female should be
produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united
for generation. Therefore directly after the formation ofwoman, it.was
said: And they shall betwo in oneflesh (Gen. 2:24)."
Although St. Thomas Aquinas attacks the Objections that woman
had no right to be in paradise, his own views as expressed in the Answer
summarised above, leave something to be desired. I will therefore now
formulate my objections to hisview. In his statement concerning the
reason why it was necessary to have women in paradise, he bases himself
on the Biblical description ofEve as the "helper" ofAdam. He interprets
the term "helper" as referring solely to the activity of reproduction,
thereby firmly referring women to their biological function as their only
justification for being and their only real purpose in life. This is the
Aristotelian use of this word, but is such an interpretation justified on
Biblical grounds?
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I would suggest that one could object that St. Thomas Aquinas'
position here is indeed debatable because of the way in which he
misinterprets the word "helper". The Hebrew word used in this text is
also found in another book ofthe Bible, the Psalms. There God is called
our "Help".6 This usage does not refer to the notions of reproduetion
or of inferiority, but connotes matters such as standing by one' s side,
supporting one another, being there for one another. Since the context
of the use of this word in Genesis is Adam's feeling of loneliness at not
having a mate as all the animals do, this would seem to be a more likely
meaning of the term."
Secondly, one could object to St. Thomas Aquinas' acceptance of
Aristotelian ideas such as the systematics ofactive (superior) and passive
(inferior) powers of generation to distinguish between the male and
female task in generation. Perhaps knowledge of biology was not very
advanced in Aquinas' time, but there seems to be little justification for
linking male deminarion of women to their mysterious "active power
of generation". Furthermore, the idea that men should only associate
with women for reproductive purposes because they have intellectual
tasks to do is manifestly absurd: witness Aquinas's statement that men
ha;vf "a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation" as
opposed to the presumed inactivity of women in this area. When he
finally concludes that the purpose ofmale and female is that "they shall
be two in one flesh", this must be read in the context ofwomen having
primarilya reproductive task in life and ofmale superiority over women.
We arenow at the point at which Aquinas, in light of the Answer
given above, gives Replies to the Objections to the idea ofwoman being
in paradise with which the artide started. There were three objections
mentioned. I will go through Aquinas' replies to each one.
In his answer to the first objection, Aquinas agreeswith the position
that woman is misbegotten in her individual nature but not in terms of
the "general intention of nature" which is "directed to the work of
generation". That is, as an individual person she is not perfect, as the
male is, but she has her own type ofperfection within the whole context
of nature, that is, for the purpose of reproduction.
In his reply to the second objection, Aquinas agrees both with
Aristotle and the Christian tradition that female subjection is proper
because there is always subjection among people. It is right for women
to be ruled by men, for men have more rationality than women, he
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argues. Subjection is thus not a fault in creation, but it is a matter of
proper order.
Replying to the third objection, Aquinas states that, since it was
necessary to create woman, God did not make the mistake of creating
someone who would cause sin to come into the world. God created the
common good as good, and besides, he adds, God can direct any evil
to a good end.
I would now like to make some comments on the way in which
Aquinas responds to the Objections. In his response to the first objec-
tion, Aquinas concedes Aristotle's point that women are defective and
misbegotten, but that she is needed for the whole order ofthings. There
is, as far as I know, no mention in the Bible of the idea that a woman
is defective or misbegotten, a not insignificant problem in Aquinas'
argument. As was mentioned in the discussion of the passages of De
Generatione Animalium in the chapter on Aristotle, the idea of the
woman as misbegotten is based on a biological misconception on the
part of Aristotle. Aristotle believed that only the male provided the
"form" for the child, the female provided the "matter", that is, the
material nurturing of the child in the womb. Since deviationfrom
"form" m~lJns, biologically speaking, having defects (for example, a
child bom without certain limbs or organs is defective), women, in not
resembling their formal originators, men, are seen as defective males.
Once more, we have the problem here ofAquinas using ideas which are
biologically inaccurate in order to justify male superiority over females.
In Aquinas' reply to the second objection, he states that there are
different aspects to the subjection ofwomen. He states that there is no
servile subjection before the fall into sin, but that there is always in any
state an element of subjection: he mentions economie and civic forms
of subjection as examples. In other words, there is a bad (servile) and
good form of subjection, based on the right order of things. Between
men and women, this proper form of subjection is based on the fact
that men are "wiser" and "in man the discretion of reason predomi-
nates" . Apart from the unfounded claim that males have more reason
than females, there is also again in this case a matter of theological
dispute about the accuracy ofAquinas' argument.
Aquinas, as we have seen, argues that the subjection of women to
men is a good and normal matter, part of the general order of things.
On what grounds is this argument based?There is no indication in the
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passageofGenesis here being discussed that Evewas subjected to Adam.
The notion of the subjection of the female to the male is introduced in
Genesis 3. Here it does not refer to the state ofparadise but is introduced
in the context of the curses which befelI women as a result of the fall
into sin. The curse of subjection is rnentioned together with a number
of other curses: for woman, bearing children in pain, for man, tilling
the ground, working hard, and, for both, eventually death. These curses
are not particularly attractive, hence one can object to Aquinas that not
only was there no question ofwomen being inferior to men in paradise,
resulting in the "proper" subjection ofwomen to men in that state, but
that there are, contrary to his claim, no sinless forms of subjection of
women. Subjection is precisely a result of sin, according to the Biblical
account. The fact that mankind has been actively reducing the impact
of the curses in Genesis 3 (lengthening lifespan, reducing labour pains,
lightening work loads) would seem to point to a more liberal interpre-
tation of the subjection ofwomen: that it is time to deal with that curse
as well. Aquinas' interpretation, in not going down this road, articulates
a more secular reality, the factual subjection of women in his society.
Putting this argument in a more theological mode, Aquinas here fails
to t~e into consideration the liberating aspects of the Bible as the
history of redemption and of the way people have dealt with the curses
placed on them, ideas which he does introduce elsewhere in his theo-
logy.8
In his reply to the third objection, Aquinas states that even though
women are an "occasion to sin", they are properly created by,ç:;odfor a
common good, and that God can turn all evil to a good end. This
argument resembles Aristotle' s position that woman was created to serve
a greater good, reproduction, and that one should regard her in that
perspective. One can object to Aquinas' use of this view that women are
not totally responsible for the fall into sin. Adam too sinned by eating
of the forbidden fruit and to emphasise that, creation only fell into sin
when heacted contrary to God's commandments.
Aquinas' views as presented here have had astrong influence on
western theology. We can still recognise some of the ideas put forward
here. That women exist mainly for the purpose ofreproduetion has been
the position of the Church for centuries. In addition, the notion that
men are more perfect, active, intelligent and wise can and has been used
to justify male rule within the Church.
The Creation ofWoman
In the second artide of Question 92, the question raised is whether
woman should have been made from man, as the creation story in the
Bible relates. This question arises because, as is stated in Objection I, it
seems unnatural that a female would come into being from a male.
Objection 2 states that it seems unnatural that people ofthe same species
are not made from the same material: that is, Adam was made from day
or slime, while Eve was made from a different material, Adatn's rib;
Objection 3 states that if Eve was created from out of Adam's rib she
would be so closely related to him that they should not have had a sexual
relationship or children.
Aquinas, in his reply to these Objections, states that God made Eve
out of Adam. In his Answer to the objections, he makes a number of
points. Firstly, Eve, the woman, was made from Adam, the man, in
order to give Adam dignity as the "first principle" of the human race
just as God is the first principle of the universe. Hence Eve's creation
out of Adam is an affirmation of Adam's supreme human status.
Secondly, Aquinas argues that God's making woman out of a part of
the body of the man means that the two are of the same nature, they
are to "deave together", that is, spend their lives together in marriage.
Thirdly, .Aq~ïinas argues that woman was made out ofman to symbolise
"...domestic life...in which the man is the head of the woman". His
"headship" is based on and symbolised by the fact that the man is the
"origin" or "principle" of woman. Finally, Aquinas states that woman
was created out of man in order to symbolise the sacramental meaning
of the fact that the Church has her origin in Christ just as Eve has her
origin in Adam.
I would like to respond to this Answer of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Although this artide contains discussions which are not all that pressing
in our time from a theological or social point of view, a number of
assumptions and assertions about women are here being made which
reveal deeply embedded prejudices about women.
The first point which Aquinas makes in his answeris to say that the
creation ofEve from out ofAdam is a confirmation ofAdam's position
as male, image of God, and principle of the human race. One could
object that God created Eve out of Adam, but that that does not
necessarily mean he now has greater status as "principle of the human
race". IfAquinas were consistent here, he would again refer to Aristotle's
view that the material cause of generation is not the formal cause. In
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other words, when women provide the material for generation this
seems to justify their inferiority, when men provide the material, it turns
them into a "first principle". Women's contribution to the origin of
man does not seem to have had much effect on her status; a rnan's
contribution affirms his superiority. "Origin", apparently, does not as
such guarantee primacy, unless one has already decided the question of
primacy beforehand and on grounds extern al to the argument being
presented. Aquinas does point out that Adam's material is used by God
to create Eve. Adam is not of course her father. But this remark by
Aquinas muddies the argument concerning the male being the principle
of the human race even further.
In the second and third points in Aquinas' answer he argues on the
one hand that the creation of Eve from out ofAdam means that they
are to be united, to be one, to cleave together in monogamous marriage.
On the other hand, however, the creation ofEve out ofAdam does not
mean, for Aquinas, the equality of these two halves. He reiterates his
position that man is the head of woman and of the household. Here
one can introduce the same objections to Aquinas' position as were
mentioned earlier in the discussion ofAquinas' notion ofthe subjection
ofwomen to men as already having taken place in paradise.
Finally, Aquinas argues that there is a "sacramental reason" for the
creation ofEve. Just as the Church takes her origin in Christ, so woman
has her origin in man. I will return to this point at the end ofthis chapter
when I will discuss imagery relating to women and the Church.
In the final two articles ofQuestion 92, dealing with the.creation of
woman, Aquinas first considers the Question and Objections to the
issue of whether woman was made from the rib of man and secondly
whether she was formed immediately by God or by other causes, such
as man, angels or causes within creation itself.
In his Answer to the question ofwhether woman was made out of
the rib of man, Aquinas states:
I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of
man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the
woman should neither use authority over man, and so she was not
made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to mari's
contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet,
Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of
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Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed - namely, blood
and water - on which the Church was established."
Aquinashere restates his view that there is a hierarchical relationship
between men and women. A woman must not have authority over a
man but at the same time she is not his slave. One could object to this
by referring back to the original question of whether Eve should have
been made from Adam. Aquinas, aswe saw, argued that this was indeed
so. But this means that Eve is made from a higher type ofmaterial than
Adam himselfwas. Is this not a relevant point to consider? If one sees
the process of creation as a process of continuing completion and
perfection in the course of6 days, asAquinas does, then it is logical that
Eve comes out of a higher type ofmaterial than Adam. It would be less
logical to have an idea ofcreation coming to its epitomy in the creation
of the male, taking a down turn at the creation of. the female, the last
being created, a "necessarily lower" afterthought. Already in the Middle
Ages, Hildegard von Bingen, a German mystic, discussed this point and
considered the possibility that perhaps woman, not man, is the highest
creature made by God.
Accordlhg to Aquinas, woman sho~ld be neither the head nor the
slaveofman, yet for all that she should be subservient to man. One may,
spuriously, consider the fact that man does not come from worrian's
head or feet either and ask what this implies in terms of male authority
overwomen.
Aquinas here affirms the hierarchical order between the two genders.
Such a position is quite typical of a Judeo-Christian theological view of
women in that it combines complementarity with hierarchy. Summa-
rizing responses to such a view, one can attempt to solve this double
attitude towards women in various ways. Firstly, it is possible to try to
reverse the hierarchical order, that is, by pointing out that women can
very wen be seen as the final and highest product of creation: there is
no real reason why it should have been men. Secondly, one can focus
on the complementarity aspect of this view of women and emphasise
that it affirms equality. Then Aquinas' most fundamental presupposi-
tion underlying his response is simply that of the bias that men are
superior to women. Lastly, one can also attack the attempt as such to
make distinctions between men and women "before God".
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Next, Aquinas deals with the problem of the precise material from
out of which Eve was made. Here he once more appeals to the power
of God:
Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into
existence outside the ordinary course ofnature. Therefore God alone
could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman
from the rib of man."
Aquinas replies to the objections that they should take into account the
Divine Power to perform an act ofcreation. Ultimately, it was God who
created Eve, hence Eve was not the daughter ofAdam.
3 Woman as the Image of God
I would now like to turn to the next question, Question 93, which deals
with "The end or term ofthe production ofman". I would like to discuss
the fourth artide of this question, in which the question is posed,
"Whether the image of God is found in every man?"
In this artide, St. Thomas Aquinas is dealing with a question
debated more often in the Middle Ages,whether all men are created in
the image ofGod and whether women are or are not made in His image.
He first considers the following Objections. Firstly, women, although
part of the human species, are nevertheless not made in the image of
God. Only man is because "man is the image ofGod, but woman is the
image (glory) of man". The second objection is that some people are
chosen by God to be made in his image (predestination) and others are
not. Thirdly, it is argued that no man is the image of God because all
people are sinful.
Aquinas' Answer is that man is the image ofGod. This isso primarily
by virtue ofhis intellect. He notes three ways in which man is the image
ofGod: firstly, through his intellectwhich giveshim a "natural aptitude"
for loving and understanding God; secondly, since God has both love
and intellect in Himself, man is his image in grace before God; and
thirdly, man is the image of God because he is created in His image,
can re-create His image, and, in the case of the blessed, he can be a
likeness of God. In his replies to the three objections mentioned above,
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Aquinas considers the issue of whether women too are made in the
image of God.
In his response to the first objection, he states that both men and
women have an intellectual nature and therefore both are made in the
image of God in the "primary" sense. But in the so-called "secondary"
sense, Aquinas adds, man is made in the image of God and woman is
not. Aquinas states that, quoting Paul, "man is the image and glory of
God, but woman is the glory of man...For man is not of woman, but
woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for
man". Once again, Adam is more "primary" and closer to God than
woman because ofthe idea mentioned earlier that man is the origin and
the principle of the human race through Adam.
One can make several objections to Aquinas' distinction between a
primary and secondary sense in which woman is and is not the image
of God. The position he takes here can be called one of "spiritual
equality and natural subordination", that is, in the spiritual, primary
sense, woman is equal to man and is made in the image of God, but in
terms of the natural order, that is, the male-female relationship, man is
in the image of God and woman is so only in a secondary sense." The
duality onpiritual equality and natural subordination is deeply embed-
ded in the Christian tradition. As such, it is not a completely consistent
position to take. If, from out of the perspective ofGod men and women
are to be seen in terms of His image, then why, when women are
regarded in terms of their relationship to men are they placed on a
secondary plane? This means that somehow the position men have
determines the place ofwomen, but God's position does not have any
effect on the place of women. Since God seems to be rather more
important than males, this seems at least on first sight a curious view to
hold. Aquinas, as we saw when discussing the previous question,
however, does not consider this view to be unusual in that the order of
nature demands subordination.
The idea that women are not the image of God in the secondary
sense is related to ideas, mentioned in Questions 92 and 93, concerning
the role of Eve as mother of the human race. As we saw, Adam is the
principle of the human race. Woman was created for man, not man for
woman. We saw, however, that Aquinas holds that woman was created
out of man as an act ofGod, but not ofman himself (thus avoiding the
problems of too close a genetic relationship between the two). Over
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against this, one might consider the notion that woman has always, at
least after the creation, been the origin of man. That is according to
Aquinas precisely her value in creation, as we saw when considering
Question 92, artiele 1. Once more, a view of HiIdegard von Bingen, the
medieval mystic, can perhaps provide an alternative. She argues that
women are the origin of the human race and have the primary power
ofreproduction. She even attributes the fall into sin to this characteristic
ofwomen: Satan tempted Eve because he was jealous ofher reproductive
12powers.
In these particular articles by Aquinas concerning women, it is
obvious from the terminology used that ideas of Aristotle were of
influence on his views, mixed togetherwith theological ideas taken from
the Bible and the Christian tradition, with, in the background, deeply
held social-cultural convictions concerning men and women. As has
been shown, there are a number of assumptions and assertions which
can be debated, both in terms of the compatibility ofAristotle' s views
with those of the Bible as weIl as in terms ofAquinas' interpretation of
the Bible passages mentioned.
4 Aquinas' View ofWomen in the Church
There are several implications of the hierarchical view of the nature of
women, implications which have had an inestimable impact on the view
ofwomen and their role in society in western culture. This impact has
been greatest in three areas: in marriage, with respect to job opportuni-
ties and in the Church itself. As a result ofa view ofwomen such as the
one which Aquinas distilIs from Genesis, women are to be subservient
to men in marriage, are not to have authority over men within society
and have a secondary role to play in the Church. I would now like to
turn to Aquinas' view ofwomen in the Church." Aquinas is consistent
in his interpretation of the implications of Genesis for the nature of
women and his interpretation of New Testament passages on their role
in the Church. Aquinas discusses a number of New Testament texts
referring to women, in particular texts written by St. PauI. There are
several issues which he discusses.
Following the Pauline guidelines, Aquinas considers it improper for
women to have their heads uncovered (I Corinthians n:3-15) and to
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speak in Church (I Corinthians 14:34-35). Men, on the other hand, can
do both. This is based, as we sawearlier, on the notion of the man being
the image of God in a primary sense, the woman not.
Central to his views ishis interpretation ofthe allegory ofthe Church
as the Bride of Christ (Ephesians 5:21-33). The concept of the bride is
that she is faithful, loving, and subservient to her husband (I Peter 3:1;
Collosians p8). In this sense, the Church is the Bride of Christ.
Transferring this to the allegorical mode, this means that the Church,
with men in the dominant role, is to have afemale role towards Christ.
Men thus have a female role towards Christ, and women have a female
role both towards men and to Christ on a higher plane. This is a mixed
metaphor which, on one level, makes sense, on another it does not. I4
The metaphor begins to strain when the bride-bridegroom imagery is
repeated on the concrete male-female level within the Church itself.
For, are not all the members ofthe Church female in relation to Christ?
Why then distinguish within the Church between men and women?
The image ofrnan-woman, Christ-Church, is prevalent in Christian
theology and gives rise to a number ofpoints and arguments. It has been
used as a powerful argument to justify male rule over women in the
Church bfái:aUSe it introduces suprahuman or divine reasons for female
subjugation. But on the suggested alternative interpretation of this
image it means that there is no justification for a male hierarchical
structure within the Church, for, as was stated, everyone in the Church
is equally the Bride ofChrist. Admittedly, however, the image does seem
to justify a hierarchical structure outside the Church, specifically in
marnage.
With respect to women, marriage and subservience within the
Church, Aquinas makes a distinction between married and unmarried
women. Au unmarried woman does not participate in the "bride" role
in the same way as a married woman, who must be subservient to her
husband. Her subservience to men is placed within the context of the
Church and not her husband.? But, on the other hand, married and
unmarried women entering into religious orders are still subservient to
male supervision of that order.
A text which might be able to liberate women from all these
hierarchies based on gender would seem to be Galations 3:28 where it
is stared that there is no male and no female in Christ. This would seem
to imply that the spirituallife is neutral with regard to gender. Aquinas,
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in commenting on this text, however, daims that the text refers only to
the next life in which there will be no more distinction made, but that
in this life the distinction still applies."
5 Theoretica! Contexts for InterpretingAquinas' View ofWomen
A number of theoretical contexts have been suggested in the literature
to give a wider perspective on Aquinas' view on women. I shall here
present two approaches which I think are innovative and interesting.
Firstly, I would like to return to the notion mentioned earlier, that
of "spiritual equality and natural subordination". "Spiritual equality"
refers to the idea in Christianity that men and women are equal before
God. Both are called to the faith, are capable of religious feeling and
action, have equal chances ofattaining salvation, are both human in the
sense that they have reason and are created in the image of God. This
means that on the spiritual level, both genders have enough spiritual
and rational ability to understand the contents of Christian doctrine
and its implications in personal and social terms.
lt has been argued that in this sense, Christianity improved the
image and position ofwomen, in contrast to the way the Greeks thought
about them. While perhaps in some forms of Greek thought doubts
were cast on the heights which women could reach with their emotional
and rational powers, this no longer seems possible in Christian thought,
In contrast to this optimistic interpretation, it has also been argued
that the concept of "spiritual equality" is a limited one. As C. Capelle,
in an exceedingly thorough book shows, it is unclear whether Aquinas
truly considered men and women to be equally rational: some passages
indicate that he thought this, others that he did not." In addition, the
notion of equal spiritual emotionality and insight seems undermined
by the fact that Aquinas insists on the fact that women must be
subservient to men in the faith, symbolised most clearly by the fact that
they are not allowed to perform the priestly sacramental functions.
Women are thus in a sense spiritually equal to men, but not entirely
so. Contrasted to and related to the concept of"spiritual equality" is the
notion of "natural subordination". Natural subordination refers to the
human, everyday realm of life, in which concrete phenomena such as
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gender play a role. N atural subordination refers to the hierarchical
structure in this world, the rule ofthe higher over the lower in allspheres.
But it is not at all easy to distinguish between the realms ofspiritual
equality and natural subordination or, for that matter, to keep them
apart. As we have asked before, if people are equal before God, why are
they unequal among themselves?This question is also raised byAquinas
and has, ofcourse, bothered the Church for millennia, not only in terms
of male-female distinctions but also in terms of the social concerns of
the Church in general. Aquinas, aswe saw, makes use ofAristotle' s idea
that there is a proper order for the general good. Women, however, have
not been convineed that their subordinate role is for the general good
and would, I think, tend to believethat such ordering ofmale superiority
over against female subservience is rather too "natural" a male impulse.
To what extent is the concept of natural subordination a theoretical or
theological notion and to what extent is it a rationalisation ofnecessities,
needs, instincts or desires? Or is this concept actually an expression of
the incapacity of human beings to create a world with justice and
equality for all?
A second context within which Aquinas can be read is a rather more
sympathetsc one in the sense that it can be argued that Aquinas is
mirroring existing social relationships and conventions in his philoso-
phy and theology. Hence, reading his views in a historical context, they
should be judged as reflections of his time. C. Capelle, in her study of
Aquinas' view of women, tends to some extent towards this type of
interpretation, yet for all that, she does note that if one looks at .the
historical dimension, one should also consider the eschatological one.
In other words, even if one glosses over Aquinas' views as the reflection
of views of his time, as a theologian, Aquinas should have been aware
of the Biblical view of history. The Bible tells a history of people and
their faith. It speaks of a movement towards greater revelation and
realisation of God's purpose of earth. There is very little dynamism in
Aquinas' views, that is, a forward looking element pointing towards a
perspective of liberation. As in the case ofAristotle, gender roles are set
and not seen as subject to alteration in different historical periods or
societies.
Capelle argues that if an eschatological perspective were built into
Aquinas' views, it would offer more openness to women. Her book
moreover indicates that the medievalswere aware ofchanges in the view
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and place of women in history and in different societies. They were
aware of the fact that in the Bible there are indications ofchanges from,
for example, a polygamous society to a monogamous one, from allowing
divorce to forbidding it. I think that the eschatological approach is an
interesting one in that it both allows for the fact that Aquinas reflected
the views of his time and yet presents him with the issue of how to
approach the problem of the analysis of the nature and roles ofwomen
in a historical setting.
In the next chapter, I will deal with the protest of the late medieval
- early Renaissance writer, historian, poet and philosopher Christine de
Pizan against images ofwomen which fail to do justice to their courage,
intelligence, strength and faith. Unlike St. Thomas Aquinas, Christine
de Pizan places the question of images of women within a truly
wonderful eschatological perspective of rehabilitation and liberation.
She argues that women, with the help of God Himself, will overcome
the injustice which has been done to thern.
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5 Christine de Pizan. The Feminine Response
1 Introduetion.
This book opened with the Pythagorean women speaking about their
role in the home and expressing ideals of female virtues. I would like to
close off the discussion of the ancient and medieval period as well as
open the way to modernity with another female voice, that ofChristine
de Pizan. I will begin by contrasting Christine's view of women with
that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Then I will turn to Christine'sview of an
alternative history ofwomen which iswritten with the desire to radically
change views of women in light of the principle, as it was stared in
Descartes' philosophy later, of thinking and reasoning for oneself, not
purely out of tradition.
Christine de Pizan (1364-143°) was a poet, novelist, historian and
philosopher. Born in Venice, Italy, her father. Thomas de Pizan, was a
government official. He later received the job ofadviser to King Charles
V of France and after three years the family moved to Paris to join him
there in 1369. Christine, married in 1379 at age fifteen to Etienne de
Castel, had three children and was widowed in 1389 when her husband
died oftheplague. She was then twenty-five. Her father had passed away
as weU, and Christine, her mother and her children had a hard time
making ends meet. She had legal problems as well, concerning money
matters, but, asshe protests, women were unable to go to court to defend
themselves and present their case.After fourteen years oflitigation these
problems subsided, and Christine was making a living by writing.' ,
2 Literature and Mythology as Allegory
We have seen how powerfuUy the traditional image of women was
supported and strengthened with arguments by Aristotle and St.
Thomas Aquinas. These two thinkers had a great deal of influence not
only because of the persuasive arguments with which they placed
women within the familial and reproductive order but also because their
views were sanctioned by the authority ofChristian theology.
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Chris tine de Pizan realised that if she were to deal with the negative
views ofwomen which she considered to be prevalent in her society and
time, she must deal with the theological context ofsuch views. She was
not a theologian, nor was she concerned with presenting a feminist
theology in the modern sense of the word. A feminist theology would
attempt to attack Bible interpretations which lead to a negative view of
women by means of a traditional scholarly method. Christine instead
puts her literary skills into the battle and writes a feminine allegory,
based on a Bible story. As such, this approach is very effective indeed.
The result is a critique which does not enter the literal battleground but
rises above it as an inspiration. Christine demonstrates by her artistry
that there are effective ways with which to attack chauvenism and to
give women new perspectives on themselves. Christine presents her
alternative view ofwomen in the Book ofThe City ofLadies. The title of
the book refers to the City of God, spoken of at the end of the Bible
book Revelation. According to the Bible story, after the last plagues are
cast over the earth, the end ofthe world has come, and the last judgment
has taken place, a city descends from heaven. This is the new Jerusalem
and in it can enter only those whose names are written in the book of
life.The city has no suffering in it and no day or night, for there is always
light in it. God is its light, and Christ, its lamp, rule the city.
In the Biblical account, the construction ofthe city has a symbolical
significance. The city has a radiance like a jasper and a clarity as crystal.
It has high walls and is square, having in total twelve gates, three gates
on each side. On the gates are inscribed the names of the twelve tribes
of Israel. The wallof the city has twelve foundations, with written on
them the names of the twelve apostles of Christ. The number twelve
and its square, one hundred and fourty-four, are the proportions of the
length and area measurements of the city. These numbers symbolise
perfection and point to those who may enter the city: the spiritual
descendents ofthe twelve tribes and the twelveapostles. The city is made
entirely of precious metals and stones. The gates are each made of a
single pearl." The Bible story already contains symbolism; Christine de
Pizan uses symbolism as weIl but transforms its content and direction.
In the Bible story, the city is allegorically called the Bride, the wife
of Christ. Christine de Pizan also imagines a city, but it is not only
symbolically female but isspecificallymeant for real-lifewomen. Instead
of the male names found on the walls and foundations, Christine
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imagines that the foundations are formed by courageous women, the
walls by the wise, and the buildings by the pious. Por Christine, the
most noble women are found in the third category; they are the saints
and martyrs, those who were courageous and persistent in the faith. As
Christine writes:
We must lodge holy women with the Blessed Virgin - the holy
Queen of Heaven, Empress and Princess of the City of Ladies - to
keep her company and to demonstrate God'sapproval of the
feminine sexwith examples ofHis giving young and tender wornen
(just as he has done with men) the constancy and strength to suffer
horrible martyrdom for His holy law, women who are crowned in
glory and whose fair lives serve as excellent examples for every
woman above all other wisdom. Por this reason these women are
the most outstanding ofour City.'
Hence she appeals to Mary, the mother ofChrist, to come and take her
place as the ruler of the city. Christine thus replaces the masculine
symbols of the Bible story with feminine ones.
Christiae's setting of this allegory is also allegorical: she herself is to
"build" the city. Her book opens with an account of herself sitting at
her writing table, feeling saddened byall the negative things which have
been said throughout the ages about women. Suddenly three women
appear to her. Theyexplain to her that they are the allegorical figures
of Reason, Rectitude and Justice. These are the three weapons needed
in the battle against sexism. Prejudices against women can only be taken
away by thinking about women in a rational way, in seeing them in the
right light and in being fair when judging women.
The three figures are presented in an evocative way. On the one
hand, they resembie Greek inspirational muses. Afrer all, Christine is
supposed to be inspired by them to write an attack on sexism, girded
by the strength ofthe values these women represent. On the other hand,
these allegorical figures can be associated with the Christian notion of
angels as messengers of God. Christine herself calls the women Ladies
and, even more tellingly, describes them as daughters of God. By the
respect she shows the Ladies and her description ofthem as living in the
presence of God, she implies that Reason, Rectitude and Justice are
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characteristics of God Himself. She does not hesitate to represent these
characteristics of God as feminine.
The women command Christine to build the city of women. The
ground must be prepared, foundations laid, mortar and bricks, the
material from out of which the city is to be built, be gathered and
cemented together. These steps in the construction of the city refer to
the material which Christine is to use to demonstrate the good qualities
ofoutstanding women. The purpose of the book is to document all the
courage, wisdom and piety of women from ancient times onwards.
Christine includes many ancient legende, Greek mythology, Bible
stories and historical material to make her case on behalf of women.
Christine states that her purpose is to clear women ofall the bad things
that have been said about them and to inspire other women to achieve
the things their great predecessors have done. Christine thus uses her
material in a surprisingly modern way: to rediscover and rewrite femi-
nine history.
3 Alternative Images ofWomen
In her Book ofthe City ofLadies, Christine de Pizan's main aim is to find
different patterns, formulate different notions, of the nature ofwomen
and their capacities. She thus expresses a very fundamental desire of
women: to alter the way in which they think about themselves and how
others see them. To illustrate this, I will discuss one example taken from
each of the three categories in which Christine describes women: the
example I have chosen from the category of courageous women is that
of the Amazons, of wise women, Minerva, and of pious women, St.
Catherine.
Christine de Pizan mentions the Amazons at the beginning of her
book, placing the stories she tells about them in the category of stones
which are placed in the trenches dug to contain the foundations of the
City of Ladies. They belong to the foundations because theyare proof
of the fact that women are as strong, courageous, determined and
warlike as men."
Christine relates that the Amazons lived in Scythia, a land located
on the edge of the great Ocean which surrounds the entire world. Long
ago, all the males of fighting age were killed off in warfare, leaving only
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women, elderly men and children in the land. The women decided that
they would run their country themselves and they banned all men from
their territory. The women went to neighbouring countries at certain
times of the year in order to conceive children. They returned pregnant
to their country and when they bore male children, they would send
them back to their fathers, keeping their female children themselves.
Next, they formed a kingdom with two queens at the head, Lam-
pheto and Marthesie, and proceeded to create astrong armywith which
they attacked their enernies. The Amazons owed their name, "without
a breast" to the fact that they would cut off one breast in order to be
able to weild a shield (left breast) or a bow (right breast).
Christine relates at length the military exploits of the Amazons,
claiming that their power lasted for eight hundred years, up to the time
of the conquests ofAlexander the Great. They captured neighbouring
countries, gaining enormous wealth and a fearsome reputation. They
ambushed, defeated and killed Cyrus, King ofPersia, and his armywhen
they invaded their country. In turn Hercules and Theseus, King of
Athens, decided to invade. They thought that the Amazons were such
a risk to Greek security that a pre-emptive strike would be a good idea.
The result'f,f this encounter was a truce between the Amazons and the
Greeks. Later, however, the Amazons supported the Trojans in their
fight against the Greeks, wishing to revenge the death of Hector at the
hands ofAchilles.
Reading the stories Christine de Pizan relates about the Amazons,
different people may react in different ways. For Christine and many of
her readers, the message of these stories is a positive one: it shows that
the Amazon women are physically and mentally strong, independent,
and courageous. In some readers, these stories may arouse a feeling of
dismay at the fact that women are being described as having charac-
teristics which at times resembie arguably the worst traits in men.
The most telling example of this issue is the story of the Amazonian
Queen T omyris and King Cyrus. T omyris hated Cyrus so much that
she had him and his nobles taken prisoner, had the nobles beheaded
before Cyrus' own eyes, beheaded Cyrus and threw his head in a
container containing the blood of his nobles so he could drink their
blood, as it were. T omyris did have a reason for what can be considered
to be excessively brutal behaviour: Cyrus had treacherously killed her
son after T omyris had sent her son to see him. Christine is here
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illustrating the fact that the world can be a cruel place where women
can be betrayed or victimized but that it is important for women to
stand up for themselves and to turn, if necessary, the weapons of
oppression back on the oppressors. But anyone with pacifist convictions
or someone who entertains the idea that the New Jerusalem should
contain only those who refrain from matters such as revenge and
murder, may be surprised at the desireofChristine to place these women
in the foundations of her City. On the other hand, as far as Christine
is concerned, the City must be strong and protected and who is better
able to symbolize that than the Amazons?
Another reason for focussing in on matters such as killing and
warfare is that this realm is usually regarded as exclusivelymasculine as
weU as the most dramatic side of the public realm and its heroism.
History is often thought to be the story of kingdoms, rulers, wars,
conquests, and heroic deeds. By describing the Amazons as she does,
Christine de Pizan removes female imagery away from the realm of the
domestic and private by describing women who are more than equal to
men in this particular area of the public realm.
An example ofher desire to seewomen as able to compete with men
in th:eir field is Christine'saccount ofthe Amazonian queens Menalippe
and Hippolyte. These queens, on hearing that Hercules and Theseus
have invaded their land and that their soldiers are killing people in the
night, ride out to meet the two men to take them on singlehandedly.
They attack Hercules and Theseus personally and both manage to
remove the enemy men from their horses. But Menalippe .and Hip-
polyte are captured in the ensuing sword fight on the ground and are
taken captive. Ancient sources, Christine de Pizan relates, try to explain
Hercules' initial defeat by blaming his horse: what else can you blame
when the most powerful man of Greece is defeated by a woman?
Another aspect ofChristine's descriptions ofwomen is that they always
remain feminine. Her descriptions of the physical appearance of her
heroines is an indication of this. At one point, she describes the death
of Queen Penthesileia of the Amazons on the battlefield. Pyrrhus,
having ordered his men to have only one purpose in mind, that is, to
capture Penthesileia during a battle, finally succeeds in having her
surrounded. She is attacked and her helmet is hit offher head. Pyrrhus,
before clefting her brain with his sword, sees her beautiful blonde hair
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flowing free1y. In fact, all the Amazon women were, according to
Christine's account, stunningly gorgeous.
Another characteristic which Christine attributes to the women she
describes is that many of them are so proud and independent that they
refuse all their lives to sleep with men, or, as in the case of the Amazons,
only for the purpose of reproduction. Christine does not impose a
binding view ofmarriage on her women: she praises the decision on the
part of women to remain independent. This medieval view of the
re1ationship between the genders is unique in western culture. In the
times before and after this period, the ideal woman is married and
oriented totally to the man or men who give her a purpose in life (we
shall see, this view as especially prevalent in the I8th and I9th centuries).
In the medieval view, in keeping with the teachings of St. Paul in rhe
New Testament, marriage and re1ating to the other gender are not the
highest ideals, but the highest ideals are spiritual, as Christine also
argues. While in the Church the independenee ofwomen was partially
taken away again by the fact that males were to rule over women, for
Christine the ideal is it true independence: the capacity to cope for
onese1f in life.
The w9men Christine describes all through her book represent for
her rhe best possible combination of male and female characteristics.
She wishes to come to a reaffirmation of the feminine in two ways: on
the one hand as not being any less than the masculine and able to
compete with the masculine on its own ground; on the other hand as
feminine, itse1fstrong and beautiful.
4 Alternative Conceptions of the Historical
The second theme which I would like to discuss in light ofChristine's
book is that of the historical. Perhaps one of the most important
questions here concerns the accuracy of the historical accounts and the
implications of the accounts. At first sight, Christine does not seem to
be overly conscientious about the historical authenticity ofher sources,
at least as measured by present-day standards.
An extreme example of this issue is Christine's account ofMinerva.'
Christine places her in the category of intellectual women, regarding
her as a woman who invented a number of sciences. She expanded the
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Greek alphabet so that more could be expressedand written in the Greek
language, thus laying the foundation for the great tradition of Greek
writing. She discovered numbers and a simple method ofaddition; the
art of spinning wool and weaving; the making ofoil by pressing olives
and other fruits; the making of carts and wagons; making armour from
iron and steel; the strategie ordering of men to form a fighting army;
and making flutes, trumpets and other musical instruments. Our reac-
tion to these claims today may be that they are completely out oforder
as historical facts. But Christine does have a very interesting argument
to support her claims, an argument of demythologisation. Christine
claims that the Greeks saw Minerva as a goddess precisely because of
her wisdom and accomplishments. The Greeks could not believe that
a woman was capable ofsuch things and hence when she died they built
a temple in Athens to her honour, calling her the goddess ofwisdom,
weapons and knighthood, In the ternple, they placed a statue of her,
that is, of the historical Minerva. Beside the statue they placed an owl
to defend her, but also to symbolise the fact that both warriors and wise
people must be alert day and night, whether against attack or in order
to make the best of situations.
In this way, Christine not only demythologises the goddess Minerva
in order to place a woman, Minerva, in the history books, but she also
makes an interesting move here in terms of the theme of the New
Jerusalem. For surely, in the same sense that it is daring to describe
characteristics of God as being symbolised by Ladies and having fero-
cious Amazons in the city, it is alsodaring to have Greek goddessesliving
in this Judeo-Christian place. But for Christine de Pizan, if Minerva is
not a goddess after all, but a highly talented historical figure, she fits
into the city.
Another example of the issue of historical accuracy is Christine's
inclusion ofmaterial from legends concerning the livesof the saints. In
the last part of her book, she describes the life of St. Catherine of
Alexandria. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the story of St. Catherine
follows upon those of the Queen of Heaven, Mary, and of Mary
Magdalene. St. Catherine receives this place of honour because she is,
among others, the patron saint of philosophers. She was a philosopher
who defended the truth of the Christian faith against heathen philoso-
phers and she was martyred in this cause. Because her death was that of
being racked on a wheel she is, somewhat macaberly, also the patron
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saint ofwheel makers. The story of St. Catherine is as follows. She was
the daughter of King Costus of Alexandria. One day, when she was
eighteen, she was bothered by the bleating of sacrificial animals who
were being gathered together for sacrifices to the gods by emperor
Maxentius. She rushed to the temple where Maxentius wasworshipping
and proved to him by philosophical arguments that:
...there was only one God, Creator ofall things, and He alone should
be worshipped and no other. When the emperor heard this beauti-
ful, noble, and authoritative maiden speak, he was completely
amazed and utterly speechless:nevertheless, he stared at her intently.
He summoned from everywhere the wisest philosophers known in
the land ofEgypt, then quite famous for philosophy, and some fifty
philosophers were assembied who were quite unhappy to learn why
they had been sent for, and said that a trifle had moved the emperor
to assembie them from such distant lands in order to debate with a
maiden. In short, when the day of the debate arrived, the blessed
Catherine so successfully overwhelmed them with her arguments
that they were confounded and unable to answer her questions. On.
this account the emperor was beside himselfwith anger, which had
no effect at all, for theyall converted, thanks to the divine grace in
the holy words ofthe virgin, and confessed the name of]esus Christ.
The emperor had them burned for this disrespect, and the holy
virgin comforted them in their martyrdom, assuring them that they
would be received in eternal glory, and she prayed to God to uphold
them in true faith. Thus, because of her, they were ranked among
the blessed martyrs.Î
After this event, Maxentius lusted after Christine, who repelled his
advances. He had her imprisoned, tortured and starved her, but to no
avail. He then had her placed on two wheels with razor edges turned
against each other so that the person placed on the wheel would be cut
in two. Catherine was placed naked on the wheel, the wheel was broken
by angels and the torturers were killed. At that, the wife of the emperor
was converted: he had her beheaded, along with other converts. Finally,
Maxentius had Christine successfully beheaded. Although this story
contains a great number of deaths, it is in Catherine and Christine's
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world view more important for a person to die in the faith than to live
a godless life.
As to the question at issue here, that of historical accuracy, we may
perhaps assume that both Christine and the medieval Church consi-
dered stories ofthe livesofthe saints to be historically accurate accounts.
We can conclude that Christine was at least not creating a fanciful
history merely for ideological purposes but was using a historical
methodology acceptable in her time. On the basis of today' s more
stingent criteria for historical accuracy, the existence and dating of the
life ofSt. Catherine is a problem. But I think that it is important to note
that our present-day emphasis on historical accuracy has its limitations.
By this I mean that modern people often fail to understand the
importance of religious stories as inspiration: a matter vital for under-
standing Christine de Pizan's project as a whole. In our abstract,
rationalised culture abstract religious principles form the basis ofspiri-
tuallife. We feel that we have no need anymore for illustrations, perhaps
comparable to the example given in the introduetion to this book, of
Heidegger figuratively tearing the illustrations out of the Nietzsche text
he is commenting on. Yet for medieval people, abstract principles were
transmitted in concrete, inspirational stories such as that of St. Cathe-
rine. The story points not so much to St. Catherine herself, but to the
example of faith which she sets. The stories of the lives of the saints are
to inspire people and ultimately to speak of the glory of God. In this
sense, I think that it can be argued that the question of the historical
accuracy of the stories of the lives of the saints is one which must be
evaluated in light ofthe inspirational function ofsuch stories in religious
experience.
I think that there may weIl be a conneetion between the idea that
the stories of the livesof the saints are inspirational and Christine's aim,
discussed earlier, to describe the lives of noble, talented, wise and
religious women in order to inspire her fellow-women and to improve
their self-images as women. Nevertheless, historical accuracy and inspi-
rational value are interdependent: an untrue historical fact is less inspi-
ring than a true one. This problem has also presented modern feminists
with methodological headaches, as I shall try to show in the next section.
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5 Christine de Pizan and Modern Reconsiderations of History
Christine de Pizan and many women after her argue that the achieve-
ments of women in the public and intellectual realms have been
under-reported in the history books. They argue that there were a great
number of talented women in history who were ignored by male
historians and culture. They then attempt to prove that women were
and are capable of all the things men are, perhaps of even more, were
they not ignored by history or prevented from being active in traditional
male realms. Their opponents, on the other hand, would argue that
there are perhaps only a handful of talenred women in history and that
this proves the natural inferiority ofwomen in the public realm.
In the womeri's movement, this debate has moved in the direction
ofa critique ofideology. Women in the women's movement claim that
it is not simply a question ofhistorical material and facts but that there
is a need for a re-evaluation of historical method itself. Perhaps history
writing is something which serves the self-image of society and perhaps
those who write history are the winners perpetuating their own victory.
Perhaps, feminists suggest, there are also some faulty psychological
dynamics g(;~ing on when women are excluded or downgraded and when
traditional patterns are continually repeated when writing history.
Those who wish to claim that there are a large number of great
women in historywho have been ignored by male historians and culture
run the risk that their claims will be considered to be exaggerated. Those
who claim that history has dealt fairlywith talented women run the t;jsk
ofbeing corrected by the research continually coming out. But perhaps
the most insidious of those who enter into this debate are those who
agree that women have indeed achieved great things in history but who
use this fact to cover up the sexism in society. Praising the achievements
of great women from the past can be a ploy to cover up the fact that
these women struggled to an extraordinary extent to achieve what they
did. In this sense, they are not typical of all women but their achieve-
ment is so rare because they were able to rise above the sexism in the
societies in which they lived. Those who wish to call attention to great
women may want to claim that there is appreciation in society for
talented women and that therefore there is no sexismin society. In other
cases, the examples of great women have been used against women:
would you as a woman like to have a steely disposition or the same
74 Christine de Pizan. The Feminine Response
character as some famous role model? Such role models then get a
negative connotation.
For Christine de Pizan, there were many great and talenred women
in history and they are a positive example ofwhat women can do. Sexism
for her loses all its justification ifmen would only consider what women
are capable of. In this sense, Christine de Pizan is gloriously optimistic.
But her views go further than sheer optimism: Christine de Pizan notes
that it is important for people to think for themselves, to look beyond
prejudices and received opinion. In this sense, Christine de Pizan stands
halfway between the medieval period and that of modernity, the time
at which a new emphasis was placed on thinking for oneself and
considering matters anew. In the next chapter, we shall see what the
results of such rational methods are for the view of women and their
role ~:n society.
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6 Women, Reason and Scïence
1 Introduetion
In the last two chapters, we considered the view of women presented
by St. Thomas Aquinas in the scholastic tradition of the Middle Ages
and the response to the medieval view ofwomen by Christine de Pizan
in terms of rewriting and re-evaluating this tradition. Modern philoso-
phy is dated from the rëth century, the period when, in western thought,
the break becomes definitive between the Middle Ages and modernity.
This change is most specificallycharacterised by an orientation towards
reason as opposed to the acceptance of the traditions of ancient Greek
and medieval philosophy, of Christianity and the Church, as the basis
for philosophy and philosophical method.
In this chapter, I would like to look at some implications ofthe new
emphasis on reason for the view ofwomen and their place in society. I
will first look at the relevanee for women of the new ideal of rational
science in the modern sense of the word by discussing some of the ideas
of Francis Bacon. Secondly, I willlook at Descartes' idea of reason as
providing universal access to knowledge for everyone. I will then turn
to two iss~s raised by the views of Descartes: firstly, that of the
relationship between the practical and thetheoretical sides ofreason and
secondly, that ofthe abstract universality ofreason. Aswe shall see, these
two issues are relevant to the question of the view of women in the
context of modernity.
2 Francis Bacon: Reason, Science and Women
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is known as one of the founders of the "new
science". In Bacon'sview, the time has come to create a new scientific
method, free of superstition. Because it would be entirely based on
reasonable assumptions and logical steps of reasoning, it would be
capable offreeing mankind from superstition aswell. The task ofscience
is to investigate nature and to discover its secrets in order to free
mankind ofall sorts of ills caused by nature, such as disease and natural
disasters. Bacon sees nature as something good, but only insofar as its
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evil effects are brought under control by knowledge and the power of
reason. The most famous statement which Bacon makes outlining the
need for a new scientific method, as opposed to the methods of "the
ancients" such as Plato and Aristotle and as opposed to the superstitious
approaches to nature of the Alchemists, is found at the beginning ofhis
book The Masculine Birth of Time or The Great Instauration of the
Dominion ofMan over the Universe.
The remarkable thing abour the way in which Bacon presents his
views here is his use of a number of male-female images and presuppo-
sitions. Bacon assumes that the scientist is male. He denotes nature as
female, which is a traditional image for nature. His book opens with
instructions to "my son" to put aside all prejudices and to aim for a more
complete understanding of nature through science. He writes: "My
intention is to impart to you, not the figments of my own brain, nor
the shadows thrown by words, nor a mixture of religion and science,
nor a few commonplace observations or notorious experiments tricked
out to make a composition as fanciful as a stage play. No; lam come in
very truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to
your service and make her your slave".I
The male scientist, according to Bacon, has the task of "wresting"
the secrets of nature from her. In expressing this idea, Bacon uses
terminology which is rather odd. Carolyn Merchant, in her book The
Death ofNature discusses this idea of "wresting secrets" from nature,
noting the parallel in imagery here used by Bacon with concepts more
fitting to his other occupation, that of solicitor general and ~,ord chan-
cellor of the British government. In this role, Bacon was an advocate of
torture (indeed, that is how he got promoted from the former govern-
ment job to the latter by James I). He was active in the persecution of
women for witchcraft and used the tactics of "wresting secrets" from
them in the all-too-literal sense. In this context, Merchant finds terms
such as "wracking" as used by Bacon disturbing.'
The second attitude which Bacon describes in sexual terms is that
of the male scientist looking at nature with admiration, respect and an
attitude of listening to what she says. Only the humble, devoted lover
can expect nature to reveal her secrets. In this attitude, "The method
must be mild and afford no occasion of error".3 Bacon sees this court-
ship, as it were, ending in chaste and holy wedlock: "My dear, dear boy,
what I purpose is to unite you with things themselves in a chaste, holy
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and legal wedlock; and from this association you will secure an increase
beyond all the hopes and prayers ofordinary marriages, to whit, a blessed
race of Heroes or Supermen who will overcome the immeasurable
helplessness and poverty of the human race, which cause it more
destruction than all giants, monsters, or tyrants, and will make you
peaceful, happy, prosperous, and secure"." Bacon seems to assume that
there are also "unclean" relationships possible between the scientist and
nature, for example, those of sorcery and witchcraft. The chastity of
matrimony symbolises the attitude which the scientist must take to
nature, that of research and reason. The children, described in male
terms as heroes and supermen who will prevail over the evils in the
world, symbolise the power of reason and empirical knowledge.
The two attitudes, one of wracking secrets from nature, the other
of modest courtship and holy matrimony, seem contradictory, but in
fact are not. They express two possible ways in which a male can
approach a female: by using power, control, and violence or submission,
love, and gentleness. The ultimate aim is the same: to get something
from her, in this case, to obtain truths from nature and control over her.
3 Theoretica! Discussions and Implications
Although Bacon uses many other images and examples to illustrate his
ideal of a new scientific method, his use ofsexual imagery is significant.
I think that a number of issues can be raised concerning this type "of
imagery and the presuppositions which underly it. These issues concern
Bacon'snotions of the masculinity of scientists and scientific thought
as well as the ideals of control and manipulation of nature.
It is dear that for Bacon scientific activity is a male monopoly. This
is no doubt due to the factual situation in his time: men were better
educated than women, had more free time, associated with each other
to increase scientific knowledge, and encouraged each other in these
activities. Women kept to the home, were busy there, and did not
participate in the public realm of intellectual pursuits. In the r6th
century, it was considered unfeminine to participate in male activities
such as doing science: such a woman was a "public" woman.' But,
despite all the new emphasis on reason versus superstition, no change
was considered in this situation by either Bacon or most other men, nor
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were changes made through some kind of intellectual revolution by
women. As such, this is a curious fact, no doubt due to strong social
and cultural influences.
Another issue which can be raised in light ofBacon's view ofscience
is whether there is a specific kind of scientific thought and rationality
which can be characterised as male thought." What does it mean when
Bacon addresses the scientist as "my son"? In other words, if scientific
thought is done and is to be done exclusively by men operating within
a certain intellectual tradition, will this give rise to an ideology of male
thought? But what would that be? Feminist philosophers have noted
that there are a number of possible characteristics of such thought: for
example, the emphasis on abstraction and control which Bacon men-
tions as characteristics of his new science. This would mean that men
want to fit the empirical, multifacetted elements of nature into theo-
retical frameworks and theories. The diffuse, the diverse, is categorised,
systematised, and made "statie". In a view such as that of Bacon, such
characteristics seem essential to science and would, in his eyes, perhaps
even necessitate the exclusion of female thought and values.
The feminist critique of the theoretical, abstract, and controlling
nature of science and scientific thought is, of course, not uniquely
feminist. Especially in the 20th century critique ofwestern thought and
the scientific mentality, the ideals of science as expounded by Bacon
have been discussed at length. Feminists often see the root origin of the
characteristics of modern science as the masculinity of this type of
thought, created by men in a male mental atmosphere. Other thinkers
have argued that various cultural influences are responsible for creating
these characteristics ofscientific and rational thought: for example, the
influence of Christianity, through which nature came to be seen as
abstractable and controllable because in this religion it has been demys-
tified.
Feminists, again in keeping with similar attempts by other zoth
century critics, have tried to formulate an alternative view of science.
An example of the specifically feminist critique of this type of thought
is presented by L. Irigaray in her concept of the "mechanics of fluids"."
Irigarayargues that scientific thought, as male thought, has always been
one-sided, She suggests that science should now begin to incorporate
feminine elements, elements traditionally associated symbolically with
the feminine and elements which reflect characteristics of the way
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women think. Irigaray argues that female thought is more fluid, focuses
more on change, makes room for the chaotic and the irrational. It is
unlike the strict, controlling, and static theory formation of male
thought. She notes that a number of male thinkers have also reconsid-
ered the characteristics of modern scientific thought, There have been
many changes in modern scientific method that are a result ofdevelop-
ments in relativity theory and quantum mechanics in which there is an
acceptance of the limitations of theory, of the chaotic, the changeable,
and the non-quantifiable. Sandra Harding, an American philosopher of
science, even calls late zoth century scientific thought female thought
because the move to postmodern conceptions in science is a move away
from traditional norms of male thought,
It certainly seems true that in our culture there has been a move
away from the ideals of control of nature and static theorising about
nature. But some questions concerning the feminist critique do remain.
I think that it can be argued that contemporary changes in the view of
scientific method and the scientific attitude towards nature are emerging
out of paradigm changes which have come about in science itself. And
has contemporaryscience not been thought out mainly by men? In
addition.jhe alternative view of nature as something we do not control
or which should not be exploited in a ruthless fashion can also be seen
as dictated by necessity, based on scientific testing of, for example, the
environmental consequences of such exploitation, again done mainly
by men. In addition, the lessening of the threat of nature and the
environment to mankind makes controlless necessary. For example, if
one lived in an environment in which one could be eaten by a lion, one
would want to control the lion population. In an environment in which
lions are almost extinct or in which people are protected against attacks
by lions, control of lions seems not only unnecessary but an attack on
the right of lions to live and have their own territory. Perhaps such
dynamics also account for the increased call to lessen our ideals of
control of nature.
But even more troublesome are the questions concerning male and
female thought. Are critics who now see the coming of the age offemale
thought in science not simply repeating the same preconceptions which
have pervaded western thought in the first place?In other words, would
not even Bacon himselfagree thatwomen are lessrationalising and more
attuned to nature than men? Perhaps we need to break through the
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sexism ofseeing thought as male and female in order to avoid repetitions
of stereotyping. It may not be wise to rehabilitate the old taboos
concerning female thought as true after all, but now in a positive sense.
What would a new "female" "postmodern" science be like?A great
deal of traditional science and the resulting technology is still valid
thanks to the theoretical, abstracting and controlling characteristics of
such thought. What, equally successful but without the negative side
effects, could we replace it with? How radically could a new conception
of science eliminate the negative side effects of the old science?Ifa new
science is possible, how radically different would it be from traditional
science?Is a new science only a change oficing on the cake oftraditional
science or is there a real possibility that in the future we may develop
completely new paradigms? Or are the confusions now being caused by
traditional science already indications of a paradigm change situation?
Perhaps it is important, when asking these questions, to distinguish
between theoretical science and technology, and between different fields
in science, in which there are different theoretical fashions and develop-
ments. Sometimes in a certain science theories emerge which create a
broader view of rationality or nature than was previously the case.
Sometimes the development of theories have a direct, liberating impact
for women. In that case, it is perhaps better for feminists to do science
and keep a watchful eye on developments than to aim for a completely
new type of female thought in science.
Another issue that arises concerns the effects on women of the kind
of science for which Bacon argued. A number of thinkers have noted
that male dominated science means that women are sometimes victi-
mized by technology created by men. Very fewwomen will want to hold
that the practical, technological consequences of science have been all
bad or have given thern nothing at all. From switching on a light bulb
to having medical treatment, everyone profits from "thepractical appli-
cations of science. The point, however, is that women have sometimes
been treated instrumentally and unfairly by male dominated science.
An example which is often cited is that of gynaecology. Historical
developments in this field have been seen as controversial. For example,
the development of tongs to deliver babies was an invention of a male
doctor in the r8th century and led to people preferring doctors to
midwives to deliver children. This was so despite the fact that the tongs
were not in all casesgood for the mother or child. Another area in which
René Descartes: Theoretical Versus Practical Reason 81
the interests of male doctors conflicts with those of the mother is the
way mothers are made to deliver their children in positions more
convenient for the doctor than for them. The greatest scandal in this
field, however, was the epidemie of infections and deaths in the 19th
century when women began to go in great numbers to hospitals to have
their children. The result was that, in an age unfamiliar with bacteria
and viruses, doctors without sterilized hands were the cause of innume-
rable deaths. In our day, controversy has arisen about the development
of family planning medications made almost exclusively for female
consumption. This issue takes on especiallyschocking forms in the third
world where instances occur of women being given long lasting and
strong anticonceptive medication which is not permitted in western
countries. Another heritage of the battle between male and female
interests in this field is the continuing strife between mostly male
doctors and mostly female midwives. Although the midwives are mak-
ing a comeback, for generations they have been depicted as dangerous
amateurs. 8
Bacon' s view ofnature as female lives on to this day, albeit in forms
he himselfdid not antielpare. In the anti-science viewofscience, Bacon's
ideas are perpetuated in the idea that women are closer to nature than
men. On the other hand, it can be argued that because of that, they
would never have allowed the world to become such an exploited,
polluted and technologised place as it now is. But where would science
and nature be if women had been in charge? We will of course never
know, since science is one of the most strongly male dominated areas
we have in our culture. Science done bywomen using different methods
and having other values is therefore more part of the future than of the
past.
4 René Descartes: Theoretical Versus Practical Reason
The second thinker whom I would like to discuss in this chapter is René
Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes, like Bacon, emphasises the impor-
tance of reason in philosophy and science. He is known best for his
famous statement of "modernity", found in the opening words of his
Meditations onFirst Philosopby.' Descartes here states that he wishes, for
the first time in his life, to free himselfofall ideaswhich he has accepted
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as true on the basis of authority and tradition and to base his thought
solelyon the principles of reason. Hence his meditations: his aim, he
states, is first, to eliminate everything which he has accepted hitherto as
true, then to come to a rational, necessarily true foundation for all
thought, and then to see the world anew in light of this foundation.
Such a project is "modern" in the sense that it breaks with the notion
that philosophy and science should be based on tradition, as it clearly
was in medieval thought, Reason is now to become the final arbitrator
of truth,
A considerable amount of research has shown that the view of
Descartes as the philosopher of modernity and the forerunner of the
Enlightenment ofthe 18th century is not entirely correct. Descartes had
a Jesuit philosophical training, which was, however, considered inno-
vative in his own time. Yet his philosophical background is still strongly
influenced by concepts coming out ofthe scholastic tradition, apparent,
for example, in his metaphysics and his attempts at formulating proofs
of the existence of God. In this sense, Descartes is a symbol for the
changes in western thought which were occurring in his time and in
which he participated. Nevertheless, Descartes himselfbelieved strongly
in the ideal of reason. He notes that the entire inspiration for his
philosophical and scientific thought is the idea of founding them on a
unified system with mathematics at its basis."
Por women, Descartes' beliefin doing away with ideas from the past
not based on reason would seem to provide hope. Their natures and
gender roles could be reconsidered in light of this new thinking,
unencumbered by the weight of the traditions of the Greeks and the
medievals. In fact, this was partially true: a number of women in
Descartes' own time and afterwards did see his philosophy as a new
inspiration and a statement of liberation." This was primarily due to
the "democratie" way Descartes saw knowledge. He speaks for example
f b "d "d . " "ho on sens, goo sense an sensus communts, common sense or t e
natural capacity for arriving at true knowledge which all people have.
All people of all classes and both genders can, according to Descartes,
develop themselves intellectually in philosophy and the sciences. On
this point, Descartes can be seen in the context of attempts by rzth
century thinkers to broaden accessability to knowiedge. An example of
this is the widespread tendency, which Descartes also followed, to begin
publishing works in the vernacular rather than in Latin.
The Practical BasisofTheoretical Thought
Yet, aswe allknow, the true revolution in the beliefin the intellectual
abilities ofwomen and the opening up of higher levels of education to
women did not really begin to take place until the 19th century. In the
following discussion of Descartes, I would like to look at some of the
reasons for this lack ofa breakthrough, linking these reasons to some of
Descartes' own views and practices. The theme I have chosen to lead us
through this discussion is that of the tension in Descartes' thinking
between theoretical and practical reason.
5 The Practical Basis of Theoretical Thought
One of the most interesting aspects ofDescartes' thinking about reason
is his idea that theoretical reason, in order to develop, must do so under
certain practical conditions. Since we can safely assume that one of the
main barriers to women participating in science and academie pursuits
is practical, it is all the more striking that Descartes actually discusses
this issue with a woman, Princess Elisabeth of Bavaria.
During the 1640's, Descartes corresponded with Princess Elisabeth
concerning •philosophical, religious and personal matters. Ilo Elisabeth
was, of course, not an average woman of Descartes' time: she was a
wealthy woman ofa good family living in the elegance ofthe diplomatic
center of The Netherlands, The Hague. For a woman in such a
privileged position, it would seem that there is no real barrier for her to
develop herself, to obtain a good education and to deepen her know-
ledge of philosophy and science. Yet her letters are full of complaints
that she has no time to read and to think more deeply about the issues
she is corresponding about with Descartes. A similar complaint was
made by another friend ofDescartes, Queen Christina ofSweden, who
would get up at 5:00 a.m. in order to have some free time for reading
and thinking. It would seem that the demands made on women in such
high circleswere considerable and that the notion ofprivacy and offree
time to read and think were not very much part of the culture. This was
most likely all the more a problem for women of the lower classes.
Descartes, in response to these complaints by Princess Elisabeth,
notes that there are practical requirements for the exereiseofreason and
the development of theoretical thought. He notes that he himself has,
in this respect, always followed a number of rules. The rules are related
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to the type ofintellectual activity involved. In his letter ofJune 28, 1643
to Elisabeth, he writes:
First, then, I note a great difference among these three kinds of
notions, in that the soul conceives itself only by the pure under-
standing; body - that is to say, extension, figures, and movements
- can likewise be recognised by the understanding alone, but very
much better by the understanding aided by the imagination; and
finally, the things that pertain to the union of the soul and the body
are recognised only obscurely by the understanding alone or even
by the understanding as aided by the imagination; yet they are
known very clearly by the senses.13
Descartes here mentions three types of knowledge, corresponding
to three mental funtions: that of pure intellect (e.g. metaphysics): that
of intellect aided by the imagination (e.g. physics): and knowledge of
the senses (e.g, everyday experience). The thinker must adjust his
thinking habits to these distinctions. Descartes gives Elisabeth the
following guidelines:
...I have never employed save very few hours each day at thoughts
that occupy the imagination, and very few hours per year at those
that occupy the understanding alone, and that I have devoted all the
rest of my time to the respite of my senses and the repose of my
mind; I even reekon among the exercises of the imagination all
serious conversations, and everything that requires attention. That
is what made me retire to the country.l"
Descartes' time schedule no doubt reflects what for himis the best
way ofdoing things and, considering his great achievements in philoso-
phy and science, it obviously works. Yet the likelihood of Princess
Elisabeth and a great number of other people following this type of
schedule and coming up with any achievements at all is small, And not
everyone can retire to the country for peace and quieto Descartes,
curiously, does not mention the fact here that there must surely have
been a great deal of study behind his thinking: he was very knowledge-
able about all the latest intellectual developments of his time. How-
and when - is Princess Elisabeth to achieve anything like that? Of
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course, not many people in the world have achieved what Descartes has,
but how is Elisabeth to achieve anythingon the basisof this advice?Nor
does Descartes mention the fact that the price he paid for his peace of
mind was a solitary existence, having abandoned his lover and illegiti-
mate daughter.
At issue here is "having no time". In the case of the privileged
Princess Elisabeth, this may seem a trivial complaint. But what does it
mean when women say that they "have no time" to achieve the same
things as men in science or other academie pursuits? Perhaps having no
time has deeper meanings: one is too tired, or one isnot reallyinterested,
or one has taken on too many other marginal tasks which distract from
what should be the main aim, or demands are made on a person which
means that that person is robbed of the time for intellectual activities.
People tend to have time and make time for achieving things which
are rewarding in a certain social-cultural setting. While for men there
would be great rewards and admiration for intellectual achievements,
someone like Princess Elisabeth may have been subconsciously influ-
enced by the fact that her surroundings placed value on activities such
as those of caring for her family and fulfilling her considerable social
obligationsrît is then admirable for both Princess Elisabeth and Queen
Christina to have made the effort they did to "make time". For most
women (and men), "time" is a reality which prevents them from
achieving what they wish. A notabIe example of this is the fact that
research has shown that in the yearsin which men obtain PhD's, women
are having their children, a situation which creates a tremenddus
handicap for women who wish to pursue academie careers.
6 The Tension Between the Practical and the Theoretical
We saw in the discussion of Bacon'sview of science as a male activity
that it is possible to give "male" and "female" characteristics to thought
and reason. The question concerning a possible difference between male
and female thought also arises in the correspondence between Descartes
and Princess Elisabeth. Perhaps it is a coincidence, but Elisabeth, the
woman, advocates a concrete and practical position, while Descartes,
the man, argues for a much more abstract and theoretical approach. The
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issue which illustrates this difference in approach is that of the relation-
ship between body and soul.
One of the main themes of the correspondence between Descartes
and Elisabeth is Descartes' dualism. In his Meditations, Descartes con-
duded that body and soul are manifestations of two distinct substances,
the material (body) and the mental (soul). These two substances, he
argues, have entirely different characteristics: body has extension, is
located in time and space, and hence is subject to the laws of physics.
Mind, he argues, has none of these qualities: it is immaterial, is not
locatable in any specific space and is not empirically observabie. For
Descartes, the fact that body and mind have completely different
characteristics means that he has presented a proof of the immortality
of the soul. The only difficulty with his theory is the problem of the
interaction between body and soul. How can substances of an entirely
different nature interact with each other?
For Elisabeth, the metaphysical arguments used by Descartes to
prove his dualism do not fit in with her everyday experience ofwhat it
is to be a concrete person. For her, mind and body are linked together
and influence each other. A human being is one interactive whole.
Descartes goes to great pains in order to convince Elisabeth that his
view is theoretically correct, even though he understands her intuitive
objections. Descartes also admits that in this particular case the truth of
metaphysics and the truth of everyday experience are difficult to uni te;
instead, he argues that the results of knowledge obtained by the pure
intellect and by sense experience can be at varianee with ofte another.
While our reason tells us that body and mind are totally different and
separate, our everyday experience is that of the unity of the two. In this
sense, his concession to Elisabeth is that she may think of the soul as a
kind of rarefied material and thus she can imagine the interaction
between body and soul. This is, however, onlya method of imagining
the situation, not the metaphysical truth.
Gradually, the letters between Elisabeth and Descartes change in
tone and content. Elisabeth describes the tensions she is experiencing
caused by family matters and her illnesses as a result of these problems.
It emerges that she is subject to psychosomatic ailments, such as
depression and lack of energy. Descartes responds very openly and
sympathetically, offering her comfort and advice. From this correspon-
dence, one can see that Elisabeth was very concretely concerned with
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the relationship between body and soul, experiencing their interrela-
tionship in her own life."
In the end, it does seem as though Elisabeth, together with other
critics of Descartes' dualism, had some influence on him. His last
published book was ThePassions ofthe Soul, containing a physiology of
human functioning and emotions." With its more empirical approach,
this book attempts to deal with the issues raised by Elisabeth. Descartes
posits the idea that the rational soullives in the pineal gland, surrounded
by the cavities of the brain. Animal spirits move throughout the body,
ending up in these cavities and by their movement they give information
to the soul. Thus Descartes tries to explain the influencing and being
influenced ofthe body by the soul, thus accounting for their interaction.
Descartes did not feel comfortable with the book, not publishing it
imrnediately after it had been written. This book lacked, no doubt, the
rigor and search for necessarilytrue metaphysical truths which his earlier
work on the body and soul had had.
Were Elisabeth' s objections to Descartes' dualism typically female
ones? Could the debate between Elisabeth and Descartes demonstrate
that male and female thought are based on different intuitive insights?
Would Deseartes' separation ofbody and soul have had no influence at
all ifhis intellectual peers had been women instead ofmen? Would not
the whole biological make-up ofa woman protest at the likelihood ofa
soul independent of the body?
Unfortunately, these hypotheses have never been tested by a poll on
how men and women react to Descartes' views (although that would.be
a very interesting experiment indeed). Many male philosophers were
also troubled by Descartes' dualism and philosophers such as Male-
branche, Spinoza, Berkeley, La Mettrie, Kant and Husserl struggled to
find different answers to the puzzles surrounding dualism with which
Descartes had presented them. Many contemporary philosophers would
also object to astrong dualism ofbody and mind, although, interestingly
enough, there are still a considerable number of Cartesian theories
around in present day philosophy of mind. The dualistic theories tend
to be in areas in which forms of physicalism or information processing
theories play a role. Philosophers who are more oriented to a view of
people in organic or wholistic terms are usually less dualistic.
What, then, influences a theory and its acceptance or rejection in
areas such as science and philosophy? Is gender a factor, together with
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cultural and intellectual-historical presuppositins and developments?
But the question which continually ariseswhen speaking about the issue
ofthe relationship between gender and thought iswhetherwomen really
want their thinking to be seen as more concrete, earthly and practical
than that of men? Would that mean a new ghetto for "female thought"
or something positive, a different voice in a male dominated discussion?
As was noted earlier, there are examples of prominent female
thinkers who took the ideas of Descartes concerning the equal ability
ofall people to reason as their inspiration and the justification for their
intellectual activities. Descartes' friendships with Princess Elisabeth and
Queen Christina also show his inspirational and sympathetic qualities.
Yet these women were relativelyprivileged and Descartes made no effort
to engineer social change on a broader scale.Descartes was anything but
a social activist by nature or a practical philosopher concerned with
social questions.
Descartes of course had no notion of an alternative type of female
thinking: his idea ofreason is based on the ideal ofmathematics, an area
in which answers are either right or wrong, independentlyofthe thinker.
His concept ofreason means on the one hand equal access, on the other
hand. that women had to function within the parameters of a view of
science and philosophy based on concepts developed by men.
7 Conclusions
In this chapter, a number of issues concerning reason, science, and
women have been raised. More questions remain after mulling over the
discussion of these issues than have been answered. Perhaps answers are
not even desirable, considering the misuse that can be made of them on
both sides of the gender gap. Can science be called "male", nature
"female"? Is there such a thing as male and female thought? How are
we to explain the fact that the achievements of males and females in
areas such as science and philosophy are so different? Why did the birth
of the new ideals of reason and science not create new opportunities for
the education and development of women? Why were the social and
gender-political conventions not changed in light of the new fashion in
thinking? Who had the responsibility for making such changes: people
such as Bacon and Descartes or revolutionary women themselves? Or
Conclusions
are the changes hoped for by some women at that time doomed to failure
because society was not at all prepared for them?
This period did not, as we have seen, become the start of a revolu-
tionary historicalliberation of women. This is not only because of the
failure in the rzth century to bring about such change in society as a
whole, but because the Enlightenment ofthe 18th century did not build
on the positive insights which arose in the rzth century. We have seen
that Descartes' view of the universal access to knowledge for everyone
and reason as something all people have potentially has positive impli-
cations for the liberation ofwomen. It would seem that the Enlighten-
ment, in holding reason and human equality to be its highest values
would bring ideas such as those of Descartes into practise. Unfortu-
nately, however, in terms of a view of society and the nature ofwomen
and their roles in it, some very different developments came about, In
the next chapter, I will describe how they come to expression in the
philosophies of Rousseau and Kant, and how Mary Wollstonecraft
attempted to show that such philosophies did not apply Enlightenment
ideals of reason to women.
Notes
I Francis Bacon, TheMasculine BirthofTimeorTheGreat Instauration ofthe Dominion
of Man over the Universe, in: Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: Philosopher of
Industrial Science. New York, Schumann, 1949, p. 62. This passage is also quoted.by
C. Merchant, TheDeathofNature. New York, Harper and Row, 1980, p. 170. See also,
F. Bacon, Works. Collected and edited by J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath.
Stuttgart, Fromann, 1961-1963.
2 C. Merchant, TheDeathofNature. New York, Harper and Row, 1980, p. 168-169.
3 F. Bacon, TheMasculine Birth of Time or The Great Instauration ofthe Dominion of
Man over theUniverse. in: Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: Philosopberoflndustrial
Science. New York, Schumann, 1949, p. 62.
4 F. Bacon, TheMasculine Birth of Time or The Great Instauration ofthe Dominion of
Man over theUniverse. in: Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: Pbilosopber oflndustrial
Science. New York, Schumann, 1949, p. 72.
See for example, Angeline Goreau, "Alphra Behn: A Scandal to Modesty", in: O.
Spender ed. Feminist Theorists. Three Centuries of Key Women Thinkers. New
YorkJToronto, Random House, 1983, p. 8-27.
Women, Reason and Science
6 See for example, Sandra Harding, "Is Gender a Variabie in Conceptions ofRationality?
A Survey of Issues", in: Dialectica 36 (r982, 213), p. 225-242. This artiele also contains
a large number of further references to lirerature on this issue, p. 240-242.
7 L.Irigaray, Cesexe qui n'en estpasun.Paris, Minuit, 1977. English translation: This Sex
Which Is Not One. trans!. by C. Porter with C. Burke. Ithaca, New York, Cornell
University Press, 1985, p. ro6-1I8.
8 For a detailed discussion concerning this particular issue, see: Adrienne Rich, Of
Woman Born. New York, W.W. Norton, 1976. See especially Chapter 6, "Hands of
Flesh and Blood, Hands of Iron",
9 R. Descartes, ThePhilosophical Works ofDescartes. trans!. by E.S. Haldane and G.R.T.
Ross. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Volume I, 1973, p. 144-149.
ro Bernard Williams, "Descartes, René", in: P. Edwards, ed. TheEncyclopedia of'Pbiloso-
phy. New YorkiLondon, MacMillan and the Free Press/Collier MacMillan, 1967.
Vo!. n, p. 344.
II For example, Madame Marie de Gournay who, inspired by Descartes' view of
rationality wrote, among other books, L 'Égalité des hommes et des femmes. See: Janna
Thompson, "Women and the High Priests of Reason", Radical Philosophy 34 (1983,
Surnrner), p. ro, There were a considerable number of well-educated and talented
women in the rzth century who wrote on philosophy, among them Anne Conway
and Anna Maria van Schurman. In addition, a point of debate found in l?th century
European literature is the discussion as to the natural inferiority, superiority or equality
ofwomen to men. An example ofthis type ofliterature isJohan van Beverwijck's book
Van de wtnementheyt des vrouwelicken geslachts, (On the excellence of the female
gender) published in 1639 in The Netherlands.
12 See J.Blom, Descartes. His MoralPhilosophy and Psycbology. Sussex, Harvester Press,
'b
1978, for this correspondence.
13 R. Descartes, Descartes - His Moral Philosophy and Psychology. trans!. by J.J. Blom.
Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978, p. 1I3.
14 R. Descartes, Descartes - His Moral Philosophy and Psychology. trans!. by J.J. Blom.
Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978, p. 1I4.
15 R. Descartes, Descartes - His Moral Philosophy and Psycbology. rransl, by J.J. Blom.
Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978, p. 1I8-24I.
16 R. Descartes, ThePhilosophical Works ofDescartes. trans!. by E.S. Haldane and G.R.T.
Ross. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Volume I, 1973, p. 329-427.
7 Rousseau, Kant and Wollstonecraft; The Education
ofWomen
I Introduetion
In the previous chapter, we considered the relationship between the
development of ideals of reason and the "new science" and the view of
the nature and roles ofwomen. Although few breakthroughs occurred
for women in the réth and I7th centuries, one would expect that the
I8th century, the time of the Enlightenment, would finally see the start
ofliberating developments. This is, however, not the case for a number
of reasons. Although the philosophical-theoretical view of the Enlight-
enment is that it is a period ofstrongly developed rationality in thoughr,
in society the emphasis was on art and artifice. In the growing middle
and upper classes ofEurope, in the fine urban cultural settings ofwhich
Paris seems to have been the epitome, the search for elegance and
refinement implied that, among ethers, gender roleswere more strongly
defined than ever and that a complex code of"morals and marmers" was
developed to guide relationships between the sexes.'
The literature of this period on morals and manners is based on the
idea thatdî.ere is a male and female nature as well as an ideal dynamic
between men and women which reflects their natural and social ten-
dencies. The purpose of this type of literature is to formalise the
male-female relationship, thus creating principles by which a young
man or woman can be guided towards his or her appropriate charac-
teristics, habits and talents by means of a social and sexual education.
The concept of "education" as used here is different from the contem-
porary idea ofeducation since it is both broader and narrower. On the
one hand, it isnarrower because it does not passon scientific and cultural
knowledge in the many subjects as we know them today. On the other
hand, this concept of education can be seen as broader in the sense that
it includes guidance for the way to behave, virtues to have, ideals to
strive for and social skills to be developed, all ofwhich enable a person
to fit into a social and sexual role.
In the views of education we will be looking at, males and females
are thought to need a different education to suit their masculinity and
fernininity, their rationality and lack of it. The development of human
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reason in its "neutral" connotation is only applicable to men. In this
literature, men are regarded as rational and ashaving the task ofthinking
deeply and critically, thus freeing themselves from tradition: the En-
lightenment ideal. Women, however, in contrast te Descartes' ideas on
this matter, are not to share in this training. In some cases, as we shall
see, women are referred back to authority and tradition as that which is
to regulate their thought and behaviour.
In this chapter, I will discuss some viewson the education ofwomen
by looking at two writings in the genre of morals and manners:
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile and Immanuel Kant's Observations on
theFeeling ofthe Beautifuland the Sublime.
Rousseau and Kant both take the ideaofhuman nature as their point
of departure. They ask what the relationship is between human nature
in general and the nature ofmen and women. The way they answer this
question has implications for their views of the education of men and
women and the roles they are to play in society. After my discussion of
these issues in Rousseau and Kant, I will turn to the British philosopher
MaryWollstonecraft's critique ofRousseau'sviewson these issues. I will
then discuss some issues related to the way she presents her alternatives
forthe education ofwomen.
2 Human Nature, Male and Female Nature
For Rousseau (1712-1778), the basis for a theoretical view of.people is
the concept of nature and human nature. In contrast to the Christian
tradition, asexpressed by St. Thomas Aquinas, human beings, according
to Rousseau, have not received their nature through divine creation.
Instead, mankind evolved from a state of nature towards life in civil
society. For this reason, the point of departure for speaking about
human nature is in terms of primitive man and his and her evolution.
The state of nature is for Rousseau the situation in which our most
fundamental characteristics were formed and which still represents the
most authentic expression ofwho we reallyare ashuman beings. Culture
is for Rousseau a later, possibly deforming, development. Therefore, in
order to determine the basic natures ofmen and women, Rousseau goes
back to an analysisoftheir natures and gender roles in primitive society.
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According to Rousseau, men and women at first lived fairly inde-
pendently ofeach other, meeting only for the purpose of reproduction.
When the female conceived, she drove away the male and raised the
children on her own. In Rousseau's view, men and women only begin
to be dependent on each other with the development ofsocial structures.
With the emergence of the idea of the home and a community based
on an economie structure, people discovered that a certain role division
was useful: the man proteering thè home and his children, hunting and
providing, the woman taking care of the home and the children. Basic
to Rousseau's ideas concerning the differences between male and female
is that males are physically stronger than females and yet are dependent
on thern for sexual gratification; and that females should use all their
powers and charms to gain control over men, thus compensating for
their lack of physical strength. A woman must develop characteristics
which make her attractive to men, able to bind a man to her; in order
to do this, she has to give up her independenee and learn to exploit the
male weakness for sexual gratification. A man must develop charac-
teristics of being strong, independent, rational and in control: on the
other hand, he too has become dependent on the woman. The result of
this divisip.~ of strengths and weaknesses between the genders is that it
enables them to manipulate each other to get their way.'
In his book on education, Emile (1762), written at the request of a
female friend, Rousseau develops a theory of education which he
believes reflects the natural tendencies of male and female.' Education,
a product of civilisation which can pervert the natural tendencies of
'c
mankind, must be employed, perhaps paradoxically, to bring out the
best ofthe natural. Education must therefore he in harmonywith nature
and help nature come to its fuH potential in culture. In Book V ofEmile,
Rousseau discusses general principles for the education of women and
gives his impression of "the perfect woman", Sophie, whom Rousseau
himself, the mentor of Emile, has selected to be Emile's wife."
In Rousseau's view, if there are differences between men and
women, this must be reflected in the type ofeducation they are to have.
He opens this book with the question of the extent to which men and
women share a common human nature and to what extent they differ
from each other. Rousseau admits that he does not know how far the
differences extend between male and female: do they pertain only to
their body build or also to their character? Rousseau resolves this vital
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issue with the rather casual remark that men and women are mostly
equal and similar, but the perfect man does not resembie the perfect
woman. Women must develop their strengths and advantages, men-
tioned above, in the battle of the sexes.
An important aspect of this sexual strategy for women is that she
learn to (appear to?) please the male. She is to exploit all her feminine
charms. She must take care to have the best possible outward appea-
rance, must learn to show offher delicacy and weaknesses, and, perhaps
most importantly, she should demonstrate at all times her reticence in
desiring a man: modesty is astrong weapon in the battle of the sexes.
She must thus play a game with the man, being attractive to him and
at the same time not giving any indication ofthe strength ofher feelings.
A man must be kept guessing, at a distance. His strong urges will then
inflame him with passion; this passion is fuelled by his urge to protect
his own self-love and pride. In this way, the woman, according to
Rousseau, physically weaker and more in need of a man than he is of
her, will be abIe to tie him to her.
The educational process through which these feminine skills are
developed is described at length by Rousseau. Rousseau, for example,
states that girls, like boys, are, when young, equally aggressive, enjoy
playing outside, and love exercise. But young girls soon show their true
nature and impulses when they begin preferring to play with dolls and
show their love for mirrors, jewelry, and lovely cloth. In having these
interests, they show that their nature is to develop their taste and that
they want to be considered to be attractive.' Rousseau also gotes that
little girls dislike learning to read and write, but can fantasise for hours
about becoming just as attractive as their dolls when they grow older.
Since their own attractiveness is their major asset, educators should
encourage this type of play."
A girl should also be taught to accept the authority of her elders.
This is an important issue for Rousseau since this will prepare the girl
to later accept the authority ofher husband. Her educators can encour-
age this by, for example, helping a girl dress her doll tastefully and to
make matching combinations of clothes and accessories. Noting that
the little girl needs help with this, Rousseau sees this activity as a first
step in leaming that she is dependent on ethers. Boys are more inde-
pendent and therefore should be given rational reasons for doing or not
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doing certain things, but gids are to be simply told on authority what
to do.
Another way to teach gids to accept authority is to keep them busy
at tasks in the home, confining (hem all day to the house. Rousseau
realises that this form of feminine education in the home and the
concomitant confinement may mean that women become physically
less strong than men who as boys are allowed te have noisy fun and are
allowed to play and exercise more. Rousseau does not resolve this issue
entirely. On the one hand, he expresses admiration for strong women,
noting the achievements ofthe women ofSparta who, he says,exercised
naked in public; on the other hand, he would not like te apply such a
model of physical education on a refined French woman, arguing that
a certain amount offragility and dependenee are essential characteristics
of the attractive woman. As in many other cases, he tries to justify his
view with the concept of nature, stating that women "naturally",
especially after puberty, have less of a tendency to want strenuous
physical exercise than men.
In addition, an important part ofthe education ofgids is developing
their social skills. Women, according to Rousseau, are social creatures,
they are mQreaccepting of others, they desire to be ofservice to others,
more so than men. Women are more polite, being better than men at
pleasing others with compliments. For Rousseau, these tendencies also
have a natural and sexual basis. Women are much less polite and
charming to other women than to men, and showaffection to other
women only in public when men are present, in order to make the men
desire the same affection for themselves.
Asto religion, a girl should not, as in the caseofa boy, be encouraged
to form her own opinions, but to follow those ofher parents and in later
life those of her husband. This is, according to Rousseau, because a
woman is unable to reason deeply enough to come to her own conclu-
sions in this area. Men have the task ofquestioning and judging religion
in the light of reason: women must therefore leave this decision to their
husbands. Moreover, this is, according to Rousseau, the best way to
,promote harmony in the home because it prevents conflicts arising
about religion and principles. For Rousseau, religion has a social dimen-
sion in the sense that it represents social conformity. Rousseau therefore
argues that women, in their religious training, should be taught that
God iswatching them continually, thereby keeping them on the straight
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and narrow path, Hence women should be taught general piety rather
than religious principles,"
3 The Ideal Woman, Sophie.
Beyond formulating general guidelines for the education ofwomen, in
this book Rousseau describes the ideal wife for Emile, Sophie. Sophie
is the daughter of decent, down-on-their-luck gentry living in the
country: her mother was of a good family but was disowned by them,
her father had money but lost it. She is their only daughter, 15 years old
when she meets Emile, but in all respects she has mastered the art of
being a woman. She knows how to dress simply but seductively (men,
Rousseau says, want to take off her simple but artful clothes in their
imagination) . She has natural talents for singing and moving well. She
enjoys doing women's work, such as sewing and lacemaking, and she
has, from an early age onward, helped her mother run the household.
She does not disdain to take over tasks from servants when they are
unable to perform them. She has an obsession with cleanliness, hating
abo'V~all things that are dirty. She had a fondness for eating when young
(bonbons) but has now overcome that, although she does eat feminine
things: dairy products, sugared things, pastry and sweets and only rarely
meat. She does not drink alcohol and eats in moderation. Her mind is
not brilliant, but she is a good judge ofcharacter. She is lively but at the
same time she has learned to control this, although she will alwayshave
an element of sensitivity and caprice. But she never knowingly does
wrong things and when she does, she will cry and regret it: she is an
obedient, devoted and loving daughter to her parents. She has a simple
idea of religion, seeing virtue as all-important. Because of her honest
and direct disposition, she has a dislike for empty conversations and
superficial compliments, as well as the vices of society people. She has
a very mature ability to see through artifice. Because she is an energetic
no-nonsense person, she does not feign exaggerated weakness such as
putting her arm on that of an older man when going from one room to
another. As far as her formal education is concerned, she has read only
one book in her life, a work by François Barrême on how to keep
household accounts.
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Her parents decide that because of her maturity she is ready to get
married. Her father tells her that her marriage will not be arranged but
that she will be able to choose her own husband. This is in keeping with
Rousseau' s principle of a natural upbringing which takes into account
the preferences ofchildren. Sophie is sent to the city to livewith an aunt
in order to be introduced to society. Because ofher anti-superficial and
virtuous nature she does not find the men she meets attractive and
returns to her parents' home in the countryside. This too is in keeping
with Rousseau's philosophical ideas: the city is corrupt, the country
pure. At this point, her life begins to show rhe first signs of crisis. T 0
her embarassment, feelings of sexual desire and male-female love start
to manifest themselves. Her mother finally gets her to confess that she
is confused because she has fallen in love with the main character of the
second book she has read in her life, Telemachus by Fénelon, At this
point, she is ready to fall in lovewith a real man and marry. The real-life
manifestation of the romantic ideal ofTelemachus is of course Emile.
Like Sophie's father who lets her make her own choices, Rousseau feels
that Emile too must make his own decision about his choice of a wife.
With this difference, however, that Rousseau has already selected Sophie
and is arr~ging matters behind the scenes. Rousseau takes Emile away
from the city into the country to meet Sophie at the home ofher parents,
the perfect setting. No stain ofcity life must enter this scene. Once more,
the country setting reflects the purity and virtue of Sophie and Emile.8
Both geographically and inwardly, Sophie is naturally good, beau-
tifuland pure. This is an important fact for understanding the typ~ of
education which Sophie receives. Rousseau does not believe that she
needs much formal education. The characteristics of Sophie which
make her such a suitable bride for Emile have been nourished by wise
and loving parents who have given her the ability to master the
important "musts" for being an eligible mate: an attractive outward
appearance, a knack for household management, and a suitable dispo-
sition. It is only after her marriage to Emile that she will receive a more
formal education, for (and this is ofcourse the irony of it all) otherwise
Sophie would be too boring a mate for the well-educated Emile. But
what is very important is that Sophie may never become a threat, Never
must there be a moment in which Emile is not, by virtue of his gender
and education, in control. Repeatedly, Rousseau calls the husband of a
woman, including Sophie's Emile, her master.
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To demonstrate the problem ofknowledge as power and the sexual
taboos surrounding education, I will quote perhaps the most shocking
passage in which Rousseau speaks of this issue. Rousseau begins by
stating that an educated man must not marry a totally uneducated
woman, but on the other hand, if he has no choice, an uneducated
woman is preferabie to the other extreme:
But I would still like a simple and coarsely raised girl a hundred
times better than a learned and brilliant one who would establish in
my house a tribunal of literature over which she would preside. A
brilliant wife is a plague to her husband, her children, her friends,
her valets, everyone. From the sublime elevation ofher fair genius
she disdains all her woman's duties and always begins by making
herselfinto a man after the fashion ofMademoiselle Enclos. Outside
her home she is always ridiculous and very justly criticized; this is
the inevitable result as soon as one leaves one' s station and is not fit
for the station one wants to adopt. All these women of great talent
never impress anyone but fools. It is always known who the artist
or the friend is who holds the pen or the brush when they work. It
is.known who the discreet man ofletters iswho secretly dictates their
oracles to them. All this charlatanry is unworthy ofa decent woman.
Even if she had some true talents, her pretensions would debase
them. Her dignity consists in being ignored. Her glory is her
husband's esteem. Her pleasures are in the happiness ofher family."
Perhaps we could, in a spirit of generosity, grant Rousseau the point
that manywomen are made happy by successfullymarrying, performing
their domestic duties and being surrounded by aloving family. On the
other hand, Rousseau does not seem to be very generous in his appre-
ciation of the achievements of women such as Mlle Enelos (who is
mentioned more often, alwayswith horror, in this book).
After Emile and Sophie have fallen in love, they begin courting.
Their courtship, described at length by Rousseau, reflects Rousseau's
view that a relationship between a man and a woman is based on the
strength of a woman's modesty and the driving force of a man's desire
for her. Sophie, extremely noble and modest, is only graduallywon over
by Emile. Ernile's emotions and desire for her are, however, so strong
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that he suffers and persists. During their courtship, Sophie's education
is continued by means of the long conversations the lovers have:
It is both a touching and a laughable spectacle to see Emile eager to
teach Sophie all he knows, without considering whether what he
wants to teach her is to her taste or is suitable for her. He tells her
about everything, he explains everything to her with a puerile
eagerness. He believes he has only to speak and she will understand
on the spot. He fancies beforehand the pleasure he will have in
reasoning and philosophizing with her. He regards as useless all the
attainments he cannot display to her eyes. He almost blushes at
knowing something she does not know.
Therefore, he gives her lessons in philosophy, mathematics,
history - in a word, in everything. Sophie lends herselfwith pleasure
to his zeal and tries to profit from it. lO
Sophie's abilities to learn about these subjects from Emile is limited. As
Rousseau comments:
The art of thinking is not foreign to women, but they ought only
to skim the sciences of reasoning. Sophie gets a conception of
everything and does not remember very much. Her greatest progress
is in ethics and in matters of taste. As for physics, she remembers
only some idea of its generallaws and of the cosmie systern."
,
Most likely Sophie's cursory understanding ofwhat Emile is telling her
is not due to her feminine nature, as Rousseau would like us to believe,
but because Sophie is being expected to understand what Emile has
learned in the course of a long time of studying in the span of lover's
conversations (Emile prefers talking to her while he is on his knees in
front ofher). This seems to be a striking example ofthe double standard
which men apply to themselves and to women in order to affirm their
own intellectual "superiority", As to Sophie's preferenee for ethics and
esthetics, this is a point taken up, as we shall see later, by Kant.
The main purpose of the fifth chapter of Emile is to describe the
courtship and marriage of Emile to a woman who is right for him. The
context of the description of Sophie's education is, as Wollstonecraft
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points out, sexual. The book ends with the armouncement by Emile
that his young wife Sophie is pregnant with his child.
I will now turn to a most curious document inspired by the reading
of Rousseau's Emile, Kant's Observations on the Feeling ofthe Beautifitl
and the Sublime.
4 Kant's Observations on the Feeling ofthe Beautiful and tbe Sublime
Rousseau's Emile was published in 1762, Kant's Observations in 1764.
The two works are connected not only in time, but there is even a
philosophical legend about the relationship between the two books.
Kant (1724-18°4) was known at Känigsberg for living a very regular life.
Every afternoon he would take a walk at precisely the same time: so
precise was he that the townspeople said that one could set the clock by
his schedule. Kant is said to have missed his walk only once: when he
was reading Rousseau's Emile. Unfortunately, this delightful story is
most likely untrue, but it does indicate the extent to which Kant's
Observations are influenced by Rousseau's views."
The book consists of four chapters in which Kant describes various
aspects of culture and society in terms of the concepts of the beautiful
and the sublime. The third chapter deals with the idea of the beautiful
and the sublime with respect to male and female.
Like Rousseau, Kant opens this chapter with a discussion on human
nature. He states that men and women are all human beings,and thus
share a common nature. Nevertheless, Kant states that the humanity
male and female have in common may not obscure the fact that the
male and female are very different as well. This idea, also expressed by
Rousseau, can be seen as the classical philosophical approach to male
and female nature: they share a common humanity, based on a shared
rationality and emotional world, but underlying this sameness are
differences.
Kant claims that the rationality of male and female can be distin-
guished in terms of female-beautiful and male-sublime, Female ration-
ality is directed to the amiable, the pretty, and the concrete. Male
rationality is directed to that which is deep, theoretical, general, and
abstract. The female is, in her daily life, concerned with the aesthetic
and judges everything on the basis ofwhat is or is not pleasing. For the
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female, her appearance, her house, and her friends should all have a
pleasing character. The male is less concerned about such charms: he is
more involved with "duty" and the heavier things in life.
Like Rousseau, Kant sees the natural tendencies of the two genders
as emerging in childhood. Kant states that girls tend to love being pretty
and attractive, they like pure things, are sensitive to things improper,
love being busywith trivial things, are casual and like laughter, comport
themselves well in company, are kind to others, prefer the beautiful to
the practical, love jewelry, are sensitive to insults, have a good intuition
about people, and should ultimately aim to make men more gentle and
refined.
Kant also deals with the question of female virtues and morals.
Female virtue is described as being beautiful, male virtue as sublime.
Women have, according to Kant, moral sentiment. They avoid evil not
because it is evil, but for the aesthetic reason that it is reprehensible. A
woman will not act according to certain virtues because she is ordered
to do so, but because she feels that it is attractive to do so. Women were
not created to follow principles, according to Kant, although he adds
that it is also exceptional for men to follow principles. Women are
blessed with a good heart, a willingness to do good, and a feeling ofwhat
is proper and fitting.
Kant also mentions a number offeminine "weaknesses", stating that
theyare ultimately "beautiful faults": a woman's sensitivity, her aversion
to insults, her vanity which makes her want to appear beautiful,
appealing and charming, her humour and changes of mood - all these
can be attractive. For all that, Kant feels that women should restrain
themselves: too much vanity, for example, will turn into a real fault.
As to sexuality, women have, according to Kant, a natural aversion
to unchastity: their purity is what they value most and their greatest fear
is to be called unchaste. Women have a highly developed feeling of
shame and an aversion to male sexual banter. Modesty in a woman is
described by Kant as "a form of noble simplicity and naïveté connected
to an outs tanding character". 13
The description given by Kant of male and female characteristics is
one that is based on the notion of complementarity: the two genders
enrich each other's lives and modify each other's character. The noble,
deep-thinking man has his complement in the sensitive and intuitive
woman; the male orientation to ethical principles is modified by the
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female's good-heartedness and spontaneity; female delicacy and rno-
desty refine overly strong male tendencies towards crudity and improper
desires.
Kant modifies his idea of the complementarity of the two genders
somewhat by stating that while the male is noble and the female
beautiful, both genders have elements in thern of the other. Through
male-female contact and mutual influence, people are made more
complete, thus avoiding the development of one-sided gender charac-
teristics or extremes.
For Kant, the complementarity of the two genders means that
neither male nor female need feel insulted at the way he describes them:
after all, he says, what he is describing are the natural differences they
have and the ideals towards which they rightly strive. A criticism which
is often made of the so-called complementarity thesis is precisely that it
tends to cover up the fact that negative judgments are being made. This
comes to light when comparing the characteristics attributed to men
and women. A great number of women might weIl feel that they have
not been justly described, having gotten short shrift in the division of
characteristics.
finally, this essay is written explicitly by Kant from his own male
point of view, referring to "we men" as opposed to "women". This is
not only stylistically the case, in that the first person is male and the
third person female, but it also emerges in the language used to describe
the two genders. Women are described as being "attractive" and "char-
ming", terms which refer to the impact ofwomen on men. Indeed, Kant
argues that this impact of women on men is what it is all about, even
for women themselves: their greatest concern is men. T erms used to
describe men are more external and neutral: they stand on their own,
nor in relationship to someone else and men are described as being
oriented to things other than women. One can see this, for example, in
Kant's description ofthe sublime and principled minds ofmen. Women
direct themselves to men, men to higher things. At certain points,
however, Kant does refer to male feelings about themselves and how
they appear to others, as, for example, when he refers to the fact that
men have a fear of appearing to be ridiculous.
Although this essay is not an explicitly pedagogical one, as was
Rousseau's Emile, Kant does give some guidelines for the education of
women. According to Kant, the education ofwomen must be suited to
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the rationality of women and to theway women operate. Women do
things easily, unlike men, who need deep thought and intense labour
to accomplish something. A woman, Kant says, who attempts to
perform deep mental activity deserves only cool admiration because she
is then sacrificing all that is beautiful in her. Mentioning the examples
of Madame Dacier and the Marquesse de Chastelet, he states that all
they need to complement their intellectual achievements is a beard.I4
Women, he states, will never be successfulat academie activities in fields
such as geometry, philosophy, physics, history, or geography. They
should, however, be taught something in these areas in order to be able
to understand social chit chat and general conversations about them and
in order to (strangely enough) understand them in terms of what can
be learned from them about women. This latter aim is not a feminist
one, however: what a woman can learn about herself from such an
education are interesting stories and perhaps a morallesson or two.
In summary, Kant'sview of the education ofwomen resembles that
of Rousseau in a number of respects. Like Rousseau, he bases his view
of education on the idea that it must serve to bring out natural male
and female characteristics and he seesthe fulfillment ofthe development
of the beätitiful characteristics of the female as being marriage and
keeping house. It is the woman who brings the aesthetics, warmth and
charm to the home. Kant also gives examples of the horrors ofwomen
with a formal education who follow intellectual pursuits: he replaces
Rousseau's Mlle Enclos with his own examples of Madame Dacier and
Madame du Chätelet.
Both Rousseau and Kant attempt to find a firrn basis for their
theories in human nature. Yet many people todaywould consider their
ideas to be quite contra-intuitive. Perhaps this is a waming that an
appeal to nature is not at all self-evident, One can even go further and
say that theories ofmale and female nature will always be suspect because
they tend to cover up the influence of culture on the interpretation of
nature.
5 Mary W ollstonecraft. Reason versus Passion
Mary Wollstonecraft (r759-1797) is one of the most important forerun-
ners ofthe women's movement ofthe roth century. She had only a short
104 Rousseau, Kant and Wollstonecraft. The Education ofWomen
life, but it was one of commitment to women's rights, inspired by her
intellectual background and her own considerable abiIities. For Woll-
stonecraft, women have a right to an education equal to that ofmen. A
contemporary of Rousseau and Kant, Mary Wollstonecraft travelled to
France after the beginning of the French revolution in order to observe
its progress and results at first hand. She was by then alreadyacquainted
with the work ofRousseau and wrote, in 1792, an attack on his theories
of education for women as expressed in Emile.15
In the literature, Wollstonecraft's attack on Rousseau is aptly termed
an attack of reason versus passion.16 W ollstonecraft accusesRousseau of
tainting the Enlightenment ideals of reason and equality with what she
calls the demands of male passion. Her own cause, she argues, is that of
reason: a no-nonsense, non-sexist view of the education of women. In
asense, however, Wollstonecraft herself is passionate in her passion for
reason to prevail and in her outrage at Rousseau's pinning women down
to the sexual images, needs and desires of men.
Wollstonecraft's main concern in her critique of Rousseau are the
sexual and sexist overtones in his description of Sophie's education."
She quotes Rousseau's views and then comments on them. Her first
point is that Rousseau wishes a woman to be educated according to her
female "nature" and in such a manner that she wiIl be attractive to men.
W ollstonecraft argues that the ideal woman, according to Rousseau, is
attractive, weak, frivolous and is to be educated in a way which leads to
"a system of cunning and lasciviousness". Women are to learn to play
a sexual game with men. Physical and mental weakness is encouraged
to make them seem vulnerable. But this weakness has a twist: it is to be
employed to gain control of men, or at least to capture their sexual
interest. Wollstonecraft argues that the aim of education for women
should not be formulated in terms of male desires or in terms of "an
education of the body". They should be educated in a manner which is
best for them as people. Women, Wollstonecraft notes, are not really
being educated in Rousseau's guidelines for their education. Wollstone-
craft argues that women have a lot more to cope with in their lives than
satisfying men. Noting that even Rousseau states that male-female love
only lasts a short time, she says that there is no justification for limiting
the education of women to a sexual strategy which wiIl only help a
woman through the first decades of her life. For Wollstonecraft, the
development of reason is the most important thing for people because
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it enables them to cope with their feelings and the vicissitudes of life.
Rousseau, she argues, ultimately gives advice which leads to women
becoming sickly and unable to cope, especially after they have lost
everything they depended on: their youth and attractiveness.
Wollstonecraft states that her alternatives for the education of
women may lead to the sacrifice of the attractiveness of these women to
prejudiced men such as Rousseau. We saw in the consideration of
Rousseau' s concept of education in Emile that education is to further
and not to diminish the possibilities ofwomen on the marriage market.
W ollstonecraft, in response to this idea of Rousseau therefore ends her
discussion of Rousseau' s concept of education with the words:
...1 earnestlywish...that Fortune, slippingoffher bondage, will smile
on a well-educated female, and bring in her hand an Emilius or a
Telemachus...There have been many women in the world who,
instead of being supported by the reason and virtue of their fathers
and brothers, have strengthened their own minds by strugglingwith
their vices and follies; yet have never met with a hero, in the shape
of a husband.I8
Wollstonecraft hopes, however, that such prejudices can be overcome
and even if they are not, women are not to be overly concerned with
this problem. A good education and independence, an ability to cope
with life, means astrong and healthy relationship with a man is possible.
Strangely enough, Rousseau and Wollstonecraft in fact agree shat
the goal ofthe education ofa woman is to create someone who is strong,
healthy, dependable, attractive, wise, mature, rational, and able to cope
with life and other people. Yet, Wollstonecraft, as we have seen, claims
that the type of woman who is formed by Rousseau's education is
someone who is weak, dependent, manipulating, irrational and igno-
rant. Wollstonecraft and Rousseau differ about the way in which they
think education functions to create a healthy person capable offorming
positive relationships. Rousseau lays astrong emphasis on the fact that,
to start with, a woman must have a "naturally" good disposition which
accords with the natural tendencies of the female gender. It is only on
the basis of her natural capacities that she can be nurtured to develop
characteristics such as that of good judgment and maturity, For Woll-
stonecraft, an education which includes more formal, abstact content is
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essential not only for the development of a rnan's mind, as Rousseau
thought, but also for a wornan's mind. This is, I think, the essence of
Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau's "education of the body".
6 Conclusions
In my concluding remarks, I would like to return to two aspects of
Wollstonecraft's response to Rousseau: firstly, her critique ofthe role of
a "sexual code" in education and secondly the function of repetition in
Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau.
In Wollstonecraft's response to Rousseau, a major theme seems to
me her attack on the sexual code inherent in his view of the education
of Sophie. In the Enlightenment, we are confronted with the develop-
ment on the one hand of very strong ideals of reason, education, and
the making ofone's own decisions in all areas of life; on the other hand,
there seems to be a renewed and strengthened affirmation of a tradi-
tional sexual code in which a taboo is placed on a formal, rational,
education for women as well as on the public display of a worrian's
intellëcrual achievements. There is no doubt as to the effectiveness of
such a code, a code by which, as Wollstonecraft notes, women are
blackmailed. If one does not follow the code, the result is no husband
and a bad reputation. Proof of the force with which the sexual code
worked is the fact that in one roth century dictionary, the name ofMary
Wollstonecraft was listed as synonymous for the word "prostituee"."
Her heroic character and tragic life cannot, however, be summed up
with this term. The reason for such an outrageous association is that
certain intellectual pursuits were identified with the "public" realm, a
realm in which women, properly identified with the "private" realm,
should not participate. If they did, they were "public" women, a term
also associated with loose women. Two examples of such public intel-
lectual activity are the publishing of books (even innocent books of
poetry) and the running of a salon or publically having intellectuals as
friends. While Wollstonecrafi: was courageous enough to publish her
books, there is also a long tradition ofwomen writing books and either
publishing them under a pseudonym, making small private editions, or
not publishing them at all in order to avoid such social taboes;"
Wollstonecraft also lived in the other part of the "public" intellectual
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realm, openly having intellectuals as friends on an equal basis with
herself. Ironically, Rousseau of course himself participated, albeit
against his will and impelled by financial necessity, in the salons ofParis,
often run by wornen."
The interesting part of this is that the taboos applied to women at
the time of the Enlightenment went together with an increase in the
number of well-educated women. It is, I think, almost impossible to
analyse clearly the dynamics taking place in the historical sense (a
problem we will see return in the next chapter on the 19th century). Did
the male desire for a very "feminine" image have anything to do with
the growth of the number ofwomen capable of intellectual pursuits? In
which social classes was the contrast between an "intellectual" and a
"feminine" woman an important one? And, on a deeper level, did the
emphasis on women-in-the-home, being weak and superficial have
anything to do with male fears of what would happen if women were
to reject such roles and images?Are we dealing with merely superficial
fashions which prescribe what it is to be an attractive woman or are the
views of Rousseau historically deeply embedded in French culture (a
claim Wollstonecraft at one point makes)?
Wollsi:ónecraft's reaction to Rousseau is primarily on the level of
sexual dynamics. Her struggle with Rousseau concerns his concept of
femininity. On a personallevel, it is no wonder that Rousseau's ideas
raised such outrage in Wollstonecraft. There is an implicit promise,
which Wollstonecraft also mentions in her critique of Rousseau, that if
women are the way he thinks they should be that they will be able to
fascinate men and bind them to themselves. Men, Rousseau promises,
will falliock, stock and barrel for a woman educated along the lines of
his philosophy. Of course, most women, like Wollstonecraft herself,
want a man but at the same time definitely do not see in themselves the
characteristics which Rousseau saysshould be "natural" to them. Woll-
stonecraft herself suffered severely in this respect. Abandoned by her
lover, she at one point attempted suicide by jumping off a bridge into
the Thames in Londen." Hence the (unintentional) cruelty of Rous-
seau's arguments for Wollstonecraft.
The essence of the matter here, it seems to me, is that, asWollstone-
craft says, the notion of "education" has become confused. Education
is used by Rousseau in the double sense of learning, developing ratio-
nality, judgment and knowledge (primarily for men), and on the other
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hand in the sense of learning the sexual game of life (primarily for
women).
The second aspect ofWollstonecraft's response to Rousseau which
I would like to say something about is a stylistic feature ofher reaction,
which I shall caU "repetition", Of course, Rousseau's own views on
women are repetitious. Even though cultural settings change, there are
many elements in his view ofwomen which have been repeated by men
throughout history. But Wollstonecraft, in her chapter on Rousseau,
herself repeats, extensively and literally, the (for her) preposterous and
negative things which he says about women. This is a characteristic of
much of the writing done in the women's movement: a critique is
presented in which the criticised ideas are repeated and then rejected.
Mary WoUstonecraft justifies this technique of repetition as a way
of confronting Rousseau with the error ofhisways. Another reason she
gives for using this technique is that she is doing it so that people will
believe that she is stating Rousseau's position correctly. But the phe-
nomenon of repetition is, I think, more complicated than that,
Repetition can enforce ideas or it can serve to criticise and ironise
ideas unacceptable to an author. But why give currency to unacceptable
idees by repeating them? It seems to me that it is not the strong who
repeat the negative things said about them and done to them, but the
weak. The strong rewrite history to show their glory and strength, the
weak rewrite history to show the insults and exclusion. Often such
writing from out of the standpoint of exclusion can produce anger and
bring about change. But it is also painful to repeat ideas thau one finds
unacceptable. But over and over again, women are confronted with this
dilemma. For WoUstonecraft, the process of reproducing painful ideas
is the struggle for a new world, for the vindication (the beautiful term
she herself uses) of the tights of women. And, as we have seen in this
chapter, one of these rights is the very important one of access to a
universal education, equal for men and women. Therefore, even though
it is painful to repeat ideas one finds reprehensible, it can have some
effect. The right of women to an academie education began to be
realised in the roth century with some important developments, the
movement for universal public education for boys and girls and the start
of the admission ofwomen to universities.
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8 Schopenhauer and Nietzsche versus the Suffragists.
The "Natural" versus the "Unnatural"
I Introduetion
In the previous chapter, some 18th century ideas about the role of
education and artifice in regulating relationships between the sexeswere
discussed. The I9th century in Northern Europe is a "heavier" century
in the sense that great emphasis was placed on maintaining the values
ofthe middle classcitizen, or, to put it in English terms, on Victorianism
and the maintainance ofclassstructures. Looking back on this century,
it is clear that it was a century on the verge ofa new world order whose
social structures were to be changed drastically by the First World War.
It was also a century which, while maintaining traditional values, saw
some of the greatest intellectual innovations in history and created
strong impuises for the revolutions that were to follow: we need ony
think of the enormous impact ofscientific discoveries made in the rçth
century and the revolutionary nature of ideas such as those of Freud,
Darwin, Marx and Nietzsche. It is therefore not surprising that in this
century atension arises between those who wish to maintain traditional
values widirespect to women and the family while at the same time
revolutions, among which the feminist movement, were taking place.
The women's movement of the I9th century was a variegated
movement, with differing backgrounds and influences forming it.
Historically, the development of the movement can be linked to the
effect of the French Revolution (asWollstonecraft had already dorie-ar
the time of that revolution). Women had seen that revolution pass
without the promises of freedom, equality and "brotherhood" being
extended to them. Although there was, in the first stages of the French
Revolution, a concern for women's rights and their freedom to partici-
pate in the demoeratic process, this soon dissipated. In fact, the French
Revolution, like so many other revolutions, attempted to alter existent
structures, but the actual work of change, as in the case of universal
suffrage for males, took much of the roth century to accomplish. In this
respect, it can be argued that the Suffragist movement of the 19th
century was part of a broader social movement coming from the desire
to implement the ideals of the French Revolution. But drawing such a
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historical line gives the Suffragist movement a legitimacy which its
critics at the time were not prepared to give it: the movement was seen
as a scandal which violated the propriety of ethical and social conven-
tions or as simply a sillyphenomenon.
There were, however, some very good reasons for the issues raised
by the women's movement. At stake were matters such as the right to
vote, to inherit and hold property and measures to prevent the depen-
deney, impoverishment and exploitation ofwomen left without a male
to take care of them. Because there were political and social issues such
as these at stake, not all the women who supported the women's
movement were radicals simply wishing to overthrow the established
order. A large number of women from religious and socially active
backgrounds were concerned, for humanitarian reasons, with the plight
ofwornen.'
In this chapter, I will try to show the way in which Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche reacted to ideas on the liberation ofwomen. In the first
part of this chapter, I will argue that despite their reputations as critics
of their society and time they were nevertheless quite reactionary
defenders of the middle dass. Their tactic was also a traditional one:
atttibuting certain natural characteristics to male and female as a
justification for existent social roles. They saw traditional patterns as
"natural", innovation as "unnatural". One of the strongest arguments
they used to criticise change and the women's movement was to say that
ideas were being launched which go against true female nature, male-
female relationships and existing images of men and women. In the
second part of the chapter, I will focus on the discussion of whether
Nietzsche's perspectivism and his view of "the woman as truth" is as
liberating as has been argued by some critics. Does this concept con-
tribute to wornen's liberation or does it reflect Nietzsche's sexism?
2 Schopenhauer "On Women"
Arthur Schopenhauer (r788-186o) is famous for, among other things,
his personal misogynism and his notorious essay "On Women". This
essay is generally considered to be the most negative text on women in
the history of philosophy. In light of some of the other texts discussed
in this book, it is dear that this is not the case. Rather, Schopenhauer's
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text can be considered to be a good summary ofsome ofthe "traditional"
views held by a number of the philosophers discussed in this book.
Perhaps its tone is sharper, more reactionary than the texts of earlier
periods. This is, as I noted earlier, most like1y due to the fact that in the
19th century the tug ofwar between the genders began on a iarger scale
in the context of social change.
It is not entire1yclear from Schopenhauer's text whom exactly he is
describing when he is describing "women" . It can, I think, be argued
that Schopenhauer does not have one woman or one kind ofwoman in
mind, but, most likely unconsciously, he describes various manifesta-
tions of the feminine: the child, the mother, the middle classwife, and
the prostitute. What these typologies have in common is that they are
chosen from out of the male perspective: the perspective of what a
woman can mean for a man. Schopenhauer's style in this respect
resembles that ofKant and Rousseau. His discourse concerns "we men"
d " h "D' h fh"" "h" i han t ose women. espite t e use 0 t e we versus t em sty e, e
claims that his descriptions are generally or super-genderly valid.
Schopenhauer opens his essaywith a claim that the greatest value of
women lies in "mothering". He states that women are primarily made
for reprodaction and nurturing. Men need to be cared for by women:
that iswhy caring is their greatest virtue. As to their other characteristics,
Schopenhauer notes many features of women in a rather incidental
fashion. T 0 summarize some points in his considerable list of female
characteristics: women are not intended for great mental or physical
exertion; they contribute to life by suffering; a woman's life is trivjal;
women are childlike; young girls have been given exceptional qualities
of attractiveness in order to attract men; older women no longer need
this attractiveness and hence are unattractive; women have weak powers
of reasoning; their intuition is good; they spend the money men earn;
women are pragmatic and prosaic; women are kinder to others but less
principled to others than men are;women lack a sense ofjustice; women
are cunning; women lie more easily than men; women are by nature
enemies because they all have "the same profession"; their difference in
"rank" is dependent on the achievements of their men and is thus more
precarious and less differentiated than the differences among men;
women are not attractive as such but the male sexual drive makes them
seem attractive; women do not have a purely objective interest in things,
their only interest is to dominate men; women have never achieved
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anything great in culture; they are the inferior sex in every respect;
women should not be indulged or honoured: the oriental way oftreating
women is preferabie to western gallantry; women do not have a right to
equal rights with men because they are inferior to men; men are by
nature polygamous, so marriage is a sacrifice for men; prostitution is a
reflection of the natural tendency of men towards polygamy and is
caused by the prohibition on having more than one wife; polygamy
would mean more subordination of women, a good thing, since that
would put an end to the phenomenon of the "European lady", the type
ofwoman who wishes to "have" a husband, a position in life, wants him
to be monogamous, wants chivalry and equal rights.'
Are these merely personal impressions on the part of a philosopher
who, despite having had a large number ofaffairs, never got along with
a woman until he was around 70 years old? There are a number of
anecdotes about Schopenhauer which illustrate his difficult relationship
to women, notably about his fights with his mother and his landlady.
Friedrich Nietzsche, commenting on Schopenhauer's difficulties with
women, states that Schopenhauer's misogyny is not an isolated person-
ality quirk. He sees it as part of the deepest dynamic from out ofwhich
Schçpenhauer lived, all part of his tendency towards nihilism, pessi-
mism and asceticism. Moreover, Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer
needed enemies to function: these enemies are sexuality, sensuality,
women, Hegel, and even existence itself.' Nietzsche is, of course, not a
particularly objective judge ofpersonality, but this analysis is an indica-
tion that even among his contemporaries Schopenhauer was seen as
having a rather odd attitude towards women and life.
But surely Schopenhauer's essay "On Woman" would not have
become as famous as it did if it were merely the reflection of personal,
eccentric opinions. Surely there must be some truth to the essay, it must
touch some kind ofchord in people in order for it still to be read - and
for it to continue to raise blood pressures.
Is it possible to show that there is some kind of "logic" in Schepen-
hauer's seemingly incoherent summing up of female characteristics? I
think that a number ofpoints can be mentioned which reflect patterns
in Schopenhauer's observations about women which are based on social
reality. Firstly, a major factor which seems to underlie Schopenhauer's
characterisations of women is their lack of access to education. This
would explain his claim that women are less rational, less capable of
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great achievements in cultural and academie areas, that they are "down
to earth" in their viewsofsituations and in the decisions they make, that
they are less capable of "objectivity" than men, that they are childlike
in many ways. All these characteristics, it seems to me, are developed
through education. Secondly, many ofthe characteristics Schopenhauer
mentions are due to the lack ofopportunity for women in society. His
arguments that women seek to attract men, that they obtain social status
through men, that they are manipulative and cunning, that women are
rivals, all point to characteristics of people who are socially powerless
and dependent. Lastly, a number of the observations which Schope-
hauer makes seem to reflect male frustrations with social codes coneer-
ning male-female conduct and relationships. His view of women as
unattractive, his resentment of monogamy, his dislike of showing
respect for women, his acceptance of prostitution as the fulfilling of
normal male needs, all point to sexual-social frustrations.
From this analysis, it would seem that all ofSchopenhauer'spoints
of criticism of women could be resolved if he were to support the
liberation ofwomen. Ifwomen were to obtain a good formal education,
have the opportunity to hold jobs and if there were a liberalisation of
the mores of marriage, he would surely be pleased at the improvement.
Schopenhauer, however, argues that because of their natural inferiority,
women do not have the right to equal rights with men. Schopenhauer's
idea of the natural inferiority ofwomen is based on his conviction that
their power of reason is less than that of men and on the presupposition
that the characteristics ofwomen which he has summed are natural and
hence unchangeable. For this reason, there is no way out of the impasse
in which Schopenhauer places himselfand women: women's liberation
could help to take away their perceived faults and weaknesses, but these
same faults and weaknesses are used to justify not liberating women.
Schopenhauer uses another peculiar argument to oppose the libera-
tion of women. This is his assertion that women may not daim more
rights from men besides the great concession they have already received,
monogamy. Men have sacrificed enough for women, in his view.
Obviously, both arguments form barriers against the liberation of
women and are used to leave the power of men as weIl as of society
unchallenged.
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3 Nietzsche and Middle Class Society
The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) greatly ad-
mired the work of Schopenhauer in his early days. Nietzsche, as I
indicated earlier, was later to reject what he considered to be the
nihilism, asceticism and pessimism in Schopenhauer's philosophy ofthe
will, But Nietzsche did have in common with Schopenhauer a tradi-
tional view offemale characteristics and a suspicion and rejection of the
women's movement ofhis time.
Nietzsche's views on women are perhaps best described as a combi-
nation of theory and personal experience." He lost his father and
younger brother by the age of five and grew up in a family consisting
solely ofwomen: his mother, his sister Elisabeth, his father' s mother and
two unmarried aunts. This situation at home meant for him submersion
in a female, rçth century middle c1ass environment with astrong
Lutheran religious atmosphere. I think that it is possible to interpret
Nietzsche's views on women in light of this middle c1ass background as
well as in the context ofhis viewsofsociety and social change in general.
Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, bases his views on women on what are
claiëaed to be natural and unnatural characteristics.
In one of the most famous passages which Nietzsche wrote on
women, the discourse "OfOld and Young Women" in his book Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes what he seesas both the top layer
and the underlying dynamics in male-female relationships.' This passage
seems to me almost a parody of the middle c1ass perspective.sincluding
its tensions. As in the case of Schopenhauer's essay on woman,
Nietzsche's summing up of female characteristics is haphazard. Just as
in the Schopenhauer passage, it is possible to fill in a background of
social practices and personal preferences underlying the descriptions.
In this passage,the perspective on women is an explicitly male one,
seeing the woman as oriented totally to the man, family and domestic
concerns. The description of the nature ofwomen is extremely heavy-
handed. According to Nietzsche, women are basicallyoriented to their
husbands and children. That is why matters such as attracting a male,
pregnancy, and raising children are their main concerns. The nature of
women is directed to the realm of the natural and biological: in a sexual
sense, women serve as "recreation" for men, they are playthings; in an
emotional sense, love is their fiereest emotion and honour: a woman's
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hate is directed towards the man who does not want to have her, her
feelings of fulfillment consist in doing what a man wants. As was also
the casein Schopenhauer's description, women are seen aslesseducated,
rational and honourable than men. Nietzsche states that women are
bitter, base, and irredeemably shallow. Although Nietzsche claims to
have a very different view of women than Schopenhauer, this passage
from Tbus Spoke Zarathustra shows how pervasive the impact is of the
social situation in which these philosophers found themselves: the
stifling atmosphere of women tied down to biological and domestic
concerns, with men feeling both threatened and claiming natural
superiority over them.
4 Speaking about Women
One sees in both Schopenhauer and Niezsche an unease in speaking
about women. The philosopher must first overcome a barrier of taboo
or embarassment in revealing his preferences or prejudices. This is
perhaps the reason why Nietzsche places the passage on old and young
women within a framework. The comments made at the beginning and
the end ofthe passageraise a number ofquestions ofinterpretation. The
passage begins as follows:
Today as I was going my way alone, at the hour when the sun sets,
a little old woman encountered me and spoke thus to my soul:"
"Zarathustra has spoken much to us women, too, but he has
never spoken to us about woman".
And I answered her: "One should speak about women only to
"men.
"Speak to me too of woman", she said; "I am old enough soon
to forget it",
Zarathustra is asked to speak of women to an old woman. When he
protests that men should only speak about women to other men, the
old woman replies that it is a good thing that she is old enough to forget
what is being said. As such, this comment concerning age is interesting:
already in ancient Greek society a distinction was made concerning the
social-sexual status of young and old women. Old women were more
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free in their movements and in what they could do, say and think than
young women. This is no doubt connected to the idea that young
women are part ofthe sexual dynamic and the reproductive process, and
that hence the taboos and rules governing their behaviour are to be
applied in a strict fashion. Older women, less attractive and no longer
ofreproductive age, are considered to be less subject to sexual codes. An
old woman may therefore hear this description from Zarathustra but a
young woman may not. Could it be that his description of a young
woman's nature and behaviour would give her a certain amount of
awareness ofherself, ofmen and how they see her? Would that int1uence
her behaviour and her own sexual-social desires so that she might even
want to break out of the traditional patterns? Whatever the answers to
those questions, there is something smug and superior about the
description which Zarathustra gives of young women. The context in
which Nietzsche places his remarks on old and young women points to
the fact that his aim is not liberation but rather maintaining the social
order in which men determine who women are.
The end of the passage is as follows:
The little old woman answered me: "Zarathustra has said many nice
things, especially for those who are young enough for them.
"It is strange, Zarathustra knows little of women and yet he is
right about them! Is it because with women nothing is impossible?
"And now accept as thanks a little truth! I am certainly old
enough for it!
"Wrap it up and stop its mouth: otherwise it will cry too loudly,
this little truthl"
"Give your little truth, woman" I said. And thus spoke the little
old woman:
"Are you visiting woman? Do not forget your whip!". 6
Here the old woman seems says that what Zarathustra has said is in fact
suitable for being heard by a young woman. She herself then as it were
offers Zarathustra a truth in return - a truth which is even "older", that
is, more suitable for mature people, than the truths which Zarathustra
presented. This truth, the old woman says, must be kept secret: "Wrap
it up and stop its mouth: otherwise it will cry too loudly, this little
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truthl", This truth is that when visiting a woman, one should take a
whip.
The atmosphere of complicity between Zarathustra and the old
woman which expresses the the power of speaking about gender rela-
tionships at this point moves forward into a deeper dimension: we have
here an expression ofthe feelings ofpower and powerlessness which can
occur between the two genders. There is a strange incident in
Nietzsche's life to which this remark can be linked. In the period when
writing Thus spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche was in love wirh Lou Salomé,
and, at the end of their relationship, on a trip through Switzerland,
Nietzsche urged her and their friend Paul Rée to have their photograph
taken at a professional photographer's in Base!. In I9th century style,
the photographer had a number ofbackground scenes and props in front
ofwhich his customers could pose. Nietzsche chose the scene ofa rural
cart, with Lou in the cart and he and Paul Rée as horses before the cart,
with...Lou wielding the whip." The three participants in this photo
session were later profoundly embarrassed by this act, yet it says some-
thing very strange about the comment of taking a whip when seeing a
woman. Apparently Nietzsche felt powerless against Lou Salomé; hence
the fantasjssf turning the situation around, a fantasy in which the male
is in control.
It seems to me that there is something very unhealthy about both
Nietzsche's and Schopenhauer's attitude towards women. Perhaps for
both of them the power ofwomen, especially that of female sexuality,
is frightening. As was argued earlier, the stitling atmosphere of I9th
century social-sexual norms makes the situation all the more difficult to
get out of. Perhaps the attraction ofNietzsche to Lou Salomé rested on
the fact that she was a liberated woman, a person who wanted to have
a good education and wishing to have a "non-traditional" marriage. In
this sense, Nietzsche may have (unconsciously) realised what I have
already argued with respect to Schopenhauer: that even though he
argues for a solution to the tensions in the relationship between men
and women in terms of the repression ofwomen, the real solution may
actually be found in the liberation ofwomen.
Finally, a curious aspect of this passage is the old woman's comment
that even though Zarathustra seems to know little about women, he
tells the truth about them. The old woman asks, ironically perhaps: is
this because with women all things are possible? One can interpret this
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question as suggesting that anything one says about women will to some
extent be true. It is of course a truism that statements about people are
to some extent multi-interpretable: take the example of horoscopes in
the daily newspaper which speak ofcharacteristics and events in the lives
of any person at all, applying only a few categories. But for Nietzsche
this multi-intepretabiliry of the feminine has another meaning as well.
Nietzsche means that woman is changeable, she is not as solid and set
in her character as a man. This idea ofthe indeterminacy ofthe feminine
comes back elsewhere in Nietzsche's work when he speaks of women
and the feminine. 8 This theme is also already referred to implicitly in
the passage from Thusspoke Zarathustra, in which men are described as
childlike and playing. If Nietzsche sees the feminine as the symbol of
truth does this mean that Nietzsche has a high regard for women after
all? On this reading, can the feminine even be considered to be the future
ofwestern thought?
5 Woman as Truth
Niesssche regards the classic philosophical idea of truth as a typically
male idea. It is a male misunderstanding that through earnest searching
it is possible to find rhe one truth about the one reality. Women are
capable ofseeing through this illusion because of their attitude towards
life and the way in which theyexperience themselves. Nietzsche agrees
with the "feminine" idea oftruth in that he believes that there-are many
truths about many aspects of reality. He calls this the perspectival view
of truth. While the pre-Soeratic philosophers and the post-Soeratic
Diogenes realised that truth and reality were changeable, the Soeratic
and Platonic tradition gave western philosophy its guiding idea that
there is one reality, one truth, and one rationality and that it is the task
of the philosopher to think according to these standards. Plato,
Nietzsche argues, wants to "fixate" truth in anIdea, An Idea is some-
thing which is statie, existing in arealm above the changing world. The
ultimate Ideas of the Good, the Beautiful and the T rue are what the
philosopher directs himself to. He wishes to reach an area of thought
and insight which transcends everyday thought and reality. But, as
Nietzsche points out, these Ideas, as weU as the means by which the
philosopher attempts to gain insight into Reality and Truth have
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continually eluded the serious lover, the philosopher. He states that it
is time to reformulate these ideals.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes three stages in
understanding the nature of philosophical knowledge. Firstly, there is
the stage ofearnest searching for the truth. He calls this the stage of the
camel, the beast ofburden par excellence, who, significantly, lives in the
desert. Secondly, there is the stage of the lion, the stage at which the
philosopher focusses on the ideas of power and the will. Lastly, there is
the stage at which one accepts the fact that the earnest searching for
truth is an impossible ideal and one learns to live with this insight, joyful
at the fact that one has reached this higher plane. Nietzsche calls this
the stage of the child, the child who in its innocence approaches reality
in a fresh way, allowing reality to show itself spontaneously. In its play,
the child is not really concerned with whether the world it is creating is
"real" or not: it is simply a reality in which the child lives at that moment.
For Nietzsche, this notion of the playing child symbolises the activity
of the philosopher." In another description of these stages, Nietzsche
uses the image of woman. The woman, in the final stage, is the image
of truth, always veiling herself, always eluding the man chasing her,
temptingbim, withdrawing herself. lO
These ideas are opposed to Plato's concept oftruth. Nietzsche's view
of truth can be seen as non-masculine or anti-rnasculine, a critique of
Plato's identification oftheoretical thought and the search for Ideas with
a masculine order which excludes the feminine. Also opposed to Plato's
philosophical insights is Nietzsche's view of truth as feminine as a
positive appreciation of the earthly realm, of matters such as the love
between man and woman, the family and reproduction. Nietzsche's
ideas can be seen as positive for women because their nature and their
approach to reality becomes the philosophical norm."
On the other hand, allegorical figures ofwomen are often deceptive,
usually being less flattering than they appear to be at first sight,
Nietzsche's idea ofwo man as truth or leading man to truth may seem
attractive, but the reality is that the philosopher or the searcher for truth
is male. He is the eager lover, he is ultimately the active subject.
Nietzsche, as we saw, makes this clear in the passage from Thus Spoke
Zarathustra on old and young women. In this passage, Nietzsche states
that the highest ideal ofa woman is to bear the Superman, the male who
will be able to create newvalues for humankind. It is the Superman who
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has the subjectivity: the woman stands by, is image, means and object.
The idea ofsubjectivity as masculine is also found in Nietzsche's use of
a quotation from Thus Spoke Zarathustra in the Genealogy ofMorals, a
statement to the effect that Wisdom is a woman who only loves
warriors." Here too the male is the one fighting to find truth, the woman
represents Wisdom and perhaps the elusiveness of the object of the
warrior's search. The subjectivity of the feminine as a real-life woman
is not referred to in this type of imagery.
The idea ofwoman as truth and as the beginning ofa new feminine
idea of truth is also perhaps not as new as Nietzsche claimed. Aswe have
seen, Plato already identified women with sophistry and idle chatter. It
seems that in a theory such as that of Nietzsche they are now allowed
admission to the new male order of thought by being described in the
old way. Some women simplywant to be included in "serieus thought",
thus claiming for themselves both rationality and subjectivity, Others
see Nietzsche as an ally, helping them to attack the objectifying and
transcendent dimensions of male thought, But neither of these options
are, when taken to their ultimate conclusion, very attractive. On the
one hand, identification with the masculine means the absorption of
the feminine within that order, without its own identity. On the other
hand, conscious, subjective identification with the idea of the feminine
as changing, perspectival, even sophistic may simply reinforce old
prejudices and does not do justice to female thought. However one looks
at these options, what is ultimately wrong with Nietzsche's imagery of
the woman as truth is its absorption within exclusionary male subjee-
tivity, seen as the only real activity. Women too are subjects involved
with searching for truth, no matter how the truth and the road to finding
truth is described.
6 Nietzsche and Feminism
Nietzsche, as may be concludeJ from his view of women as oriented
towards love, men and the family, had a negative opinion of feminism.
But, as is more often the case, his attitude seems ambiguous. During his
professorship at the University of Basel, he did vote for the admission
of female students to the university when presented with this issue in a
committee he was on. This, however, could have been Nietzsche's irony
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and bitterness coming through because he did not think a great deal of
his male colleagues. In fact, he had acrimonious debates with them and
wrote a devastating critique ofacademia in Thus SpokeZaratbustra'? He
may have thought that considering the lack of quality of males at the
university it therefore did not mean a loss of prestige if it started
admitting women. Yet this is pure speculation and there are other
indications that Nietzsche in fact adm'red intellectual women, especially
Lou Salomé, who so much desired a university education that she came
all the way from Russia to Switzerland in order to find a universitywhich
would admit women.
Yet when it comes to the concrete issue of feminism, Nietzsche is
very clear in his views. Moreover, his remarks concerning feminism are
not made in passing, but reflect a number of central notions in his
philosophy. One criticism of Nietzsche of feminism expresses a very
central idea in his philosophy, that of the re-evaluation ofall values. He
states that feminists are devious women: theyin fact attack other women
by changing the values pertaining to women. Before feminism, women
who were beautiful, attractive to men, loving, oriented to husband and
family, stood in thehighest regard with other women and with men. In
feminism, Nietzsche argues, this situation is altered in the sense that a
woman who was not successful at these things says that they are not
important: the important things are matters such as getting a good
education, fighting for social and political rights, being a free woman.
The traditional woman with her traditional set ofvalues is thus devalued
by feminism with respect to both the male and the female traditional
value systems. While previously women in traditional roles were the
most successful and ranked highest in these systems, they are now looked
down on by the new breed of feminists as catering to the male order
and as not achieving enough within the new female one.
For Nietzsche, a fundamental critique of thought and society takes
the form of re-evaluating values. This is the most effective instrument
in dealing with people because it is the best instrument for gaining
power over others.I" Nietzsche says that the will to power is the most
fundamental human impulse in our relationships with others and with
reality. This means that feminism is simply, in its alteration of values,
a will to power: a will to power not only over men but over "traditional"
women as well.
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Although for Nietzsche the idea ofthe will to power is pervasiveand
thus applicable to almost anything, his insight that feminism is a will
to power is, I think, in some senses a very incisive and correct one.
Feminism does seek to take some ofthe power away from the dominant
male order which tends to impose its values on women, often to their
detriment. What is interesting is that Nietzsche does not consider this
point seriously, but rather emphasises the changes ofvalueswhich occur
among women themselves. This is of course a brilliant move, in the
"divide and conquer" category. This attack on feminism is quite devas-
tating in the sense that Nietzsche plays on the insecurity and guilt
feelings of women. With this argument, he seeks to breed a feeling of
doubt in feminists: perhaps they are not doing the right thing but are
in fact attacking other women rather than fighting for the liberation of
all women. In addition, the argument is effective in that it assumes
without further ado that all feminists are unattractive and unsuccessful
with men, playing out the old sexual theme and pumping female
psychology in the manner already noted by Wollstonecraft half a
century earlier. The assumption of the unattractiveness of feminists is
smuggled in implicitly: it in fact reflectsNietzsche'svalues and thé values
of nlany men opposed to feminism and even of some women opposed
to feminism. But a familiar pattern can be noted: the idea of "being
attractive" is seen from out of a male perspective, without considering
the subjectivity of the woman and her particular motivation for taking
up a feminist position. For this reason, Nietzsche does not take femi-
nism seriously as an intellecrual, social or philosophical movement. In
order to do that, he would have had to consider more specifically the
views being discussed.
Another reason why Nietzsche did not take the feminist project
seriously is because he saw the future salvation of the world in terms of
a complete change ofvalues from the Christian tradition towards a new,
post-Christian order in which (superior) peoplewould freelycreate their
own values. The creation of a new society would, according to
Nietzsche, be achieved when people have learned to express the positive
nature of the will to power, the eternal return of the same, the love of
life, and fate. The prophet Zarathustra's task was to announce the
coming of the new values, the Superman was to bring them to life.I5
According to Nietzsche, only men have the power to create truly new
values, only men have the moral and intellectual depth to have values
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at all. Nietzsche was aware of the fact that there were many social
movements in his time: the demand for greater democracy and equal
rights which had begun with the French Revolution, the worker's
movements for better wages and working conditions. But all these were,
in his view, banal in the sense that they tried to alter small parts of the
sociallandscape but did not radically free society from its basic tenden-
cies and values. He criticised movements for democracy and equal rights
on the ground that theywould bring about conformism: masses stamp-
ing their label of commonality on the rest ofsociety. Such movements,
Nietzsche feared, would create a society without art, without great
intellectual pursuits, and without great achievements. Nietzsche calls
for a return to the old aristocratie ideals in Europe. Nietzsche regards
the aristocracy as the classwhich preserves culture, which rules in terms
ofits own good insights, which is truly"noble".16
Nietzsche's desire for a return to the old order, an order which he
sees going back to the Greeks, goes against the social tendencies of his
time." Social movements such as feminism completely passed Nietzsche
by. He was in fact fighting for an ideal of aristocracy which he saw as
having been realised in its most noble form in ancient Greece, butwhich
in fact ha4~ literally and figuratively, been beheaded during theFrench
Revolution and which would get its final, devastating blow in the years
ofwar and revolution at the beginning of the zoth century.
7 Conclusions
There were a number of philosophers in the 19th century who saw the
good sense of the women's movement. One could argue that this
chapter has presented two bad examples of chauvenist philosophers.
Perhaps more justice would have been done to the history ofphilosophy
to have dealt with a "female-friendly" male 19th century philosopher.
On the other hand, "female-friendly" philosophers may be less typical
of 19th century philosophers than Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. One
ofthe aims ofthis chapter is to show some ofthe reasons for the historical
failure of 19th century philosophicalliterature to deal adequately with
issues concerning women, issuessuch as those expressed by the women's
liberation movement. While women were fighting for the right to an
education, independence, the vote and equal rights, many 19th century
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philosophers were saying very different things about them. A number
of the ideas discussed in this chapter are, I think, to most men as weIl
as women, tedious in their banality and just plain embarassing. Written
in an age which was still fairly naïve in terms of its awareness of
psycho-sexual expression, they are expressions of basic urges by some
men to see things in their own way. I think that the failure of zoth
century male philosophers to deal adequatelywith women and women's
issues is partly a result of19th century failures in these matters, failures
of, among others, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.
But another factor in this failure is, I think, the social context in
which 19th century philosophy began to develop, a development which
continued in the zoth century. Philosophical discourse, including that
on women, must be seen in light ofthe growth ofuniversities and hence
of academie philosophy in this period. Hegel, for example, the great
professor at the University of Berlin, was given prestigious social status,
a fact which Kierkegaard relates with distaste. Befere this time, the
majority of philosophers were people working on their own, not in
academie settings. I think that this development had an impact on
philosophical speaking about women. By making philosophy into work
in a pnblic, male sphere, with male status becoming an important factor,
speaking about women was once more placed on the sidelines. Women
were identified with the realm of the private, arealm to be left behind
when working in the male-bonded sphere. If we add to this the roth
century failure to develop a coherent philosophical view on women,
speaking about women came to be regarded as not proper, academie,
or a particularly good idea. In a very important sense women came to
be regarded as unimportant and non-existent.
It is, however, true that rorh century philosophers were not entirely
swallowed up in the academie system. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the
two philosophers discussed in this chapter, cannot ofcourse be accused
of being part of the male philosophical establishment. Schopenhauer
failed to obtain a university position and Nietzsche gave up his relatively
briefly held position at the University ofBaseldue to health reasons and
difficulties with fellow academies. Precisely because of their feelings of
exclusion, they did not have a high regard for academie philosophy and
philosophers. Did their being excluded from a male-bonded system
mean that they were more open to women and women's issues?I8 I think
that in one respect this is the case. Nietzsche's view ofwoman as truth
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is a view of truth which indeed attempts to undermine systematic and
dogmatic notions of truth. As I stated in my introduetion to this book,
Derrida was amazed that Martin Heidegger no longer deigned to
mention Nietzsche's view ofwoman as truth, even though he analysed
in painstaking detail all the other elements ofNietzsche's view of truth.
This could well be a symptom of the difference in academie status and
milieu of Heidegger and Nietzsche.
Nevertheless, it is then all the more discouraging that these two
philosophers on the periphery of academia, for different reasons, saw
no positive way to fight for a change in the image ofwomen or for their
liberation. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were not in all respects the
radical critics of19th century society which they made themselves out
to beo With regard to their views of women, they were in many ways
typical of their time and in line with the tradition of philosophical
thought. Their arguments are perhaps more strident than those of
philosophers of the past, but the intellectual ingredients they use are as
old as philosophy itself.
Unfortunately, these messages and lessons have failed to reach many
male academies in the zoth century. Although written and unwritten
academie «1des of ethics forbid rabid attacks on certain people in
society, including women, many philosophers today still think that it is
possible to write a philosophical anthropology, a philosophy ofpolities
or society, or an ethics, without the woman being present in any way.
It can be argued, as such philosophers often do, that women are not a
distinct social group or category and that therefore such a project is not
necessary. A great deal of research has, however, shown that in many
cases the word "persen" as used by an author in fact means "male" and
that women are in fact not being spoken about. In the next chapter, I
will discuss one of the many contemporary female responses to the
feeling ofbeing excluded from philosophical discourse, as found in the
work of L. Irigaray. Irigaray makes clear, in contrast to the "don't teIl
them what we think of them" patronising attitude ofNietzsche and the
"they don't fit into male philosophical discourse" attitude of many
philosophers today, that women have heard what men have said or not
said about them, they have understood it, and want to put an end to it.
Irigaray reflects the fact that women in the zoth century have for the
first time had access to a university education and that they have become
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subjects of discourse and even silence themselves, not just objects.
Hence the title of the next chapter: from différence to female speaking.
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1 Introduetion
In this chapter, I would like to look at one of the most creative and
interesting of contemporary philosophers who discuss questions sur-
rounding the masculine and feminine, Luce Irigaray (1930).1 The main
therne of this chapter wil1 be the search by women for their own voice,
their own subjectiviry, in the communicaton community which is our
culture. Irigaray demonstrates that women have always been excluded
from the process ofspeaking by the dominanee ofmale perspectives and
the male perception that a woman is not really present. She attempts to
present a positive alternative to this state of affairs in which the female
is actuality, presence, reality, and speech in her own right,
Irigaray studied linguistics and philosophy at the University of
Louvain in Belgium, writing a Ph.D. thesis on Paul Valéry. She taught
for a while and then moved to Paris to study psychopathology at the
University ofParis. Her second Ph.D. thesis, Ie langagedesdéments, on
the use of language by the mentally disturbed, was published in 1973.
She then worked on her doctorat d'état, the state doctorate which would
give her aCçess to a permanent teaching position, by writing her fi.rst
ful1-fledged feminist psychology/philosophy book, Speculum, de l'autre
femme (Speculum. Ofthe Other woman), published in 1974. This book
created a furor in the examining committee, but was eventually ac-
cepted. Three weeks later, however, she was fired from the University
of Vincennes. She had alienated people from the school of jacques
Lacan." She could, however, keep her job at the Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique (N ational Center for Scientific Research), allow-
ing her to continue her academie work. She set up a psychoanalytical
practice in her home in Paris, where she still lives. She has her own
students and fol1owers, and has written a considerable number ofbooks
and given lectures at many universities. Among the books she has
published are readings of Nietzsche, Heidegger, works dealing with
ethics, female forms ofexpression, critiques ofsexism in philosophy and
the sciences. She has received invitations from universities around the
world to give guest lectures and seminars.'
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In this chapter, I will concentrate mainly on the most surprising of
Irigaray's works in terms of its originality, Speculum. In her later work,
Irigaray follows up on the themes and methodology begun in Speculum,
developing new ideas and perspectives from out of this first book. The
book begins with a critique of Freud's view of women, proceeds to a
critique of sexism in the history of philosophy, dealing with Plato,
Aristotle, the medieval mystical tradition, Descartes, Kant and Hegel.
She ends the book with a detailed discussion of Plato, concentrating on
his allegory of the cave. I will first give some examples of Irigaray's
philosophical approach in Speculum and in the final part of the chapter,
I will look at some theoretical issues raised by Irigaray's philosophy,
concentrating on the equality-difference debate, the most pressing
debate on the role and status ofwomen in society today.
2 lrigaray's Reading of Freud
Irigaray, in speaking of Speculum, states that there is no beginning or
end to the book." She begins with a detailed discussion ofFreud but the
factshe begins Speculum in this way is not arbitrary. As a psychoiogist
and philosopher, Irigaray wants to investigate the masculine biases in
Freud's theories in order to lay the groundwork for a much broader
philosophical-historical look at the preconceptions and prejudices
which men have about women. In her view, Freud' s theories on women
are not so much a diagnosis of the nature of women as they are
themse1ves symptoms ofwhat is wrong with the way men think about
women. In order to demonstrate this, Irigaray "reads" texts by Freud on
women.Î By saying that she reads the texts, I mean that she follows the
words and images in the text to find what dynamics lie behind their use,
what presuppositions colour the order ofFreud's discourse. In this way,
Irigaray does not present a distanced, analytical or clinical approach but
she simply allows the sexist implications of images and theories to
emerge.
For Irigaray, Freud's theory of female sexuality and sexual develop-
ment is symptomatic of male speech concerning women for a number
of reasons. Firstly, she cites the pattern we have also seen repeated in
almost all the texts discussed in this book oftaking up an explicitly male
perspective, of"we" versus "them", For example, Freud asks his readers
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and listeners te examine the mystery of women, assuming that his
audience is male. Freud uses the "conspiratorial" tacticwhich Plato and
Nietzsche also use. For example, he states a number ofso-called charac-
teristics ofwomen and he notes that if a woman hears ofthis and objects,
one is to respond with the reassurance, "But, my dear, JOU are an
exception and not like that".6
Secondly, there is the pattern of seeing women as a vaguer, lesser
"mirror" ofthe ideal characteristics ofmen. Freud expressesideas similar
to Aristotle's view of the female as a defective male, as "lack" and
passivity. Freud, to his credit, states that looking at the female in terms
of these categories will not really advance the science of understanding
women. But, as Irigaray points out, his entire theory of female sexuality
supports the idea of the female as defect, lack, and passivity. This lack
is expressed specifically in the female lack of the male sexual organ. T 0
understand how Freud comes to the conclusion that the female is lack,
it is necessary to look at his viewofmale and female sexual development.
According to Freud, children up to the age of three develop their
sexual orientation through their association with the male and the
female, usually portrayed by their parents. In the caseofthe female child,
Freud statès-rhat in the first period ofher development, the girl feelsshe
resembles her mother. She soon recognises, however, the disadvantages
ofsuch an identification. The mother is not only a riyal to the daughter
for the love ofthe father. but, even worse, the daughter gradually realises
rhat the mother does not have a penis, the organ denoting the power
and superiority of the male. According to Freud, a young girl becomes
aware of the penis by seeing it on a brother or other young boys. The
realisation that she and her mother lack this means the young girl turns
away in disappointment from the penisless mother and strives for the
love of the father. The father will, normally, reject the girl so that she
starts to desire a male ofher own. After that, she will desire a male child,
a bearer of the penis she misses.This rather incredible story centred on
the male organ serves the purposeon a more banallevel of defining the
female purpose in life as oriented to and appropriating the male.
According to Freud, female sexual development is much more
complex than male sexual development for two reasons. These two
reasons are also, according to Freud, explanations for why femalessuffer
from "hysterical" symptoms. Firstly, the female cannot express her
natural aggression in the same way that a male can. Freud states that
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young boys and girls have an equal amount of aggression but that the
boy can live out that aggression, while in the case of the girl, oriented
as she is to obtaining the love of the father and other men in her life, it
is necessary to suppress this aggression. The girl must not only come to
accept the fact that she has no penis and must create her own identity
through another, but in order to become a woman she must develop
passivity. On the sexual level, this passivity means that becoming a
woman implies transferring the pleasure given by the clitoris, the
shrunken male organ ofthe female, into true feminine, vaginal pleasure.
Such a process involves accepting sexual passivity as well as social
passivity: she comes to realise that she can only obtain a man through
passive behaviour.
The second respect in which the male and female differ is that while
the male may retain his bonding with his mother in his adult Iife,
combining it with his love for a wife, the woman must, in order to orient
herself to the male, completely cut offher relationship with the mother.
As Irigaray notes, this is a curious theory because it breaks with the
symmetry of Freud's analyses of the development of the two genders.
Why does Freud suddenly analyse the male's relationship to the mother
di~rentlyfrom the female' s? Irigaray argues that this is an attempt by
Freud to take away the "origin" and "history" from the female since the
male retains his origin, the female not, She argues the male alwayswants
to appropriate to himself the cluster discourse-economy-desire.
T aking away the history of the woman takes away the roots of her
identity and also, according to Irigaray, her roots in discourse. Irigaray
argues that female hysteria, one of the major areas of Freud's research,
is not diagnosed properly by him precisely because it is caused by the
male order itself, of which Freud's own views are an example. Female
hysteria originates in the woman's exclusion from the realm ofdiscourse.
A woman's only recourse becomes non-verbal protest. Irigaray links the
terms hysterialmystery because "mystery" is another basic term which
Freud uses to describe the feminine. The mystery ofwomen lies in the
fact that men do not understand them, This is, according to Irigaray, a
point of view which is itself the result of the woman being excluded
from her origins and language.
Freud himselfrealised that his understanding offemale sexualitywas
not a complete or clear one, callingwomen a mystery, a riddle." Irigaray
concludes that this is not a positive point of departure for Freud's
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attempt to understand women. She argues that the main barrier to
Freud's understanding ofwomen is his male perspective which does not
allow him to think of female sexuality in terms ofbeing its own type of
sexuality. In Freud's view, female sexuality is a lack. The woman has
"no" organs of her own, apart from the shrivelled male organ. Female
sexual organs are for the rest "nothing". Her origin and purpose in life,
defined in terms of male structures and desires, is also "nothing" of its
own.
In her critique of Freud, Irigaray notes that any disappointment the
girl may feel with the mother may say more about how males view
females, about the sexual power relationship between them, and about
social norms rather than about presumed defects in female sexuality.'
Manhood involves not just a certain type of sexual apparatus but
designates male superiority, freedom, opportunity and domination. The
idea that penis envy occurs in women is not an empirically verified fact
and most likely untrue." Instead, this idea is most likely a symbolical
expression of the realities of powerlessness and repression ofwomen in
Freud's Vienna and many other places in rçrh century Europe.
3 Subjectivity Appropriated to the Masculine
In Part II of Speculum, Irigaray examines sexism in the history of
philosophy and psychoanalyses structures ofphilosophical thought, She
demonstrates that sexism is in fact rampant in the history ofphilosophy.
In arguing this, she comes up with a plethora ofideas, images, and values
linked by philosophers to male and female.
lrigaray opens Part II with a chapter in which she argues that in
philosophical thought subjectivity has always been appropriated to the
masculine. She illustrates this theme by using the image ofthe Ptolemaic
system being replaced by the Copernican. The image ofthe Copernican
revolution is an image already used in the 18th century by Kant and
applied by other philosophers such as Ernst Cassirer to describe the
move to modernity in philosophical thought and philosophical anthro-
pology. Irigaray applies this image to a re-evaluaton or transformation
ofthe traditional male-female distinction as made in philosophy. Philo-
sophical thought has always and is still revolving around one pole, the
male who originates it and about whom it speaks. The earth, the
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feminine, should not be seen as revolving as alesser entity around the
sun (Apollo, reason), but in fact, according to Irigaray, it turns on itself."
In other words, female reality does not revolve around the male nor can
it be described as a weak reflection ofthe male. This is the revolutionary
idea which, according to Irigaray, must be introduced into contempo-
rary philosophy, one that has not yet occurred in the progression of the
"male imaginary" towards modernity.
Traditionally in philosophical thought, the male sees himself as
symbolising reason and transcendence, while he sees the female as
symbolising immanence, nature and matter. The male does not realise
that he cannot, in this way, define and capture the feminine. Asthe male
seeks for truth and reality higher above the earth, he is unable to come
to terms with the earth. If he persists in shutting himself off from the
feminine, he loses his own link to the earth, his own roots and identity.
The male seeks to see everything in terms of the economy of the same,
to reduce his understanding of something which is essentially "ether"
to a pale mirroring of himself. This, however, is not possible. The
feminine, especially to a masculine which has distanced itself from it, is
trulyother, has become ungraspable. Reason, "objectivity", will not give
the.desired result: the male must reopen his mind to the realms of
thought which have been repressed by rationality, those of dreams and
the unconscious. The feminine exists in a world of a different syntax,
another type ofmeaning. Asopposed to the cool rationality ofthought,
it is concrete and burns up male rationality.
After this introductory statement describing the philosophical con-
text in which she will develop her philosophical views, Irigaray discusses
a number of texts from the history of philosophy. I will discuss as an
example ofher approach her reading ofPlato's allegory of the cave.
4 Plato's Allegory of the Cave
The final part of Speculum deals with Plato's allegory of the cave. The
allegory, denoting the road one must take from ignorance to knowledge,
is, according to Irigaray, full of imagery Freud would recognise. The
story, briefly, is as follows. There are a number ofmen tied up in a cave.
They have their backs to the opening of the cave and are facing a wall
with a fire in front of it. On the wall, shadows of things are being
Plato'sAllegory of the Cave 137
projected. One of the prisoners manages to free himselfand to walk out
of the cave into the sun. At first he is blinded by seeing things in the
sun but he becomes used to it. He then goes back into the caveand tells
the others about the things he has seen but he is rejected by them. For
Plato, the allegory of the cave symbolises the struggle to attain true
knowledge through philosophical thought rather than remaining in the
sphere ofmere opinion. Following the story of the cave, Plato writes on
the importance ofeducation."
Applying a Freud-used-against-himself analysis, Irigaray interprets
the cave as the womb in which men feel imprisoned, the opening of the
cave as the birth canal. She argues that men (asFreud also thought) have
the basic need to break off their early identification with their mother.
This early bond is a biological bond: men are bom ofwomen and first
identify with the mother because she cares for them. But in order to
become a man, the young boy must identify himself with the father
through the Oedipus complex. Irigaray concludes that men have a fear
ofbeing shut in, imprisoned by the womb (or later, by the vagina).
The process of breaking off the identification with the female and
entering into the male world is symbolised by Plato by the process of
attaining kn.owledge and doing philosophy. Plato uses male images for
knowiedge: it is symbolised by the appearance of things in the sun."
Linked to these images is a value system of the higher and the lower,
the superior and the inferior, inner and outer, darkness and light,
ignorance and knowiedge, categories by which men give more status to
their side than to that of the female.
The conclusion of this psychoanalysisof Plato's allegoryof the cave
is that the attainment of knowledge and the doing of philosophy is a
process of male bonding in which males create their own symbolical
order to the exclusion of the feminine. Knowledge is not something
which is obtained "for itself" but is an instrument in the process of
coming to gender self-identification.
Throughout Speculum, Irigaray gives many examples of male
thought and imagery in philosophy by describing how male philoso-
phers think: the doing of metaphysics to reach a higher, nobler male
realm above that offemale everydaylife; the striving ofmales to identify
with a self-projected male order of the divine; the search by males for
clear and distinct knowledge, presumably opposed to female irrationa-
lity and unclarity; the priority of male desires for form, reason, action
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and control above female matter, emotion and passivity; and the urge
to order and control reality and the feminine by "placing" the feminine
in certain categories, by "setting" certain goals, ideals and ends for the
feminine. As to female imagery in philosophy, the feminine is associated
with the natural, the cyclical, the realms of the earth, the family and
reproduction.
For Irigaray, the most fundamental "given" at the basisofthese types
of images is the sexual, in the sense of physical-sexual reality. For
example, Irigaray sees a link between the male sexual organ and the sex
act and notions of teleology and control, between female physiology
and sexual reaction and notions of the diffuse and holistic. Sexuality is
based on physiological reactions which, in her view, can be associated
with characteristics of male and female thought.
5 Deconstruction and Mimesis
Although we have seen that Irigaray comes to very forceful results in her
reading of Freud and the history of philosophy, it is not the case that
Irigaray uses a methodology in the traditional sense or that she describes
systematically or abstractly what she is doing and what the results are.
Such an approach would, in her own eyes, mean that she is using the
methodology of male thought, while her intention is to present an
alternative to such thought. I have already indicated that Irigaray uses
a "reading" approach, which can be linked to the psychoanalytic
approach of letting the patient go through a process of free association
in order to reveal the nature of the neurosis. In this sense, even though
she criticisesFreud, Irigaray makes use ofsome ofhis techniques. Besides
a psychoanalytic approach in her work, there is also a philosophical one.
Two aspects of this philosophical approach are deconstruction and
mImeSIS.
Irigaray calls her philosophy deconstructive in the sense that she,
like Heidegger (whose term this is) wishes to present a critique of the
western philosophical tradition but realises that she herself is working
within the conceptual framework of that tradition. No thinker, both
Irigaray and Heidegger realise, can start entirely anew from a point
outside the tradition itself. This ambiguous aspect of borrowing from
tradition and presenting a critique of it is expressed by the term
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deconstruction. A number of images have been used to explain this
term. One can think of the Baron Munkhausen image of rebuilding a
boat board by board while it is floating on the water. Another image
used is that of breaking down a house from within, destroying the
foundations without the walls falling down on one. In essence, both
images express the idea of using philosophical material against itself or
of placing oneselfwithin that to which one is opposed.f
The philosophical image of deconstruction goes remarkably weIl
with the psychoanalytic approach. In therapy, the analyst just lets the
patient talk, not by asking questions from out of some different,
theoretical context, but from out of the terminology, ideas and images
used by the patient. Understanding comes to the patient by realising
what he or she is expressing.
Although Heidegger and Irigaray have differing styles, both see the
issue as one of asking what philosophers (or, if you will, western
thought) are really saying. Heidegger does this through depth analyses
and etymologies of the terms philosophers use, Irigaray through a
process ofthe association of ideas. Irigaray, like Heidegger, is not overly
concerned with more academie types of interpretation. In Irigaray's
texts it is-sëmetimes difficult to distinguish who is speaking, the
philosopher in question or Irigaray the deconstructivist and psychoana-
lyst. Irigaray refuses to use footnotes or bibliographies: the process of
thinking and writing is not one of distanced analysis but of intense
conversation. Although she develops a different kind of "philosophy of
difference" than Jacques Derrida, she is, like him, concerned with the
way in which language expresses meaning and thought, Derrida expands
Heidegger's deconstructive approach to language by asking what lan-
guage implicitly and explicitly expresses by means of a social-psycho-
logical reading of texts." Irigaray uses the same kind of technique as
Derrida of looking at the contexts and connotations of the use of terms
and images as well as reading between the lines, asking questions as to
the points jumped over by the author in the text, the seemingly illogical
moves which the philosopher makes to hide or express ideas.
Another term which Irigaray uses to describe her approach is taken
from Aristotle: mimesis. Mimesis has a number ofmeanings but can be
loosely translated as mimicry. For Aristotle, mimesis is at the heart of
art and literature because they mimic reality. For Irigaray, mimesis
means mimicing sexism in philosophical texts. Again, mimicry is not
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critique from outside, but from inside a view or a theory. But the
repetition is not pure reproduction. The repetition is just "off', just
"different enough" to show where the gaps are, where the sexism lies.
For Irigaray, women mimicing male chauvinism is effective in the sense
that it gives them the opportunity to demonstrate their irony and to
allow room for laughter, that is, to show (one can think here of the
Wittgensteinian notion of "showing" as opposed to "saying") how
wrong and ridiculous sexism is. The more women repeat the prejudices,
the less men will take the ideas they previously held seriously.
6 Positive Philosophy
Besides presenting a critique of male rhought, Irigaray's aim is to
re-think and re-express female sexuality and reality. Irigaray argues
against Freud that it is necessary to express female sexuality in its own
terms. The female of course has her own sexual organs and sexual
experiences which males may find puzzling over against a male sexuality
which is more directed to its object. She speaks of a holistic, diffuse
female sexuality. Women have most likely always been aware of the fact
that they are not "nothing" or "laek" in the Aristotelian and Freudian
sense. The time has come, in an age in which women have been able to
enter into traditionally exclusive male realms of arts, sciences and
academia, to express the positive ways in which they differ from the
masculine. On all levels, women should express the "difference" be-
tween male and female as a truly fundamental difference. This time, the
difference will not be the difference spoken of by male thinkers where
difference implies inferiority, but a difference between two distinct
genders, each having their own value. Applying this notion ofdifference
to acultural and artistic level, Irigaray urges women to express them-
selves in areas such as philosophy, science, art, and literature. In
philosophy there is a great need for women to begin to write and express
their own perspective. Irigaray feels that she herself has started on this
road, calling her own philosophical writing écriture fiminin, female
writing. Female expression will be flowing, diffuse, earthy and earthly,
and, to men, confusing and perhaps nonsensical because men will, as
in the case ofFreud, be unable to grasp the feminine content. If, Irigaray
says, female thought and writing leads to male confusion, it means that
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it has successfully broken with male thought and writing, which is a
writing which only accepts an "economy of the self-same".15
7 Equality and Difference
The ideas of Irigaray have had a great impact on women's studies in
philosophy, providing it with a very interesting and pronounced ap-
proach. A number of discussions have arisen about her views, but it
seems to me that the most important one concerns her idea ofdifference.
The idea that there is a very fundamental difference between male and
female, masculinity and femininity lies at the basis ofher philosophy in
both its criticism ofmale thought and in its attempt to create a positive
new notion of the feminine. But "is" there a fundamental and to a large
extent "natural" difference between men and women? Are these diffe-
rences so fundamental that one can speak of male and female thought?
What difference wouldit have made ifwomen had alwaysbeen included
in the intellectual development of western society? Is gender and
sexuality so fundamental that they give men and women different
natures? C3:n one extrapolate from the sexual and from sexual charac-
teristics to intellectual and cultural areas?
There are two ways ofapproaching these questions: firstly, in terms
of the philosophical status of the idea of difference and secondly, in
terms of the social-political implications of difference thinking.
On the philosophical level, the accusation can been levelled- at
Irigaray of introducing a form of biologism. Biology seems to play a
large role in the formation of the intellectual concepts of which she
speaks and biologism is notoriously difficult to prove. Irigaray is herself
aware of such criticism, stating that she never intended to produce a
biological theory." Indeed, biologism is not a very appropriate basis for
her philosophy since it carries with it connotations of determinism. If
men had been determined by their sexuality to produce the type of
thought which they have, then any criticism of that or the call for a new
male mentality would be quite pointless. But by noting the parallels
between the biological differences between male and female and the
patterns in which sexism is expressed in philosophy, she does not want
to reduce matters to a physicalist notion of human nature or determi-
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nism through nature. Still, however one describes her approach, this
remains a difficulty in her philosophy.
A second philosophical point which has been made concerning
Irigaray's idea of difference is that almost without exception the male
chauvenist philosophers whom she discusses and criticises have worked
with a notion of difference, one often based on a presupposition that
there are naturally given human characteristics. Irigaray, however,
claims that her notion of difference is not the same as those used in the
philosophical tradition. For her, difference is a positive notion, not one
of "superiority-inferiority" or "complementarity" (the two patterns
most often found in the philosophicalliterature). In addition, and I
think this is for Irigaray the most important point, it is now women
themselves who are saying how they differ: women have become
"subjects" of philosophical discourse instead of "objects" being de-
scribed by men. Still, apart from the reasonableness ofIrigaray's alter-
native notion of difference, feminists have stated that maintaining a
.notion ofdifferente still carries with it the problem ofwhat I would like
to call the "feminine ghetto", that is, that astrong notion of difference
leads to an expression of "otherness" which begins to live a relatively
isoláeed life, isolated from "masculine thought" and women who are
still willing to participate in that. The "ghetto" idea expresses the fact
that, despite all the efforts by feminists they are, always and ever again,
considered to be "different" and even "inferior", on the "fringe" of the
dominant order. The notion of positive difference together with inte-
gration is a very high ideal. The question is which strategy women
should use to deal with the dominant order: difference and equality or
sameness and equality?
This leads to the second set of objections which have been made to
Irigaray'snotion of difference, what I would like to call the "liberal"
objection. Going back to MaryWoUstonecraft and much ofthe feminist
tradition of the 19th century up to the birth of the "second wave" of
feminism dating from the 1960's, many women have said that the main
goal is to achieve equality with men. On this view, men and women are
not fundamenrally different, but if there are any differences, this fact
must be considered to be secondary to the fact that they are in the first
place human beings. It can be argued that gender differences are about
as relevant in dealing with the notion of human nature as skin colour
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is. The fundamental sameness is so overriding that it would be improper
to speak of difference in any fundamental sense.
Some of the philosophers discussed in this book have discussed the
issue of the fundamental sameness of people and the secondary nature
of gender differences. Rousseau and Kant, for example, explicitly deal
with this question, as do Aquinas and the Christian tradition. Are we
not, male and female, all human beings? The problem with the views
of these philosophers, as we have seen, is, however, that they claim that
there are really quite relevant differences between men and women,
differences which mean that they should be treated or educated in
different ways. In this sense, aswe have seen, the notion ofsameness of
male and female and a communal basis in human nature is often
ambiguous in the western philosophical tradition.
In the feminist "liberal" tradition, the idea ofthe sameness ofhuman
nature is associated with complete equality. Wollstonecraft, as we saw,
came to this conclusion in a very pronounced way in her critique of
Rousseau. The feminist view ofsameness as fundamentalleads to a new
view of the feminine, of philosophical thought, and of equal rights.
Women see this concept as the basis for overcoming exclusion in all
areas of liftrand thought. Irigaray explicitly rejects this option, saying
that women will again be selling themselves out and sacrificing their
identities to "rnasculine thought" with which, she argues, all women in
academie spheres have been or can be infected.
Another aspect of the difference-sameness debate is on the social-
politicallevel. Do both genders have the same social rights and privileges
and should both conform to the same standards in society?The debate
concerning sameness and difference has coloured much of feminist
discussion in the political arena. The "liberal" thinkers have argued that
they have a consistent and strong position: equal natures means equal
rights. The difference thinkers say that equality thinkers have an image
of people as androgynous creatures, denying the reality and needs of
male and female identities and the positive contributions both can make
from out of their difference. But this position makes the thinkers of
"difference", such as Irigaray, vulnerable to the accusation that they lack
commitment to fundamental equality. The difference side responds to
this by saying that in the equality position women will loose their own
identity". Perhaps a very simple example of this debate on the social-
politicallevel concerns the workplace. Should men and women be held
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to the same standards, have the same rights, and earn the same salaries
for the same work? Or should women be given additional rights, for
example, pregancy leave and time for raising children and caring for a
young family? Such a difficult issue as this shows how complicated it is
to make decisions about sameness and difference between men and
women: human rights should also be based on needs. A very important
point to note, however, is that difference thinkers do not have as solid
a basis in an idea of shared human nature which liberals have; it is a
"postmodern", more fragile and fragmentaryview than the Enlighten-
ment position.I8 The balance of power between equality thinkers and
difference thinkers will, I think, keep swinging from one side to the
other, This is because they are not merely expressing intellectual fash-
ions, but they are responding to changing socialand economie situations
and demands. After all, the concern behind this debate is how women
function in the family and the workplace, situations which are influ-
enced by social and economie factors and which are of vital concern
both to individuals and to society. Women and society tend to shift
focus on equality or difference, aswas the case for example in the 1940's
("equality" for the war effort) and the 1950's ("difference" for putting
women back in the home). Perhaps now, in the 1990's, as a response to
the equality thinking of the 1960's to 1980's, there is once more a
movement towards difference thinking such as expressed by Irigaray.
This contemporary form of difference thinking is, however, often
thought to be based on equality as guaranteed by society. In the final
chapter of this book, besides drawing conclusions from the discusslons
held of the philosophers discussed in this book, I will also attempt to
analyse the very complicated social phenomenon of feminism in the
1990's.
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10 Conclusions. Women, Nature and Culture
I Introduetion
In this book, I have described various images of women and ideas
concerning roles for women as they are presented by some of the main
thinkers in the history ofphilosophy. For me, the most surprising result
of this research is the fact that so much of what has been said about
women in the philosophical tradition is "the same". By "the same" I
mean that philosophers, when speaking about women, leave no cliché
unturned. Women are seen as less rational than men, belong in the
home, and are to be excluded from the public and intellectuallife of
society. The female is seen as functioning within and symbolically
representing the cyclical, naturalorder, the male as standing for and
achieving things in the historical, cultural order. With respect to the
male order, that of the female is inferior. The Pythagorean women,
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Rousseau, Kant, Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche are all to some extent of this opinion. Plato is the only
philosopher on this list who wanted to break out of this pattern, but as
we saw, his efforts are at best ambiguous.
Serne-ef the other philosophers discussed, Christine de Pizan,
Descartes, and Mary W ollstonecraft, have in common a desire to
increase the scope of the concept of human nature and to see women
as equal to men and as being capable of achievements in the realms
traditionally called male. Irigaray is perhaps in her own category, in that
she wishes to reformulate the question of the relationship between a
general concept of human nature and the valuation of the masculine
and feminine by combining the notions of difference and equality.
As Plato and Aristotle already indicated, the main point around
which the gender discussion revolves concerns the view of the nature of
women and their role in society. Are men and women "naturally" "the
same" or are they "different"? If men and women can be seen as having
their own "natural" characteristics, what does that say about their roles
in society? Should men and women have different/unequal or the
same/equal social status and roles? Should we follow Irigaray's sugges-
tion that there be a positive appreciation in society of femininity as
"different"? Or should we see male and female as different from each
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other but at the same time as having "equal" human and social rights
in a political and legal sense? Or should we make use ofother theoretical
models to express the relationship between the two genders? For exam-
ple, a promising area might be that ofthe study ofthe social and political
aspects of modern pluralism in philosophy and anthropology. Could
we describe male and female as different "cultures" which should be
treated in light of an ethics of pluralism?
Underlying these questions is another question. How can we sepa-
rate our viewsofmale and female nature from the socialisation processes
in which such views take shape? And perhaps the deepest question is:
why do humans make so many distinctions and judgments concerning
the ideology of gender in the first place?
In this concluding chapter, I would like to discuss the nature-culture
distinction as it applies to the creation of male-female images and give
the beginning of an answer to the question of why humans make
ideological distinctions between males and females.
2 Nature, Culture and Society
Traditionally, there are rwo possible approaches to answering questions
about how human beings come to be the way they are. One can take a
historical-cultural point of view, seeing human beings as formed by
socialisation processes and analysing the valuation and exclusion of
individuals in cultural contexts. One can also take nature as the point
of departure, searching for the reasons for the way we are in human
nature, biology and instincts. In this book, dealing as it does with the
history of ideas, cultural aspects of the valuation of the male and female
have been discussed. Yet, as we also saw in this book, the concept of
human nature, male and female nature, is very important to philoso-
phers because "nature" can function as a foundation and therefore as a
justification for certain "cultural" views. To some extent, all the phi-
losophers we have discussed revert to a notion of human nature as
underlying speaking about male and female on a cultural level. The
appeal to a foundation in nature for cultural conclusions is expressed
most clearly by Aristotle. For him, a social order is a "correct" order
when it reflects the natural characteristics of those participating in it. .
For Plato, there is a link between natural characteristics and social roles,
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but in a weaker sense than for Aristotle. As Plato states in the Republic,
it is at least theoretically possible to reconsider ideas concerning the
nature of people, a process which implies the possibility of a reconsid-
eration of the existing social order. Conservative thinkers such as
Aristotle tend to put more emphasis on human nature and natural
characteristics in order to strengthen their presuppositions about male
and female. Thinkers such as Plato who are open to alternative ideas
and the possibility of change in the way society operates will argue that
"natural" characteristics may be sodally coloured and hence subject to
reinterpretation in different social contexts.
I think that we can draw two conclusions from the nature-culture
discussions we have encountered in this book. Firstly, nature and culture
are both important factors in forming people. Through socialisation,
we become human, that is,we develop the capadty to experience human
feelings, to respond to people and situations in typically human ways,
to reason and use language to express ourselves about ourselves and the
world: all attitudes and responses which are only possible because ofthe
fact that other humans have taught us to use reason and language.
Secondly, we can conclude that socialisation is only possible because
humans have specific abilities, biological "givens". These "givens" can
vary from person to person and between the genders, but this does not
make them less necessary conditions for the possibility of human
society.
All the philosophers discussed in this book agree that male and
female are by nature human beings and that our shared humanity is"the
basis on which relationships between the genders are built. I wish to
point to this fact because I sometimes encounter statements to the effect
that there are philosophers in the mainstream of the history ofwestern
philosophy who deny that women have rationality, souls, or humanity.
This is a misunderstanding caused by reading philosophers on the
wrong level. Philosophers often do claim that women are less rational
and hence less "human" than men, but this distinction is not made on
the fundamental plane of rationality, soul and humanity but on the
secondary level of gender spedfic characteristics.
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3 Gender Typing
I think that the most promising of present day attempts to answer
questions concerning the patterns which occur in the creation ofimages
of men and women, the nature-culture discussion, and the roles men
and women are to have in society is the theory that people "gender type"
themselves. I By "gender typing" is meant that people have a basic need
to identify with a certain gender and this is done by describing and
prescribing sexual roles, characteristics and ideals. The aim is to form
sexual-social identity. Sexuality in this view is something which is not
just given, but which is constantly expressed and reinforeed in individual
lives and in culture.
The main categories in which people place gender types are "male"
and "female" for gender and "heterosexual" and "homosexual" for sexual
orientation. Both categories are crude types because they may in fact be
hopelessly inadequate for describing the wide variations which can occur
in human gender identity and sexuality. What is interesting is that
people want to believe that these categories apply and that they think
that it is somehow important to dassify human beings in this way. In
gend.er typing, people create "ideal types" which are dear and easy to
apply, aiding them in categorizing people and making their social-sexual
world ordered and manageable. People attribute certain values and
ideals to these types: a man who sees himself as fitting in the ideal
category "male" feels he must live up to certain male images and he
becomes convineed that he cannot then say that he would be just as weIl
offwith female ones. The perception of the value (a perception which
can slide into a feeling ofsuperiority) of one's own type is precisely the
function of the exemplary nature of such images in the first place.
Gender typing can occur between men and women in order to
identify a sexual mate as suitable and it can also occur in within groups
of males or females themselves. People are evaluated within their own
type on the basis ofhow "rnasculine" or "feminine" they seem to other
members of the type. Gender typing can be used by a certain gender to
make distinctions between people of that gender and certain typologies
are presented to the other gender as attractive. The other gender in turn
enforces, influences or changes the perception ofwhat the ideal charac-
teristics of the opposite sex are. Looking at this phenomenon from out
of an evolutionary, sexual selection point of view, it means rhat men
Gender Typing
and women compete within their type and select outside of their type
in such a way that certain characteristics ofeach gender are selected and
passed on to the next generation.
Gender typing also plays a role in social-sexualdevelopment. Freud
pointed out the importance ofgender typing in the Oedipus and Electra
phases of sexual development. Freud concentrated primarily on the
pivotal nature ofthe first origins ofsexual identification during what he
calls the prehistorical phase in the life of a child, that is, the first three
years of life.' At that age, the child' s sexual orientation is developed
through a complex reaction to its male and female role models, usually
parents. In later variations on the Freudian theory of gender typing,
created by his followers, the entire lifespan ofpeople is seen as a process
of sexual identification. In addition, Freud also pointed out that there
are intellectual and cultural manifestations of gender typing which
emerge through the process of sublimation. Culture can then be seen
as both formed by sexual identification processesand in turn reinforcing
the sexual identity of people.
If one wishes to account for differences in male-female nature and
social roles in terms ofthe valuation ofone' s own type and the exclusion
or downpiaying of other types, the question remains as to what makes
this process so incredibly powerful. Male-female cultural patterns and
sex/gender taboos are so strong that they can be maintained over
millennia. We often assume that ifthe creation and maintaining ofsuch
patterns is due to "nature" it means that the patterns are very set and
difficult to change. But if we conclude that an important carrier of
gender typing is culture, this means that culture, based on the expression
of very fundamental human tendencies, is also extremely difficult to
change. Perhaps culture, being so interdependent on nature is changed
differently from the way nature changes but is equally difficult to
change.
Feminism can be seen as an effort to alter gender typing rules and
procedures. As we saw, Christine de Pizan, Mary Wollstonecraft and
Luce Irigaray keep askingwhywomen have been characterised in certain
ways and excluded from certain realms. Feminists ask over and over
again "why are women typed the way they are"?What enabled men to
create certain ideologies about themselves and about women and why
did women never manage to break through the exclusionary forces of
the male system? As Simone de Beauvoir wonders, are there not two
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guilty parties, the men who created these images and the women who
also created them and accepted themi"
Women have the distinct feeling that a number of characteristics
which males appropriate to themselves (rationality or having careers, for
example) are not specifically male characteristics at all and that male
efforts to demonstrate that women are not good at these things or should
not be participating in such activities at all are offensive. Feminists
therefore wish to change the rules for typing male and female nature
and social roles. But, assuming that despite the great strength of
traditional typologies it is possible to change them, what criteria are
there for such change? This is the issue with which society and feminism
is now being faced.
4 Science and the Social Good
Who can and should how gender is to be typed and on what basisshould
such decisions be made? Men, women, science or the social-political
agenda concerned with "the social good"? Women often claim that men
haveslways been the ones who decided these matters and that this is
not right or fair. Women themselves should have more ofa voice in the
gender typing process, a task many have taken on in western society. Is
philosophy an area in which theories should be developed to support
this effort or are we better offlooking to other fields to arrive at answers?
I will first look at two non-philosophical areas in which people [ook for
answers to these questions and will then look at the efforts made in
contemporary philosophy to analyse and promote the cause ofwomen.
Are there scientifically "objective" criteria to settle the disputes?
Perhaps scientific research could give neutral answers to what fits in best
with male and female nature and what social-political role divisions
would create a more perfect society? At the moment, a great amount of
scientific research is being done in order to find factual answers to
questions concerning male and female nature. Because of the complex-
ity of the matter, science has not yet come to the point where it can give
definitive answers.
It seems to me that the only general message coming out ofscientific
research is that a certain percentage ofour make-up is different in male
and female, a certain percentage the same. This is the case on both a
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genetic, biologicallevel as well as on asocial, intellectuallevel. Biologi-
cally, female and male are variations on one fundamental genetic
pattern. Anthropological intercultural surveys have shown that males
and females in widely varying cultures will show similar behavioural
patterns and preferences but will differ in some respects due to cultural
norms. Studies in cognitive theory and neurophysiology on the func-
tioning of the brains of males and females show that males and females
may make different use of some parts of their brains, accounting for
phenomena such as the fact that males seem to be better in rnath, females
in languages. On the other hand, not all males are better in math or
worse in languages than all females and vice versa. It has also been shown
that in different circumstances, for example, if males receive more
attention with respect to language skills at school and females with math,
the differences in test results also become smaller. These results would
seem to confirm that there are no absolute differences between males
and females and that influences on the functioning of the two genders
is part nature, part culture.
Since research into areas such as biology, anthropology, cognitive
theory and brain physiology apparently cannot at this time create firm
theories to~xplain and predict the differences in the functioning ofmen
and women, such research, when applied to everyday life, does not seem
to be able to take us beyond the commonly held perception that
describing gender differences takes us into a murky, grey area of
sameness and difference. Perhaps what we need is a less scientific and
more general and pragmatic means of distinguishing images and roles
ofmen and women: we could look for criteria on a social-politicallevel.
One could attempt to take one's point of departure in the concrete
results ofrecent changes in gender roles in western culture and to project
from that what the best way is to organise male and female roles in
society in the future. But here too, we lack helpful answers. Our society
is faced at present with a broad social agenda formulated by those who
would like to give concrete expression to the notion of women's
liberation. Some of the items on this agenda are: altering perceptions of
social roles, having men care for children and the home, seeing to it that
women are as well educated and as prepared for society as possible,
helping women who get into difficulties with the male social and
political order, and working on making society aware of damaging
patterns of behaviour of males towards females. The problem with
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analysing this social agenda is that it does not form one coherent whole,
Some of these initiatives serve to maintain traditional structures and
serve the needs of women, for example, increased awareness of and
proteetion against spousal abuse. Other points on the social agenda
concern matters such as equal job opportunities, equal pay, and positive
action to help women catch up with men in the workplace. It seems to
me that pragmatism and responding to the needs ofwomen governs the
"progressive" social agenda, rather than abstract theories. This is of
course a very good thing because it means that women are getting the
practical support which they need. For theory formation, however, it
becomes quite a muddie for someone looking for dear theories to
determine what the leading ideas of such social reform are.
Another difficulty with using the present liberating social agenda to
create guidelines for the future is that it is difficult to estimate what the
impact is of the changes being made or their consequences for society
and male-female relationships. Views on this differ widely. Some say
that liberating women will mean the downfall ofvalues, the family, and
society. This seems to me an overly pessimistic view. Moreover, it is
one-sided in the sense that it blames many social ills on the changing
roles ef.morhers in the family while ignoring other factors which may
lead to malaise in a society, induding matters such as the economie
situation of a country, job opportunities, dedining values, and genera-
tions of absent fathers. Others say the impact ofwomen's liberation is
not positive because in the end it will have only minimal results. Of
those who say that, the most pessimistic view is that we need po do a
great deal more to ensure that the process of the liberation ofwomen is
not bogged down or even turned back in ever changing social conditions
and perceptions. Betty Friedan, for example, in her book The Second
Stage warns against being overly optimistic about the achievements of
the women's movement. She argues against optimism by referring to
the historicallesson of the dedine of the first feminist movement in the
early years ofour century, when women gained the right to vote. After
that right was won, the women's movement dedined, only being revived
in the 1960's because of new social conditions in western countries."
In the 1990's, Friedan's warning seems apt. There seems to be quite
an onslaught on the women's movement at present. Outside the
movement, a new image battle seems to have arisen, one which can be
called in gender typing terminology "reverting to type". Ifgender typing
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depends on the creation of clear and stabie types, as has been argued,
there will be astrong tendency to reject complex variations on the type
and to revert to old types. (This is the case not only in male-female
typing but also in the related area mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, that of ethnicity). The result of this reversion is that feminists
are once more being depicted as unattractive and out ofdate and/or that
the people who were never convineed by feminism in the first place can
now openly make this claim. Inaddition, the old strategy of"divide and
conquer" has re-emerged. Women are being divided once more by the
promise of equal opportunities and careers for those women who
conform to increasingly conservative standards. Feminists have also
been remorselessly attacked with the new catch phrase of the 90's,
"political correctness". Under this label, feminism has been identified
with petty tyrrany arising from the desire to promote the interests of a
minority; of reacting in an unreasonable way to the standards set up by
a presumably reasonable, intelligent and tolerant society; and in its most
extreme form, the political correctness attack takes the self-pitying form
of a clearly powerful majority claiming to be themselves repressed by
feminism. These tendencies are, moreover, not harmless rhetoric: the
recent rev~kingoflegislation concerning positive action in various states
of the USA is a grim reminder to women and minorities that their
social-political power is limited and hence that their tights can easily be
taken away.
Besides the battle for ideas, images, and the future ofsociety, women
are (rightly or wrongly) internalising the social problems of our tjrne
and culture. The crumbling of social structures and of traditional
morality in many western countries has led to neo-Conservative move-
ments promising redemption in traditional family values and calling on
women to uphold these values. Since women are once more being held
responsible for the family and blamed for its failures, this places a burden
on the feminist conscience. In addition, women themselves have have
turned inward to reconsider their attitude towards family values for a
practical reason: being faced with the toll on themselves of combining
raising a family with a career,
These developments must surely serve as a warning that a lot still
needs to be done to ensure that women have the freedom to determine
their own livesand fate. We must once more be cautious about thinking
that the bartles for equal opportunities and equality have been won. At
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the same time, the criticisms which have been made of feminism and
the practical difficulties resulting from some points on the feminist
agenda have served to moderate the movement. In our time, there is a
growing awareness on the part offeminism that there are no guarantees
that the course people set out to attain matters such as freedom and
equality will be the best course: women can only fight for what they
think is best. In the 1990's, the realisation has grown that there is no
gender utopia and no easy answers to be found by looking at the present
social situation.
5 The Task of Philosophy
In this climate, what can philosophy mean for the women's movement?
The discussion ofthe history ofviews ofphilosophers on women in this
book may help to analyse what some of the problems are in the way
men and women see each other and in the way they assign roles to each
other. In this sense, this book can be regarded as a consciousness raising
session. But what can philosophy mean for the women's movement in
the rnture? Can philosophy tell us whether the issues discussed in this
book will always be with us or if they can be resolved through social
change? Can it shed light on the question ofwhetherwomen will remain
for a long time to come in the present limbo between traditional roles
and liberation from them?
Philosophy can contribute to the women's movement by analysing
theoretically what is going on in society and in those areas in which
academie research on women is being done. Besides taking up the role
of diagnostician, the philosopher can also attempt to develop theories
on women within all the various philosophical fields. Perhaps the most
worthwhile and challenging task for philosophers is the creation of a
philosophical ethics of how to see women and their roles in society.
Philosophers on the whole have felt so threatened by the women's
movement that they have failed to understand that the primary impulse
ofthis movement is an ethical one. In this sense, the women's movement
is part of the more general social tendeney to realise ethical ideals by
fighting for specific causes. Examples of this tendency is the support
people give to Amnesty International, the environmental movement,
and the development of the third world.'
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Can philosophy aid both society and the women's movement by
developing an "ethics of sexual difference", to quote Irigaray? Philoso-
phy cannot and may not teU people what to do, but because of its
theoretical strength, it can aid in clarifying ethical positions and formu-
lating which values would fit into a consistent pattern and argue for the
importance ofhaving certain values. In the present philosophical debate,
two positions are already crystalizing. One is the choice for traditional
liberal values such as freedom of speech, respect for others, and the
freedom of self-expression and self-fulfiUment, free from domination.
Another option is to argue for an ethics of compassion, concern and
care, an ethics ofself-sacrifice,which can form the basis for male-female
relationships as weU as the attitude of people to others in society.
There are, however, a number ofdrawbacks to such a project. In the
first place, philosophy has, as Hegel pointed out, the woeful fate of
always coming into action after the event. Whether philosophical-theo-
retical purists like it or not, society and interest groups inside it are
already diagnosing problems and making decisions to solve them. This
is of course a good thing because society cannot wait for philosophy to
come up with solutions. Besides, the fact that philosophy comes after
the eventean be an advantage because it can then place practise in the
context of theory. A second difficulty is that the male philosophical
establishment is not very interested in supporting the development of
an ethics of sexual difference because it is seen as something women
should develop in their own philosophical sub-class and which only
applies to them. Men have the tendency to apply themselves to these
matters only when they feel that there is either status at stake or a crisis
which needs their attention. In all other cases, women are seen as
responsible for theory formation on women, the family, and the role of
women in society. Lastly, another barrier to overcome is to create a
philosophy which applies to all women, not only a small number of
well-educated middle class western women. Is it possible to create a
philosophical ethics of sexual difference which would transeend these
boundaries?
The task of philosophy in theoretically supporting and furthering
the women's movement is, luckily, not something which has to begin
from point zero. It has been argued that the most revolutionary,
pervasive movement for change in western society in the latter part of
the zoth century has been the women's movement. This movement can
Conclusions. Women, Nature and Culture
provide philosophers with a vast resource of new theoretical concepts.
The task of philosophy is to take up these concepts and to make
something of them which will provide society with asolid theoretical
basis for its decisions on male and female.
Women today owe much to the wornen's movement, whether they
regard themselves as part of that movement or not. The women's
movement has been a great ethical accomplishment because it has
succeeded in identifying and to some extent taking down the barriers
that have been put up for women in the public realm. It is also
responsible for the creation ofmore positive self-imagesofwomen. Men
have learned to accept women as more equal to them than in the past
and hopefully will continue to make progress in this area. Women can
rightly be proud of having brought about these changes, for many of
them have been due to their own efforts, hard fought for by women for
themselves and for other women.
Notes
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